Excerpta.

1875–6

What is the Soul?

The Second Paralogism, of Simplicity.

A thing, of which the action cannot be regarded as the concurrence of the action of several things, is simple.

Now the soul, or thinking Ego, is such a thing.

Therefore, &c.

This is the Achilles of all the dialectical syllogisms of pure psychology....

...The simplicity of myself (as a soul) is not really inferred from the proposition, I think; for it already exists in every thought. The proposition, I am simple, must be regarded as an immediate expression of apperception, just as the supposed Cartesian conclusion, cogito, ergo sum, is really tautological, as cogito (= sum cogitans) expressly asserts existence. I am [a] simple [being] means nothing but this — that the representation I does not contain the least multiplicity, and that it is an absolute (although merely logical) unity.

...We have proved that bodies are mere phenomena of our external sense, and not things in themselves. In accordance with this we may say justly, that our thinking subject is not corporeal; viz., that as it is represented to us as an object of the internal sense, it cannot, so far as it thinks, be an object of the external sense, or a phenomenon in space. This is equivalent to saying: thinking beings, as such, can

never be represented to us among external intuitions; or, we cannot intuite their thought, consciousness, desires, &c., externally; for all these must come before the internal sense. This argument indeed appears to be also the natural and popular one, which seems to have satisfied even the most ordinary understandings, so that from very early times they began to consider souls as totally distinct from bodies.

Now extension, incompressibility, connexion, and motion — in short, all that our external senses only can give us — are not, and indeed do not contain, thought, feeling, desire, or resolve, which are not at all objects of external intuition.

Nevertheless, <u>that</u> something which lies at the basis of external phenomena — which so affects our sense as to give it the representations of space, matter, form, &c. — that something, I say, considered as a noumenon (or perhaps better as a transcendental object), might also at the same time be the subject of thoughts, although we may not be able to obtain any intuition of mental states (but only of space and its determinations), through the means by which our external sense is affected. But this something is not extended, impenetrable, or composite, because all these predicates only concern sensibility and its intuition, so far as we are affected by that sort of objects (otherwise unknown

to us. Yet these expressions by no means declare to us what sort of an object it is, but only this, that the predicates of external phenomena cannot be applied to it, considered as an object in itself, and without reference to external senses. But the predicates of the internal sense — representation and thinking — do not contradict it. Consequently, even admitting the simplicity of its nature, the human soul is not at all proved to be distinct from matter, as regards their respective substrata, when considered, (as it should be) merely as a phenomenon.

If matter were a thing per se, it would, as a composite being, be altogether different from the soul, as a simple being. But it is only an external phenomenon, of which the substratum is not cognised by any producible predicates. I might, then, be quite justified in assuming of this substratum that it was in itself simple, although in the way which it affects our senses it produces in us the intuition of extension, and, along with it, of composition. It might follow that this substance, to which extension is added by reference to our external sense, is accompanied by thoughts in itself, which though their own peculiar internal sense can be represented with consciousness. In this way the very same thing which in one relation is called

corporeal, is at the same time in another called a thinking being, whose thoughts indeed we cannot intuite, but only their evidences, in phenomena. We should thus get rid of the expression, that souls only (as being a peculiar sort of substances) think; we should rather use the ordinary phrase, that men think; that is to say, that the very same thing which is extended as an external phenomenon, is internally (in itself) a subject not composite, but simple and thinking.

But, without admitting such hypotheses, we may observe in general, that if I mean by soul a thinking being per se, the very question is improper, if we mean to ask whether it is of the same kind, or not, as matter (which is not a thing per se, but only a sort of representation in us); for it is self-evident that a thing per se must be of a different nature from the determinations which merely constitute its states.

But, if we compare the thinking Ego, not with matter, but with the intelligible something at the basis of the external phenomena, which we call matter, as we know nothing of this latter, we cannot assert that the soul differs from it in any way internally.

Accordingly, simple consciousness is not a cognition of the simple nature of our subject, so far as it is to

be distinguished as such from matter as a composite existence.

But if this concept of simplicity is useless in the only case where it could be of service (that is, to determine the peculiar and distinguishing feature of our subject when I compare myself with the objects of external experience) we may fairly despair of ever knowing that I, the soul (a name for the transcendental object of the internal sense) am simple. This expression has no application extending to real objects, and cannot possibly, therefore, enlarge our knowledge.

If these remarks are true, the whole of rational psychology falls to the ground with its principal support; and we can as little here as elsewhere hope to extend our information by pure concepts (still less by consciousness, the mere subjective form of all our concepts). More especially, the fundamental notion of a simple nature is such, that it cannot be found in any experience at all; so that there is no way of reaching it as an objectively valid concept. Kant.

Kant's Crit. Phil. Vol. 3. Trans. by John P. Mahaffy.

Fr. D. Lobbe In his "God in History", Bunsen shows that there is a moral unity in history; that there exists a continuity of Forces in the Spiritual world; that the same Divine work has been more or less rapidly going on everywhere

Frohschammer.

Personality of God

Prof. Frohschammer on Strauss's "Old Faith & New". - The assertion that the notion of personality implies limitation and is applicable only to what is finite and relative, but not to the absolute, is taken from Fichte, and is by no means correct. This will be clearly shown by a deeper consideration of the essential elements of personality. These are - existence, consciousness of this existence, and control over it. Distinction from and therefore limitation by others is not an essential element of personality, but an accidental sign of relative personality. (An absolute personality cannot therefore be said to be impossible, for it may find in itself, in the constituent elements of its existence, without the necessity of any other being, the distinctions necessary for personality Consciousness. (The careful reader, says the London Qu. Rev. for Jan. 1874, for. wh. we quote, will see how fine a glimpse this sentence gives us into the doctrine of the Trinity. Compare it, however, with Schelling's notions of the self-limitations of Deity. E. S.)

Neither is personality essentially subject to limitation in regard to action. Ac. to Strauss's theory, the more perfect the personality the greater the limitation. Not so.

If we define God by other predicates of human perfection, we must not deny Him

the highest phase of it, must not regard Him as less than personal. That would be imperfection. It may be said that God is super-personal. ib.

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F. P. Cobbe

In opposition to Darwin's moral theory, I think we are justified in concluding that the moral history of Mankind, so far as we know it, gives no countenance to the hypothesis that Conscience is the result of certain contingencies in our development, and that it might at an earlier stage have been moulded into quite another form, causing Good to appear to us Evil, and Evil Good. Frances Power Cobbe.

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Hereditary Genius: An Inquiry into its Laws and Consequences; by Francis Galton, F. R. S. 1 vol. 8 vo. pp. 390. Macmillan, 1869. Dr. G's main doctrine, he has, I believe, demonstrated with mathematical certainty, viz., that all mental faculties, from the most ordinary to the highest and apparently most erratic forms of genius, the various gifts of the Statesman, Soldier, artist, and man of letters, are distributed according to conditions among wh. inheritance by descent of blood occupies the foremost place. ib.

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Universality of belief in Im.

The religious history of Egypt is full both of encouragement and of warning. The earnestness,

nay, rather the vehemence of the national faith in Immortality, several thousand years before Christianity is supposed to have afforded the first certainty thereof, is one of the most important facts of history. Miss F. P. Cobbe's Notice of Bunsen's "God in History".

Buddhism

Bunsen says: "Our own Conception of Buddha is diametrically opposed to that of Burnouf and all his successors (with the exception of Mohl, Obry, and Tancker) in so far that according to them the founder of the most widely diffused creed on the face of the earth, a creed wh. has introduced or levived civilization amongst all these millions, was a teacher of atheism and materialism. "For so we must denominate a system which should teach that there is absolutely nothing but non-existence, therefore in no sense a God; that annihilation is the highest happiness the soul can strive after, and that it is the highest glory of the great saint to have taught the way thereto. If this were so, the Buddha would at least lie beyond the scope of our present survey. For there is no more utter denial of a Divine order of the world than the assumption that existence is nothing but a curse."

Religion of the Greeks

"We are prepared to maintain", says Bunsen, "that the whole life of classical antiquity, espe-

cially that of the Hellenes, shows itself far more interpenetrated with prayer and religious feeling than does that of the modern Christian world."

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Bunsen says that while with the Hebrews the "soul" was synonymous with "self," with the Greeks the body was the "self", and the soul a separate entity. The Hebrew patriarch could talk even of savory meat as a thing his "soul" loved. The Greek poet (Iliad i) spoke of the wrath of Achilles –

> Which many thousand souls of the sons of the heroes
> Sent down to hell; but stretched themselves on the earth
> A prey to the ravening dogs.

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J. F. Clarke on Buddhism

It (Buddhism) is a Pantheistic religion, teaching that Man is to go on forever, and that even when in the lowest depths of hell he is free to turn to heaven. It had been changed it is a religion without a God. In one sense it is, for with the Buddhists God is the Infinite of which we know nothing. Buddha, "the knowing one", is their God. In this respect they are like those Christians who worship Christ as God.

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F. P. Cobbe

Ancient and modern Buddhist literature bears too many testimonies to the atheism of the system, and too often defines the future Nirvana as empty nothingness, to permit us to deny that

philosophic Buddhism is a religion without a God and without a heaven.

... Has man indeed no sense of immortality wh. makes him start and shudder at the endless destruction of Nirvana? The very opposite lesson is taught by the story of Buddhism ... When Buddhism became the creed of millions, their religious sentiment remodeled their creed, and transformed an atheistic philosophy into a devout and hopeful religion. Frances P. Cobbe.

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Every Buddhist is admonished to wish well, before he sleeps, to all mankind.

All virtues, says Müller, in the Buddhist religion are said to spring from maitri, & this maitri (Eugène Burnouf affirms) can only be translated by the word charity.

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Dreams Rev. Humphrey of Cambridge, Eng., defines dreams as not a normal accompaniment of sleep, but rather a result of the abnormal or imperfect condition of the organ of mental action. In the natural state, he says, we should pass from wakefulness to complete unconsciousness, and, vice versa, almost instaneously, and this is the case with many persons. More frequently, however, the transition is protracted, and stages are observed in wh. the sleep is but partial. In this

case the cerebral organ being in an imperfect state, its action is imperfect, and the first effect of the lessening of its vital vigor is a loss of the highest form of mental power – the control over the mental operations; and, in this condition, the thoughts ramble unchecked, chase one another confusedly over the mental field, and give rise to all sorts of incongruities of the imagination. Jan. 1874.

F. P. Cobbe

Unconscious Cerebration: We have credited to the Unconscious Brain the following powers and faculties: –

1. It not only remembers as much as the Conscious Self can recall, but often much more. It is even doubtful whether it may not be capable, under certain conditions, of reproducing every impression ever made upon the senses during life.

2. It can understand what words or things are sought to be remembered, and hunt them up through some recondite process known only to itself, till it discovers & pounces on them.

3. It can fancy the most beautiful pictures and also the most terrible ones, and weave ten thousand fables with inexhaustible invention.

4. It can perform the exceedingly difficult task of mental arrangement & logical division of subjects.

5. It can transact all the mechanical business of walking, reading, writing, sewing, playing, &c. &c.

6. It can tell the hour in the middle of the night without a timepiece.

In these operations (of unconscious cerebration) the balance of evidence inclines to the Materialists' doctrine that the brain itself performs the mental processes in question, and, to use Vogt's expression, "secretes Thought" automatically and spontaneously. Miss Cobbe.

[This does not at all follow. When we take in the wider sweep of phenomena revealed in the double Consciousness of somnambulism a very different solution is suggested. E.S.]

When we place the phenomena of Unconscious Thought on one side, and over against them our Conscious Selves, we obtain, I think, a new and vivid sense of the separation, not to say the antithesis, which exists between the two. Not to talk about the distinction between object and subject, or dwell on the absurdity of the proposition that we ourselves are only the sum-total of a series of cerebrations, the recognition of that fact that our brains sometimes think without us, seems to enable us to view our connexion with them in quite a new light... The severance becomes not only cogitable but manifest. ... Let us then accept cheerfully the possibility, perhaps the probability, that Science ere long will proclaim the dogma, "Matter can think." .. Admitting that our brains accomplish much without our conscious guidance, will help us to realize that our relation to them is of a variable,

an intermittent, and (we may therefore venture to hope) of a terminable kind. ... Though we may succeed in proving "that the Brain can think without the Conscious Man", the great Converse theorem "that the Conscious Man can think without a Brain", has as yet received no jot of direct evidence. Miss Cobbe.

(It is evident that Miss Cobbe has not sufficiently pondered the facts of double consciousness to write with full precision on this subject. E.S.)

Is Man a Free Agent?

The law of man's very nature is to secure himself the greatest possible amount of happiness, and avoid all the misery he can. This law binds man fast in fate, if you please to call it so; God has so constituted him, and he cannot help it; he has no power to change his own nature, nor to annul the laws of his being. Motive influence, motive power, it is, then, that governs men in all their actions. .. With all his vaunted power of will man cannot prefer misery to happiness. ... He cannot believe that which appears to him false, nor disbelieve what he knows to be true. He cannot love that which appears to him hateful, nor hate what seems to him lovely. ...

As a physical being man is governed by laws as fixed and immutable as those that govern the world that he inhabits. The supposed power of free agency does not, then, inhere in man's body. It must reside, if anywhere, in his mind. .. Is the

E. E. Guild.

Free Agency

mind governed by no law, controlled by no power superior to itself? ... In the universe there is no one thing that is not governed by unchanging laws. ... To suppose that the mind of man is subject to no law is not only contrary to all analogy, but it supposes also that the mind is not responsible for its actions; for where there is no law there can be no violation of law. I know not how the idea of the absolute liberty of the human mind may appear to others, but to me it seems as plain and obvious an untruth as ever has concocted in the human brain. ... Man has no distinct faculty called the will. Thought precedes all voluntary human action. ....

Certain actions tend to promote happiness, others misery. The divine intent would seem to be that Man shall learn by experience to distinguish between the two. ... This great law
X of necessity, which compels men to prefer happiness to misery, will, in its steady operation, finally work out the emancipation of every sentient, rational being from ignorance and passion, which constitute the source and origin of all human errors and mistakes.

.. Motives spring up spontaneously in the mind as the result of man's innate faculties; or are given rise to by outward circumstances and external influences which are brought to bear upon him. ... Man is not a free agent in the sense

that he can act contrary to his own will; nor in opposition to the strongest motive; nor in opposition to the will of God. E. E. Guild. v. B. of Light, Feb. 7. 1874.

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Putting the three possible hypotheses of the universe side by side — that which regards it as entirely composed of material atoms, that which regards it as consisting altogether of forces, and that wh. regards it as a combination of the two, we have no hesitation in saying that the first is that which we can give up with the least violation of all the fundamental principles of human knowledge. Morell. p. 681.

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Buddhism Buddha taught that those who have kept the commandments, given alms, and lived righteously will after death go to heavenly places furnished with houris more or less numerous, according to the amount of merit they have acquired. And those who have no merit will at death go to hell, and remain there until Kam is exhausted, when they will be born again as animals or men; or, if there is any merit still belonging to them, they may even go to heaven . . .

The attainment of Nirvanee extinguishes all further sorrow, stays all further change, and causes eternal rest in a state of perfect happiness, where there is no birth, nor old age, nor death . . . The religion of Buddha meddled not with a Beginning, which it could not fathom,

avoided the question of a Deity it could not comprehend, and left open to endless discussion that problem which it could not solve – the ultimate reward of the perfect. It dealt with life as it found it; it declared all good which led to its sole object – the diminution of the misery of all sentient beings. It laid down rules of conduct wh. have scarcely been surpassed, and held out reasonable hopes of a future of the most perfect happiness. Its proofs rest upon the assumptions that the reason of man is his surest guide, and that the law of nature is perfect justice.

... The Buddhist believes that every act, word, or thought has its consequence, which will appear sooner or later in the present or some future state. This he calls Kam, wh. may be translated fate or consequence.

... There is no God who judges of these acts, and awards recompense or punishment, but the reward or punishment is simply the inevitable effect of Kam, which works out its own results.

... Buddhism teaches that the relative positions of all beings are perfectly just, being self-caused by the good and evil conduct of previous existences.

There is no real or permanent satisfaction in any state of transmigration. Nirvana must therefore be the object of the truly wise man.

The theory that the various conditions of men and animals are caused by good and bad acts and thoughts in previous generations is orthodox Buddhism. ... Buddha taught a religion of which the wheel was the only proper symbol; for his theory, though professing to be complete, dealt with but a limited round of knowledge, ignored the beginning, and was equally vague as to the end. He neither taught of a God, the Author of existence, nor of a heaven the absorber of existence; but restrained his teaching within what he believed to be the limits of reason.

... The great characteristic of Buddha's preaching may be summarized in this one maxim: "If a man does me wrong, and I respond with love, the fragrance returns to me; the harm returns to him."

Notice (in Univers. Quarterly for Jan. 1874 of "The Wheel of the Law," Buddhism illustrated from Siamese sources; by Henry Alabaster.

Substance

Hume says: "We have no clear ideas of anything but perceptions; a substance is something quite different from perceptions; hence we have no knowledge of a substance. Inherence ('inhesion') in something is regarded as necessary for the subsistence of our perceptions, but in reality, they need no substrate. The question whether perceptions inhere in a material or immaterial substance cannot be answered, because it has no intelligible sense."

J. S. Mill – Herbert Spencer.

Substances J. S. Mill

Substances, bodily and Mental. Of the first all we know is the sensations wh. they give us and the order of the occurrence of these sensations, i.e. it is the hidden cause of our sensations. Of the second, that it is the unknown recipient of them. J. S. Mill.

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H. Spencer or Idealism

Anti-Realistic beliefs have never been held at all. They are but ghosts of beliefs, haunting those mazes of verbal propositions in which metaphysicians habitually lose themselves. Berkeley was not an Idealist: he never succeeded in expelling the consciousness of an external reality, as we saw when analysing his language and his reasonings.

[To prove the subjectivity of heat, Berkeley asks 'Is your material substance a senseless being, or a being endowed with Sense & perception?' Berkeley expects his interlocutor to say it is senseless; & Hylas does reply 'It is senseless, no doubt.' But Spencer argues that Hylas had no business to say this. He should have answered to the question of Philonous simply thus: 'I cannot say whether the material substance is senselss or not.' 'Like you I know nothing of any qualities of bodies save those I immediately perceive through the senses.'

Thus (H. S. argues) he detects Berkeley in recognizing that very existence which B. pretends not to recognize. Thus B's argument is brought to a dead-lock at the outset, whatever answer be given. His argument cannot proceed if he admits that it is impossible to say whether or no matter has sensibility.]

Hume did not in the least doubt the existence of Matter or of Mind: he simply persuaded himself that certain arguments ought to make him doubt. Nor was Kant a Kantist; that Space and Time are nothing more than subjective forms was with him, as it has been and will be with every other, a verbally-intelligible proposition, but a proposition which can never be rendered into thought, and can never be believed therefore. ... For once let me re-insist on the all-important distinction, ignored in metaphysical controversies, between thinking severately the components of a proposition, and thinking the proposition itself; which consists in combining the two terms of the alleged relation. ... Metaphysics in all its Anti-Realistic developments is a disease of language. ... Realism contents itself with affirming that the object of cognition is an independent existence, and Anti-Realism has shown that the cognition of it is entirely relative.

The relation of Subject and Object is a dictum of Consciousness vb. Must be thus provisionally accepted. ... Once more we are brought round to the conclusion repeatedly reached by other routes that behind all manifestations, inner and outer, there is a Power manifested. Here, as before, it has become clear that while the nature of this Power cannot be known — while we lack the faculty of framing even the dimmest conception of it, yet its universal presence is the absolute

pace without which there can be no relative facts. Every feeling and thought being but transitory — an entire life made up of such feelings & thoughts being also but transitory — nay the objects amid which life is passed, though less transitory, being severally in course of losing their individualities, quickly or slowly; we learn that the one thing permanent is the Unknowable Reality hidden under all these changeable shapes.

Herbert Spencer, Princ. of Psychology. v. 2, p. 502, 3.

Weberweg on H. Spencer's Philosophy

The persistence of force is assumed by Spencer to be a universal and necessary axiom, but it is applied indiscriminately to the persistence of phenomenal force, of which the quantum is assumed to be necessarily the same, and to the unknown and unknowable being or force which is behind all phenomena. That there is such a being or something is evident from the result of the generalizations which are necessary to science. Science and religion, so far from being hostile, are at one in that they both assume a one — a Cause — a permanent, all-pervading force. But revealed religion or scientific theology is impossible, because, under the law of evolution and development there must be endless change and variation in the conceptions of men concerning this entity, which their unformulated consciousness requires them to believe, but which the formulating consciousness of each generation must formulate differently.

H. Spencer Ethical truths and sentiments are thus accounted for: 'The experiences of utility, organized and consolidated through all past generations of the human race, have been producing corresponding nervous modifications, which, by continued transmission and accumulation, have become in us certain faculties of moral intuition – certain emotions responding to right and wrong conduct which have no apparent basis in the individual experiences of utility.' Ueberweg p. 433, v. 2.

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Huxley It is undoubtedly true of all the simple sensations, that, as Berkeley says, their <u>esse</u> is <u>percipi</u> – their being is to be perceived or known. But that which perceives or knows is mind or Spirit; and therefore that knowledge which the senses give us is, after all, a knowledge of Spiritual phenomena. Matter and motion (says Berkeley) are known to us only as forms of consciousness; their being is to be conceived or known; and the existence of a state of consciousness apart from a thinking mind is a contradiction in terms.

The thorough Materialist asserts that there is a something which he calls the substance of matter; that this something is the cause of all phenomena, whether material or mental; that it is self-existent and eternal, &c. Berkeley, on the contrary, asserts with equal confidence that there is no substance of matter but only a substance

of mind, which he terms Spirit; that there are two Kinds of spiritual substance, the one eternal and uncreated, the substance of the Deity, the other created, and once created, naturally eternal; that the universe, as known to created spirits, has no being in itself, but is the result of the action of the Substance of the Deity on the substance of these spirits.

In contradiction to which bold assertion Locke affirms that we simply know nothing about substance of any kind. I cannot but believe that the judgment of Locke is that which Philosophy will accept as her final decision. "Whether" either mind or matter has a "substance" or not is a problem which we are incompetent to discuss. Huxley.

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Th. Ribot on Lewes

Are there two distinct existences, matter and Spirit? – is there only one? And which? Such is, when we reflect upon it, the point in debate in the question which occupies us.

The idealist says, There is only one existence, the mind. Analyse the Conception of matter, and you will discover that it is only a mental Synthesis of qualities.

The realist will say, There is only one existence, matter. Analyse your conception of mind, and you will discover that it is only a synthesis of qualities (states of consciousness) which on the activities of the organism. The Synthesis is the organism.

The sceptic, in agreement with both, and in disagreement with both, says: Your matter is only a floating succession of phenomena; your mind a floating succession of ideas.

The dualist says, There is spirit, and there is matter; each is essentially distinct; they have nothing in common. Nevertheless they can act, one upon the other. How? That is a mystery.

No doubt; but as Philosophy cannot be contented with phrases, it remarks that where Realism and Idealism admit only one factor, dualism introduces two; consequently it rejects it in virtue of the rule, Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem.

Idealism tells us the esse of objects is percipi. But can we assume, 'I cannot conceive things otherwise, therefore they cannot exist otherwise.'? Idealism here assumes that human knowledge is absolute, not relative; that man is the measure of everything.

Perception is the identity of the ego and the non-ego — the relation of two terms, the tertium quid of two united forces; as water is the identity of oxygen and hydrogen. The ego can never have any knowledge of the non-ego in which it (the ego) is not indissolubly bound up; as oxygen can never unite with hydrogen to form water without merging itself & the hydrogen in a tertium quid.

English Psychology. Trans. fr. French of Th. Ribot. He is here treating of G. H. Lewes. . . London: K. S. King & Co. 1873.

We admit, then, with the idealists, that our knowledge is subjective; but we believe in the existence of an external world, altogether independent of the perceiving subject. The argumentation by which idealism seeks to disturb this belief is vitiated by the assumption that our knowledge is the criterion of existence; this is conferring upon it an absolute value that it does not possess. ib.

Law of Evolution

The German physiologists have established that an individual organisms progress consists in the passage from a homogeneous to a heterogeneous structure. Every germ at its origin is an uniform substance, in the double sense of its texture, and its chemical composition; by successive and almost infinite differentiations, that complex combination of tissues and organs which constitutes the animal or the adult plant is produced. This is the history of every organism. Mr. Herbert Spencer proposes to show that this law of organic progress is the law of all progress; that the development of the earth, of the life on its surface, of society, of government, of industry, of commerce, of language, of literature, of science, and of art, supposes the same evolution of the simple into the complex by successive differentiations. ib.

Innate Ideas

In Spencer's system that innateness on wh. so much stress has been laid is explained by inheritance. ib.

In the sense then that certain pre-established relations corresponding to relations in the surrounding medium exist in the nervous system, there is truth in the doctrine of forms of thought, not the truth maintained by its supporters, but a parallel truth. These pre-established internal relations, altho' independent of the experience of the individual, are not independent of general experience; they have been established by the accumulated experience of preceding organisms. They are legacies, both capital and interest. And thus the European arrives at having some cubic inches more brain than the Papuan; that savages, incapable of counting beyond the number of their fingers, and speaking a formless language, have, in the course of ages, Newtons and Shakspeares for their descendants.

Cause . . . Spencer says: "The idea of cause will govern at the end, as it has done at the beginning. The idea of cause cannot be abolished, except by the abolition of thought itself."

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Substance J. S. Mill says, that all the philosophers who have closely examined the question have decided that there is no need of substance, except as the support and the bond of phenomena. Let us, then, simply lay aside this support out of our thought, and suppose that the phenomena remain, and that they form the same groups and the same series, thanks to some other agent,

or even without any agent, if this be not an internal law, and we shall arrive, without substance, at the consequence in view of which substance was supposed.

.. You reduce the ego to a series of states of consciousness, but there is something wanting to unite those states to one another. If you have a necklace of beads, and you remove the string, what remains? Separate beads, but no longer a necklace. Mill seems to admit that the bond, the 'organic union' which exists between past and present consciousness, in constituting memory also constitutes the ego.

'I hold it indubitable', he says, 'that there is something real in this bond, real as the sensations themselves; and which is not simply a product of the laws of thought without anything which corresponds to it. The precise nature of the process by which we know it is an ample subject for discussion. ... I do not attempt to decide upon it.' 'But that original element which has no community of nature with anything answering to our names, and to which we can give no other name than its own without implying some false or unsteady theory is the ego. As such I recognize in the myself – in my own mind – a reality different from that real existence as a permanent possibility, which is the only one that I recognize in matter.' Ribot on Mill.

"C'est sans organe qu'on pense", a dit Aristote: cette haute proposition est demeurée inébranlable, et vraisemblement, pour qui saura l'entendre, ne sera jamais ébranlée. Félix Ravaisson.

The Brain as the organ of thought.

"L'expérience et l'observation nous apprennent ici que les diverses parties des hémisphères cérébraux, et surtout de leur substance grise, peuvent se suppléer; qu'une partie relativement minime, surtout chez les animaux, peut suffire à remplir les fonctions du tout; et conséquemment, je le répète, la doctrine de la localisation des diverses facultés instinctives, intellectuelles, et affectives n'a aucune consistance." M. Vulpian.

... Il n'a donc pas seulement été trouvé vrai qu'une faible partie du cerveau suffit à la vigueur à toutes ses fonctions; il a été trouvé vrai qu'à tout le cerveau peuvent suppléer, pour les fonctions supérieures qui lui appartiennent en propre, les parties du système nerveux qui, dans l'état normal et habituel, ne servent qu'aux fonctions immédiatement inférieures. C'est dire que ce n'est pas l'organe qui cause la fonction, comme le matérialisme le soutient, mais que c'est la fonction, l'action, qui, sous certaines conditions physiques, s'assujettit et s'approprie l'organe.

Ravaisson
p. 184

Ravaisson — Swedenborg.

Il faudrait définir l'homme non une intelligence servie par des organes, mais une intelligence servie par des intelligences inférieures.
(Ravaisson p. 193). M. Durand (de Gros.)

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Against Spencer

Difficilement donc établira-t-on que la raison soit en nous, comme nous avons vu que l'entend à peu près M. Herbert-Spencer, le résultat accumulé de ce qu'il y a de Constant dans les perceptions des Choses du dehors. Loin que Chacune de ces perceptions explique l'intelligence, l'intelligence seule les explique. Ravaisson. p. 211.

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"Notre âme, dit Pascal, jetée dans le corps, où elle trouve nombre, temps, dimension, raisonne là-dessus, et ne peut Croire autre Chose." Rien de tout cela pourtant ne lui est intelligible que par ce qui lui vient de son propre fonds. (Cf. Heredity?)

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Swedenborg

There are no other spirits who talk with man than such as were once men upon earth; and what is singular, when a man thinks that the Holy Spirit converses with him or operates in him, the spirit also thinks that he is the Holy Spirit. Hence appears the great danger in which man is when he speaks with spirits, or feels their operation manifestly ... When Spirits begin to talk with Men they must not be believed. Swedenborg.

SCIENTIFIC MATERIALISM.

LECTURE BY THE REV. JAMES T. BIXBY AT THE LOWELL INSTITUTE.

The fourth lecture of the course at the Lowell Institute, upon "Physical Theories and Religious Faith," was given on Saturday evening by the Rev. James T. Bixby of Belfast, Me. Our age, said the speaker, has made so many discoveries in the material realm, that it thinks that in the word matter it has found the key to all enigmas. Our modern materialists look upon matter as constituting the only reality, the one substance of all that actually is. Its atoms are eternal, and, by their varied arrangements and properties, constitute all the forms and energies of the world. Mind is only a mode of motion, immaterial spirit a speculative fable, and the idea of creative power superfluous. Such positions are so repugnant to healthy reason that lately it has been much modified so as to bring it more within the limits of fact and good sense, and this revised form is called scientific materialism. It traces all the present phenomena of the universe back to the original simple nebular condition and primæval atoms, from which, by evolution, all has come forth. What these atoms really are, and what the connection between them and mind and soul, whether or not there was a God as their creator, the scientific materialists will not say; they declare the matter unknowable. All we know is, that matter and mind are inseparable, and that the laws of the one are the laws of the other.

Now, this position of materialism is really *anti*-scientific. No induction can ever show that matter was eternal and uncreated and all that really is, nor can any experiments establish it. If the universe had a commencement, that commencement, from the nature of the case, was supernatural, and the absence of the supernatural *since* creation cannot disprove that creation never took place.

Professor Tyndall's view that in matter is the promise and potency of all terrestrial life is also an extra-scientific dictum, incapable of inductive proof, and as much or more an act of faith as the Christian's belief in a Creator.

It is a common demand of the materialist upon the believers in soul,—"Show me this soul, and then I will believe in it." But neither can the materialist show or see a single atom. It is beyond the power of any microscope. Nor can he show matter except through impressions of the mind or states of consciousness. Our knowledge of our own soul is thus the direct knowledge, and our knowledge of matter only an indirect inference from this. No thinking about thought will ever show that there is no such thing as thought.

The atoms are not sufficient of themselves to explain the universe, because no atoms stand in contact. There are void spaces between them, through which force acts; and no other kind of force can act in void space except immaterial power.

When we look at the atoms through the mental microscope, we see that they must be, on the materialistic hypothesis, living, thinking beings. For life and mind are facts of existence and cannot have been added to existence by the atoms, for that requires creative power. To be developed from the atoms they must have been beforehand latent in the atoms. Their outcome in the combinations of atoms shows that they already existed in germ in each atom. Materialism is, therefore, really a form either of polytheism or pantheism. If the atoms are indivisible, ultimate things, each is an infinitesimal immortal, in whom life and mind are latent. If the atoms are divisible and all matter one continuous whole, all matter is an infinite eternal being, possessed of the germs of vitality and consciousness. The question between the materialist and the Christian reduces itself to this issue, whether the life and consciousness which has formed the universe was at first fully developed, free and superior to matter, or was originally only latent and in germ and gradually unlocked by the combinations of matter. Now, such a germinal, or infantile, Deity as materialization implies is unequal to the intelligent guidance of the world and superintending the infinity of wise, admirable and profound processes that have gone on and are still going on in the world.

Herbert Spencer seems to think that these processes are too numberless and intricate for a conscious mind to direct and carry on. Omniscience, he imagines, would have to neglect much, and Omnipotence be distracted. But if there is any inconceivability or improbability in supposing conscious intelligence and will to guide all the processes of the world, there is a hundred times more in supposing a world-life and mind, for ages asleep or infantile and only gradually unfolding itself, to have directed the universe; and it is a thousand times as inconceivable that the mere chance grouping of atoms or the undirected dance of atoms should have built the world.

changes in the indebtedness of which are reported by the local papers, include fifteen which have reduced and two which have increased their town debts. The aggregate reduction in the fifteen is $137,294, and the increase in the two is $5205. One other town, Leicester, has paid off its whole debt and adopted the principle of cash payments. If we can suppose that the policy of the towns reported has been generally followed, the reduction of municipal indebtedness in Massachusetts during the past year has amounted to several million dollars.

A new line of fortnightly freight steamers between Liverpool and Boston is announced, and the pioneer is to leave the Mersey on Saturday next. This line is the fourth to be established, and when it is in full operation we shall be favored with an average of five steamships a fortnight. We presume, however, that when the St. Lawrence opens the Dominion line terminus will be transferred to Montreal for the summer, as usual, which will leave us two steamers a week. The new line has made an excellent selection of Boston agents, and there is every reason to believe that it will be successful. If it can be firmly established it will serve to bring a large amount of both inward and outward business to this port, to the great advantage of our merchants. We have already facilities sufficient if we know how to utilize them. The new line will do a great service if it becomes a competitor for business in such a way as to regulate freights and keep them at a fair rate,—not too high for the interests of trade, and not ruinously low for the carrying companies.

NEW PUBLICATIONS.

The third of the series of volumes containing brief biographical sketches of European public men, edited by T. W. Higginson, was given to the public last week. Edward King is the author, and it is devoted to the French political leaders, who are not so well known to Americans as most of the Englishmen who were treated of in previous volumes. The persons of whom Mr. King has given graphic and entertaining sketches are, Victor Hugo, Thiers, Gambetta, Simon, MacMahon, Duanloup, Grévy, Laboulaye, Rouher, Duval, the Duc de Broglie, Buffet, the Duc d'Audiffret-Pasquier, Dufaure, Ollivier, Jules Favre, the Comte de Chambord, the Comte de Paris, the Duc d'Aumale, Picard, Rochefort, Perier and Jules Ferry. All these are persons whose names are constantly prominent in the despatches and letters concerning French political affairs, and of whom it is therefore not only interesting but important to know something definite and positive. Mr. King did his work in Paris, where he has lived long enough to be well informed, and where the means of making his sketches accurate and trustworthy were easily accessible. It is hardly necessary to say to this community, where he is so well known, that he is a vigorous and racy writer and well qualified to undertake a work of this kind. These sketches are not formal and dry details of biographical facts, but clear pen-portraits of the subjects in their characters as public men. Whoever reads this book will understand better the significance of every political movement in France, and feel a deeper interest in the fortunes of that new republic.

"Miss Hitchcock's Wedding Dress," by the au-

Causes J. S. Mill says: "The causes with which I concern myself are not efficient but physical causes. They are causes in that sense alone, in which one physical fact is said to be the cause of another. Of the efficient causes of phenomena, or whether any such causes exist, I am not called upon to give an opinion."

Hamilton's doctrine would end in giving to all phenomena an eternal substratum whose causes and effects would be only manifestations in time; thus it is completely opposed in spirit and tendencies to empiricism, whereas Mr. Mill acknowledges nothing but empirical causes.

... The experimental school (J. S. Mill's) proposes to establish that matter is nothing but the permanent possibility of our sensations, and that mind is nothing but the permanent possibility of our states of consciousness; thus approaching Berkeley on the first, and Hume on the second point. ... Our knowledge of mind is, like our knowledge of matter, entirely relative.

.. In so far as it affects the question of immortality, J. S. Mill argues that, It is as easy to conceive of a succession of sentiments, a thread of consciousness eternally prolonged, as of a spiritual substance which always continues to exist; and if there are any arguments in proof, they are as capable of application to the one theory as to the other. (Is not this almost the phenomenism of Hume?) Th. Ribot.

Hamilton - Berkeley - Bain.

If the word spirit means anything, it signifies that which feels. The phenomena which manifest it are sensations, ideas, emotions, and volitions.

J. S. Mill, Logic, book VI., ch. IV.

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"Unconscious Cerebration"

Unconscious mental activity is admitted by Mill but ascribed to "unconscious modifications of the nerves". ..."Organic conditions of the nerves succeed each other so rapidly that the state of consciousness appropriate to each of them cannot be produced."

Hamilton says: "Certain abnormal conditions, such as madness, delirium, somnambulism, reveal to us knowledge, or habits of action which we have no consciousness of possessing in our normal state".

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Berkeley

Tennemann says: "The reasoning of Berkeley has great plausibility, and, if we do not distinguish phenomena from things in themselves, cannot be confuted."

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Bain

It is nevertheless manifest that the nervous power is generated from the action of the nutriment supplied to the body, and is therefore of the class of forces having a common origin, and capable of being mutually transmitted, - including mechanical momentum, heat, electricity, magnetism, and chemical decomposition. The power that animates the human frame and keeps alive the currents of brain,

has its origin in the grand primal source of reviving power, the Sun. Alex. Bain.

Edward Wm Cox's "What Am I? a Popular Introduction to the Study of Psychology. Vol. 1. The Mechanism of Man. London: Longman & Co. 1873."

The body is a structure built of atoms inconceivably small, no two of which touch each other.

... The animal is first a germ, in no manner perceptible to the eye, shaped like the creature it is to become. ... The formative force must be either from within or from without. It must be inherent in the germ, or it must be supplied from some external power.

... E. W. C. thinks "that the body is built up by the vital forces within, and not by any plastic force from without." (Stahl's view).

.. May it not be that the germ is a miniature nerve-system? that there is a formative Nerve Force?

Ac. to Cox, "Life is not the Soul — for vegetables have life and have not souls." "Life is not the Intelligence; Life is not in the bodily structure; Life is not in the nerve-cords; .. Life is in the nerve-centres, — the brain and the ganglions.

... Dr. Bastian says: "When we are able really to explain the reason of the processes by wh. one minute vesicular mass of fatty and albuminized particles develops into a man, another into a fish, and another into an insect, we may then, with a little more show of reason

think of rejecting other more or less similar facts because they are incomprehensible."

"Life is not something perpetually resident in, or belonging to, certain particles or germs. It is the property of certain kinds of matter which we call organized; the presence of life producing the organization".

Alfred Wallace: "Among the lower organisms unknown laws of polarity, akin to those wh. influence the production of crystals, but of infinitely greater complexity, directly cause the development of a great variety of forms; while conditions of existence to a great extent determine the variety of forms that shall arise in each individual case.

"These forms of Animal Life are not fixed, not hereditary, not necessarily the product of like parents; they are continually being created by conversion of vegetable into animal life; and as the probable conclusion from this that the higher forms of animal life are produced by combinations of those lower forms of life developed under conditions. If Dr. Bastian's conclusions are from correct observations, and reasonably deduced, we have before us a grand view of the Genesis of Life, wh. must materially modify present opinions."

. . In reg. to the qu. whether the parentage of the germ is due to the male or the female, C. suggests that we may be constituted by the union of two germs, one being provided by each parent.

C's "presumptive proofs" for the existence of a soul are 1. The general belief of mankind. 2. The admitted universal desire for life after death. 3. The instinctive dread of annihilation. 4. Self-consciousness. Our personality not diminished by the amputation of a limb, &c. 5. Conscious unity. I cannot conceive of myself as constructed of parts.

The soul, if it exists, must be made of some material. If composed of nothing, it would be nothing. If it has form, it must be constructed of something more dense than the medium that surrounds it and in wh. it exists. The Soul, then, is a distinct entity having substance and form. Composed of very refined matter.

Being composed of molecules infinitely finer than those of the body — as fine possibly as those of the comet (wh. tho' occupying millions of miles of space might perhaps be condensed to the size of a common watch) the Soul could permeate the body, infusing itself among all the atoms of which the body is built, and thus occupy the whole frame.

... Mr. Gillingham, a surgical machinist, living at Chard in Somersetshire, is the author of a little book called "The Seat of the Soul," in wh. he contends for the doctrine of a Sp. body. His business is the construction of artificial limbs. In questioning his patients he has got facts from wh. he derived the belief that the Soul continues to occupy the place previously possessed by the limb

when it was clothed with flesh. In supplying an arm for a woman who had been born with only one arm he found that she experienced precisely the same sensations as persons who had been born with two, but had had one amputated. Like them she felt pain, cold, &c. in the fingers, hand, and arm she had never possessed.

... Being composed of atoms infinitely more refined than those of any earthly substance, the Soul can penetrate and pass through the most solid matter – as water penetrates a Sponge.

(Mr. G. learnt that if the amputated arm was placed on a table, the sensation was as if the arm had passed through the table. If attention were distracted, persons would imagine their lost limbs were not wanting.)

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Prof. De Morgan

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Either we have ideas which we do <u>not</u> acquire from or by means of communication with the external world (experience, trial of our senses), or there is a power in the Mind of acquiring a certainty and a generality, which experience <u>alone</u> could not properly give. Prof. De Morgan.

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Descartes' argument for a God

The principal Cartesian argument for a God is: "I have the idea of an infinite and perfect being; but that idea includes his existence as one of his perfections; for he could not be a perfect being if he did not exist: therefore the idea of such a being involves

his existence. In this notion, says Leibnitz (and a multitude of other critics) Descartes was anticipated by Anselm.

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What though the approach of death seem by degrees to enfeeble and at last to suspend the powers of the mind, will not the constitution of nature bid us be of good cheer, seeing that the approach of sleep does the same? And if in some instances death does lie heavy on the trembling spirit, in how many others does it seem to be only cutting the cords that bound it to earth. Rev. J. J. Blunt on Butler

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Henry Rogers

The arguments for the infinite divisibility of matter and for its not being infinitely divisible are both unanswerable, and yet answer one another.

... That there is something we call a cause we believe, but cannot perceive or trace anything more than uniform antecedence and sequence.

... How two such substances as mind and matter, if they be supposed essentially different, can act upon one another, is an inscrutable mystery; and yet those find themselves pressed with difficulties insurmountable who to get rid of it annihilate matter and substitute ideas, or annihilate mind and make matter think.

... In like manner we cannot refute the doctrine of the absolute certainty of human volitions, as

dependent on motive; and can as little eradicate the consciousness which proclaims us to be free, and responsible for our freedom.

We see the reasonableness of either assertion, but the nexus which binds them in harmony baffles our perceptions. Happy he who is willing to believe there are many things true which now sound like contradictions. Henry Rogers.

Soul & Spirit

The word soul differs from spirit as the species from the genus: soul being limited to a spirit that either is or has been connected with a body, or material organization; while spirit may also be applied to a being that has not at present, or is believed never to have had such connection.

The Human Intellect. By Noah Porter, D.D.

Soul

The term soul originally signified the principle of life or motion in a material organism. .. Traces of this signification may be found in the threefold division of man into body, soul, and spirit. .. In the New Testament, psuchikos, psychical, is often applied to the body in the sense of animal, and opposed to the spiritual or higher body. ib.

... The soul resists the forces and actings of its own body, and, in so doing, distinguishes itself as the agent most emphatically from that which it resists. By its own activity it struggles against and opposes the coming on of sleep, of faintness, and of

death. Even in those conscious acts in which it feels itself most at the disposal and control of the body, it recognizes its separate existence and independent energy. ib. p. 28.

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... If, now, there are phenomena concerning man which are discerned by consciousness alone — if also their truth can be established only through consciousness — then they are to be received as real, whether they are or are not like the phenomena of matter, or whether they can or cannot be explained by the laws or analogies which material phenomena illustrate and exemplify. To attempt to explain them by any resort to physical analogies which fail to solve them, and which destroy their integrity or essentially alter their character, is unphilosophical. ib.

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Soul, Body & Spirit

The distinction of body, soul, and spirit, σωμα, ψυχή, πνεῦμα, is sanctioned by the writers of the Old and New Testaments, and has adopted by the early Greek fathers as being psychologically exact and of great scientific and theological importance.

... Under the Cartesian system, the soul as the principle and agent of the higher functions, was separated from the agent of living, organized matter, or the principle of life.

... Some modern physiologists contend that life may be explained by the mechanical and chemical

Vital force. properties of matter. . . Others contend for a vital force. Kind of Scholastic terms is the transmuting cell-power. Bischoff of Munich defines it as "the peculiar and individual cause or force which creates and shapes the whole body, and manifests psychical qualities by means of the brain, thus blending the vital and psychical force in one."

Evolution . . . The doctrine of the evolution of the organic from the inorganic, as held by Darwin & Herbert Spencer, is founded on a special metaphysical theory, resting on analogies violently strained from observed facts, but not confirmed by a single observed event. The only evolutions & developments actually observed lie respectively within the spheres of the organic and the inorganic. The one sphere has never been evolved or developed from the other.

. . . The cell, the beginning of life, not only begins with an aliment prepared, but with the capacity to produce another cell, and by this production it grows. This process of growth, though involving mechanical and chemical processes and results, is a process wholly unknown to the mechanics and chemistry of other kinds of matter, and cannot be accounted for by such processes or laws either singly or in combination.

. . . Growth after a plan is peculiar to living or organized beings.

. . Living beings are still further peculiar, in that their existence and growth involve a constant change of material in consistency with integrity of being and sameness of form.

Vital Force &c. Organic beings are very largely susceptible of repair.... No phenom. like this is known to chemical and mechanical forces or their laws. (v. Flourens)

.. These and other facts have led many to the conclusion that there is an organic or vital force in every living being. ... Carpenter defines life "as the state of action peculiar to an organized body or organism."

Richerand defines life as "a collection of phenomena wh. succeed each other during a limited time in an organized body". .. Virchow makes "the vital force to be the expression of the definite co-working of physical and chemical forces". .. Lotze says that "living functions are not simply forces but capacities for functions wh. arise out of the special method of conjoining material particles into a coherent system". All life, in his view, depends "on the complicated relations under wh. the physical powers act as an organism". ib. p. 33. .. Dr. Porter successfully explodes Carpenter's steam-engine analogy.

.. Of these suggestions of possible modes and conditions of action (opposed to the vital force theory) we can only say that if there are no indications of such modes and conditions, it is unphilosophical to believe them. (Porter, p. 34).

... The living cell is not only organized but organific as it is capable of growth and development into new organs, with peculiar and as yet unknown & unused functions. .. Moreover it can be demonstrated that animal cells wh. have precisely the same chemical composition, and are

precisely similar in every other property, are developed into animals of entirely different species.

.. Some explain the development of the organic from the inorganic by heat – some by light. But heat and light, though both essential to growth and life, cannot be shown to be the originators of the capacity for either in a substance that under every variety of either or of both, may remain inorganic and dead.

.. Others (like Carpenter) resort to organization itself, as furnishing the required conditions. .. But, What is organization, is the very question wh. needs to be answered. What is the force which organizes?

.. Herbert Spencer, in a similar way, takes refuge in the phrase physiological units, after being forced to reject chemical and morphological units as inadequate.

× Is Life the Cause or is it the Effect of the organization of Matter?

.... There being a vital agent or force, and the Soul being the Subject of those higher activities which are known to Consciousness, viz., the rational, the emotional, and voluntary – What is the relation of the Soul to Life? ... Since the time of Descartes, those who have held the Soul to be spiritual and immortal have almost uniformly and unanimously held that the agent of knowledge and feeling is distinct in essence from the principle of life. One exception deserves to be named, in the School of G. E. Stahl (1660–1734), who maintained that the Soul is active in the formation and

Stahl's theory

functional processes of the body, as well as in the exercise of the conscious activities.

Identity of the Vital & Psychical Principle

The progress of physiology in recent times, as well as the more careful study of the conditions of certain of the psychical phenomena have seemed to favor a theory intermediate between those of Descartes and Stahl, a theory teaching the identity of the vital and spiritual force. It may be stated thus: The force or agent wh. at first originates the bodily organism, and actuates its functions, at last manifests itself, as the soul, in higher forms of activity, viz., in knowledge, feeling, and will. In other words, the principle of life and of psychical activity is one.

Proofs: The first activities of the soul are not only manifested much later than the functions of life, but they are at first rudimental... Were the soul an essence wholly distinct from the vital agent, we should naturally expect that the beginning of its existence would be made known by decisive evidence. But there is no evidence of the sort.

As is the tone of the bodily life so is the general energy of the soul's capacities. This the general rule; but there are apparent exceptions.

The community of essence is still further indicated by phenomena wh. look at first in the opposite direction. (The phenom. of disease and old age are best explained by oneness of essence).

..Whether or not the life and the soul are one, this is certain, that in addition to the soul's capacities for

conscious activities, it is capable also of certain unconscious processes. The consideration of this fact removes the chief objection against its identity with the principle of life, inasmuch as it demonstrates that its nature or essence is complex, and extends beyond the sphere of its conscious activities. This Complexness may reach so widely as to include capacities for those processes wh. we call vital. (p. 34.)

X .. Whatever view be taken of the Soul's spirituality, the fact cannot be overlooked that it is capable of being affected by and of acting upon extended matter.

.. Nor only is there a general harmony between the body and soul of the species as a whole, but there is in individuals a special harmony between the body and soul. .. The ear that is physically refined in its discrimination of sounds and musical tones, is usually attended by a special sensibility of the soul to the delights of music, &c. (p. 34.)

.. The thoughts wh. are entertained, the feelings wh. are cherished, and the purposes wh. are enacted, mould and form the body within and without so as to be a readier instrument and a more fit manifestation of the Spiritual activities and states. The fact is unquestionable. By what intermediate psycho-physical processes is this result effected? If there be a vital principle, it must be accomplished by its agency. .. The body can be rendered plastic only by the power of the vital force. .. The sudden influence of vivid conceptions, or of excited feelings upon the muscular activities, is another

example of the power of the soul over the body. Terror induces fainting, &c. All these phenomena are consistent with the theory which makes the vital and the psychical force to be one.

The capacity of the body to express the soul in looks, gestures, speech, &c - phenomena which elevate the body itself almost to a spiritual essence - is another proof of the oneness of the vital and psychical essence.

The objections may be found in the systems of Descartes, Leibnitz, and Spinoza. (The phenomena are are arranged before Land according to Leibnitz's pre-established harmony).

But - the extended and the non-extended show that they are capable of holding mutual relations.

The a priori assumption that matter and spirit can have no relation one to another is set aside by obvious facts. No real objection to the essential unity of life and spirit can be drawn from it.

Besides, it is not inorganic matter, but the matter that is ensouled, wh. affects the spirit. . .

This involves no subjection of spirit to matter, but rather of matter to spirit.

It is objected that this view would bring the soul of man into too near an affinity with the so-called souls of animals and plants. . . But it does not follow that the so-called soul of either plant or animal should in their nature be capable of performing the still higher functions which are peculiar to the spirit of man. What is asserted is simply that the spirit of

man, in addition to its higher endowments, may also possess the lower powers &c. vitalize dead matter into a human body. . . Whatever is important in the Platonic or the Christian view of the spirituality and immortality of the human spirit is not at all diminished by the doctrine of its unity with the vital force.

That the soul should begin its existence by vitalizing dead matter into a sentient organism, is a token of its power over matter. If this involves a transient subjection to material laws and limitations, this may be necessary for its education and moral discipline. . . That the soul should begin to exist as a vital force does not require that it should always exist as such a force, or in connection with a material body. Should it require another such body or medium of activity, it may have the power to create it for itself as it has formed the one which it has first inhabited, or it may already have formed it in the germ, and hold it ready for occupation and use as soon as it sloughs off the one which connects it with the earth.

These are possibilities, it is true, but they are sanctioned by sufficient evidence to set aside the objection we are considering. They permit the only theory of the soul's continued existence in another state which is consistent with the facts of our present being. . . The evidence of observation & of facts is decisive that the soul begins its existence as a vital agency and emerges by a gradual waking into the conscious activities

Noah Porter.

... While, then, we accept the testimony of consciousness to the essential antagonism between spirit and matter, we accept its testimony, also, to the intimate union of the two. This union we best explain on the theory that spirit possesses the power to shape matter into a living existence. Porter's Human Intellect, p. 40.

Consciousness does not directly attest this view, but it does affirm certain phenomena which are best explained by it. ib.

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Phenomenon is used as properly of spiritual as of material beings. Literally, it means that wh. appears to, or is known directly by the senses, next in order that wh. is known as a fact in the mind. In science, it signifies more precisely that wh. is known as a fact, in distinction from its explanation by a force, principle, or law. ib.

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The unity and individuality of the soul depend upon and require a complex organism of faculties & powers.

The soul is complex in its attributes and organization as shown in the variety of the functions of which we are directly conscious. Its complex nature is further manifested in its capacity to cognize and be interested in so vast a variety of objects in nature and in all living beings, both those above and below and equal to itself. ... Within every soul lie, as it were, unborn powers, which themselves contain the germ of other powers.

Noah Porter.

Herbart rejects the doctrine of faculties of the soul, as inconsistent with its unity. While he contends that the soul is one – a monad without relation to Space – he makes it the arena of all manner of active and antagonistic agents, which are evolved from its own being by the objects that excite them.

... The modern materialistic system makes the brain and nervous System the proper substance of the soul, and its phenomena to be explicable by the peculiar activity of this highly organized material substance.

... Herbert Spencer, though not an avowed materialist in form, shows that he is in fact, in that he teaches that psychical action is only a more highly developed form of vital action, the capacity for which, in its turn, has been developed from a lower form of being, viz., the unorganized. His materialism becomes conspicuous when he makes the <u>a priori</u> necessity under which he accepts necessary truths, to be itself the product of a tendency first acquired by frequent association; and then augmented into an inseparable connection, which, being transmitted with increased force through many generations of material or cerebral organisms, reappears at last in the form of <u>a priori</u> knowledge. ib. p. 54.

.. The materialists of the present day, "cerebral psychologists" maintain that a change in the substance of the brain is attendant on higher mental development – a change in bulk and complexity. ... Some cerebralists venture to avail themselves of the as yet partially

established doctrine of the correlation of physical forces, in support of the conclusion that mind, or soul-energy, is but the spiritual correlate or metamorphose of so much brain or nervous energy.

.. These cerebral conditions might be supposed to exist without the occurrence of any of the phenomena in question without perception, memory, or reasoning. The nervous system might perform every one of its functions without a single psychical result. ... The cerebralist supposes a science of the mind's inner experiences which he proposes to supplement by facts or laws of sense-observation using the facts to be explained to interpret the facts wh. explain them. Should he attempt to use the nomenclature of his own science in place of that given by the science founded on consciousness, he would fail to be understood. ... A soul that is self-conscious is not so singular as a brain functionizing about itself and its own being. No definition of self-consciousness given by the metaphysicians can compare in absurdity, with that wh. the cerebralist is compelled by the terms of his system to give of the knowledge wh. is the subject-matter of his own science.

.. Objections to phrenology:- Were phrenol. established, it would not be a science of its own facts: it would serve only as a guide in the use of certain external indications as explaining the psychical characteristics of individuals.

The Association List Theory (H. Spencer) dispenses with what it calls the scholastic doctrine of separate faculties of the soul. This indeed is its pride and boast,

that it makes these several faculties to be but varied forms of the single tendency or law of association.

The fundamental defect of this school is, that it does not distinguish between those activities of the soul by which, so to speak, objects are prepared for and presented to the soul for its varied activities, preeminently that of knowledge, and the activity wh. the soul performs with respect to them when so prepared and presented ... The constant conjunction of two ideas, as a consequent of wh. the one will always suggest the other, does not explain the relation under wh. the mind connects them in an act of judgment; least of all the relation by wh. it joins them in those beliefs wh. are necessary and intuitive, as are those wh. concern the relations of space, time, causation, & design.

... Bain resorts to the emotional nature to explain belief; and H. Spencer must fall back upon the growth of two nerve-cells into one, propagated indefinitely through successive generations, to account for a priori and necessary beliefs.

The associational school can only explain the higher processes and products of the mind by explaining them away — by making them, under the pressure of its theory, to become something else than what they are. ... Bonnet, Hartley, Bain, & H. Spencer impliedly, are eminent examples of the union of both cerebralism and associationalism in the same scientific theory. That the associational psychology is not necessarily materialistic is proved by the theory of Herbart concerning

the science of the mind. Herbart is at once an extreme associationalist & an extreme spiritualist.

"'He who attempts to construct psychology by the aid and under the direction of a metaphysical system, contradicts the order by wh. both psychology and philosophy are developed and acquired.'

Substance The "underlying substance" of the schools, the "thing in itself" of Kant, are mere names, which signify either being in the abstract or being in the concrete. If it is being in the abstract, then it must be synonymous with matter as knowable, i.e., it is a concept only which can be separate from its relations in thought but never in fact. If it is being in the concrete, then this must be known with its relations and never apart from them. In either case the substance or thing in itself, cannot be known by itself. p. 532.

From Spinoza's definition the inference was direct and irresistible that no finite substance is possible, because every so-called finite material substance is produced or sustained by other material beings, and is dependent on them; or, on the other hand, there is but one such substance, and that is the total of all which exist – the universe; this totality being conceived as absolute and independent. Locke falls into a similar manner of speaking when he speaks of the constitution "which everything has within itself without any relation to anything without." Similar to

this is the doctrine of Wherell, that substance is indestructible. . .

Our analysis has shown that a material substance is so far from being independent of other beings and forces, that, properly speaking, no material substance is in any sense independent, or can be conceived to be so. Every material substance is what it is by the productive or sustaining force of all other beings and forces in the universe. It is also conceived and defined to be what it is by its relations to these forces, expressedly and impliedly. It cannot exist and cannot be defined except by these relations to other beings and agencies.

Solidified carbonic acid is no more truly dependent for its being on the pressure and cold that hold fast its constituents, than the oak that for centuries has thrust its roots into the crevices of the eternal rock, or than the rock itself or the solid substance of the earth, are dependent upon the agencies that hold them in place, and conditionate the functions of each. Modern science has impressed this lesson upon all its devotees, that the one lives in and depends upon the all, and that the all makes itself felt in the one also; that nothing in the universe is independent and nothing inconsiderable; that the forces and laws which move and sway the whole, produce, sustain, develop, and destroy every individual.

If material substance is dependent, it is not necessarily indestructible. If the forces which sustain it are withdrawn, or their action is changed, it ceases to be, or ceases to be the same substance that it was. It may be an

induction wh. is well grounded in observation, that the ultimate material particles or molecules will not be destroyed; but to call these the only material substance is to use the word in a narrow and special sense. Our belief in the indestructibility of these ultimate particles is not an axiom, but is founded on other assumptions, coupled with extended observation of facts and wide-reaching analogies.

And yet we do assume that material substances are permanent, — not the ultimate particles alone, but even the continuous forms in which they exist and perpetually reappear. If we did not assume this, we should not define the constituents of either, we should not form them into concepts, or apply these concepts for the ends of knowledge. What is the nature and what are the grounds of this assumption? In its nature it is none other than the assumption that the agencies and laws which sustain and produce them will remain, at least till they have accomplished the ends for which they exist.

. . . When on the one hand we show that all things which seem most solid and permanent in matter, are the constant products of the elements and forces which bring and hold them together, we seem to dissipate all substance into moving and struggling particles, and to resolve the universe itself into a flux of changing forces: Substance is dissipated into shadow, and the solid earth with all its forms of being and of life, is liable to be disintegrated into chaos. But when, on the

other hand, we assume design to control and fix these forces and laws, we provide for permanence in the products of these forces, for fixedness in material substance and in the mind which interprets material being.

. . There are philosophers who deny that there are permanent forms or elements of material substance. Such believe that nothing is fixed, either in substance or attributes; that everything in the universes is in a perpetual flux, that the law of development controls all existence, so that one form and species of being is evolved from another – the more complex from the more simple – in endless progression. . .

The grounds alleged for this dogma, are the varieties actually observed within the species and forms of being usually considered as permanent and fixed, and the extension of the law supposed to be thus indicated to a wider range of supposed deviations, and the application of it on a scale measured by the lapse of enormous periods of time. One relation of permanence in nature, must, however, be assumed by all these philosophers, and that is, the permanence of this law or principle of development itself. If it be assumed from the limited facts and observations adduced, that this law of development has prevailed in all the ages, and evolved one form of being after another, by a steady progress and in regular order; then the permanence of the law of development itself must be referred to a fixed purpose and design of nature. If it is accepted as the product of

induction, induction itself, with its underlying axioms and rules of practice rests upon assumed design. The law of development cannot, therefore, drive the fact of design out of the universe, nor dispense with the assumption of design as one of the axioms of science. ib. 634.

Mental or Spiritual Substance... Here we encounter, at the outset, the objection that a mental or spiritual being cannot be a substance at all. This difficulty is merely verbal. It is of purely casual association, and arises simply from the fact that the term is usually applied in a specific sense as implying material existence, and not in one more generic as equally appropriate to beings which are spiritual.

Dismissing this objection as merely verbal and superficial, we proceed to inquire in what sense a spirit is a substance with attributes....

What it is to know, to feel, and to will, we can only know by the conscious exercise or experience of these operations. The products of these operations are beings in the philosophical meaning of the word, and in respect to them we affirm a cause which is that substance wh. we call the soul.

But we know more of the substance of the soul than that it is the cause or recipient of those effects wh. we call its states. It is involved in consciousness that the soul knows these acts and states to be its own; i. e., to be caused or suffered by the individual ego, or self. What is known is the agent causing and suffering, as well as the

effects. The soul under certain conditions and limitations is known itself to act and suffer. But the relations of the soul thus known do not take it out of the category of causation, but rather require more imperatively that this attribute should be referred to this very class. So true and striking is this that many have contended that the conscious energy of the soul in knowing and in willing (in one or both) originates the conception and explains the belief of causation.

The power of the soul to be conscious, or consciously to know, is also a capacity for causal efficiency, and when attributed to the soul is attributed simply as one of its causal relations known as the others by its exercise and its results. These states or products of the soul's causal activity are transient and changing, but the ego is permanent and enduring. As the cause or recipient of these changes the soul is <u>identical</u> with itself. They are diverse, the soul is one. The attributes require only the categories of the soul which consciousness reveals of <u>identity</u>, <u>diversity</u> and <u>time</u>.

Besides the attributes of the soul which are revealed in consciousness, it is capable of acts or processes of which it is conscious only of the results.

... Perhaps in this permanent <u>ego</u> as related to its diverse and changing acts and products may be detected the real spiritual substance which is the origin and type of the various corporeal substances, which we invest with their appropriate attributes. This ego is at once a Substance and a being... That Substance which we call the

human soul, is an identical enduring self, capable of spiritual acts and states in the succession of time, and adapted to certain ends for itself and the universe of being.

Every material substance is, like spiritual substance, a being discerned or discernible by intuitive or direct knowledge and also definable by a sufficient variety and number of relations to distinguish it from other beings. These relations are discerned by thought, and exist between itself and other substances, material and spiritual. A material substance may be defined, a being occupying definite limits in space, and productive of specific sensations in the sentient soul on occasion of which it is perceived or known to exist.

.. It is a serious error to class among the attributes of matter the capacity to be perceived or known. The possibility of being perceived is in itself no attribute of matter in the sense of causative power. To perceive is an act of the mind.

Kant on Synthetic judgments

How are Synthetic judgments, a priori, possible? This is the nut Kant has to crack with Hume. But first let us understand Kant's language. He divides all our judgments into two classes, analytic and synthetic. The analytic judgment is, as it were, but a writing out of our experience. When we say that a triangle is a figure with three sides, or that a body is extended, we are judging

analytically; i. e. we are adding nothing to our conception of body or triangle, we are only analyzing it. The synthetic judgment, on the contrary, is when we predicate some attribute of a thing, the conception of which does not involve that attribute: such as that a straight line is the shortest road between two points.

There are two classes of synthetic judgments: those *à posteriori* and those *à priori*. The former result from experience: e. g. gold is ductile. .. But the *à priori* judgments are independent of experience: e. g. a straight line is the shortest road between two points; which experience may confirm, but which is recognized as true, independent of experience; above all, it has a character of universality which experience could not bestow; for though experience may show us how a straight line is, in many instances, the shortest road between two points, it cannot prove that there is, absolutely, no shorter road in any case. .:. Every effect must have a cause. Here, as in the proposition of a straight line being, &c., we have an idea not given in experience, and an idea, the universality of which experience could never verify. We are thus led to assert that the Mind does add something to sense-experience; and that what it adds is not only independent of experience, but has the further character of certitude and universality, which experience can never claim. The

certainty of experience is always limited; it never can have the character of universality, however rich it may be; for after a thousand years it may be proved erroneous.

.. In these Synthetic judgments, *à priori*, there is ground of certitude. The veracity of human reason reposes on that certitude. Although, therefore, says Kant, we can never know whether our conception of things, *per se*, are *adequate*, we can know what conception all men must form of them; although we cannot know if our knowledge has any objective truth, we can be certain of its subjective truth.

.. Thus, instead of saying with the Cartesians, that, besides the ideas acquired through the sense, we have also certain ideas which are innate, and irrespective of sense; Kant said all our ideas have a double origin, and this twofold co-operation of object and subject is indispensable to all knowledge. Geo. Henry Lewes. on Kant.

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Kant on Swedenborg

In his Letters on Swedenborg, Kant narrates two of the reported cases of Swedenborg's clairvoyance, and says he knows not how to disprove them, they being supported by such respectable testimony; but he nowhere testifies to them himself; and in his Anthropologie, 35 and 37, his energetic contempt for Swedenborgianism and all other 'Schwärmerei' is unequivocally expressed. id. p. 633.

Chisold – Swedenborg.

Should a man hear a voice from heaven, or see a vision of the Almighty, to testify unto him the love of God towards him; yet, methinks, it were more desirable to find a revelation of all from within, arising up from the bottom and centre of a man's own soul, in the real and internal impressions of a godlike nature upon his own spirit; and thus to find the foundation and beginning of heaven and happiness within himself. From Select Discourses by John Smith, Fellow of Queen's Col. Cambridge. Quoted by Chisold in his Letter to the Archb. of Dublin, p. 184.

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We commonly call a thing ridiculous or absurd, if it creates in us feelings of the absurd or ridiculous; but what can more completely demonstrate the absurdity of our own principles than to judge of the truth of a narrative upon this ground? It is making our feelings the test of truth. Chisold p. 206.

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Not only does Swedenborg maintain that the soul is not a mere quality, not a mere property, not an abstract thinking principle, but a distinct substance and form, – in fine, a spirit dwelling within the body; but that thought, or idea, is only a variation of that form; hence, that thought implies a thinking substance, as much as light or hearing implies a seeing and hearing substance; that it is as

absurd to contemplate thought as something independent of the substance of the soul or spirit, as it is to contemplate sight or hearing as a something independent of the substance of the eye or ear". ib.

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Cath. World on Spiritualism Feb. 1874

There is no mistaking the utter loathing expressed in Proj. Huxley's letter, in wh. he declines to take any part in the committee's investigation, on the ground that, "supposing the phenomena to be true, they do not interest me". He has a perfect right to compare spiritualistic talk to "the chatter of old women and curates in a cathedral town;" but his anger has made him quite miss the logical point of the position. The privilege he declines as worthless is the opportunity, not of listening to such conversation, but of examining and testing the hitherto ignored faculty; and this no man can seriously reject as uninteresting.

... I have maintained throughout that neither the hypothesis of trickery nor of delusion can be sustained for a moment as an adequate explanation of the phenomena of Spiritualism, on grounds which may be thus summarized: 1. Many of these phenomena outdo all conjuring. 2. They take place where the possibility of trickery has been eliminated. 3. The exhibition of imaginative excitement is, on the whole, inconsiderable, and there is no appreciable pro-

portion between the degrees of excitement and the phenomena.

... It may be insisted that the one effectual way of repressing Spiritualism is to pooh-pooh it. Surely it is too late; you must give its many sober adherents some better reason against trusting their own senses than its making other people laugh. Catholic World. Feb. 1874.

... There is no difficulty in understanding the bitterness with which modern science regards Spiritualism. It had been for so long carrying every thing before it; it had weighed so many things on earth and in the heavens; it had reduced so many apparently eccentric phenomena to law; its discoveries had been so brilliant, and its still more brilliant projections were so plausible, that it flattered itself that all idea of the supernatural was fairly relegated to the obscure past or to the obscurer future. The philosophy of the 19th Century was being past reduced to a bare statement of the contents of sensation, and the philosophers of the day were looking for an easy victory over the most respectable of dogmatic traditions, when, lo! full in the calm scientific light, the singularly grotesque form of Spiritualism lifts its head, and the warrior who had so loudly challenged the King to mortal combat finds himself set upon by the Court fool. When earth, according to the poet's dream, should be "lapped in universal

law", up starts a mass of phenomena not merely inexplicable by any known law, but, in popular estimation at least, incompatible with any hypothesis but that of supernatural agency. ib.

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That a certain moral discipline is necessary in order not to be deceived, even when you are dealing with one who has a true spirit of prophecy, is implied in the words of Ezekiel, cap. XIV.: "For every man of the house of Israel, and every stranger among the proselytes in Israel, if he separate himself from me, and place his idols in his heart, and set the stumbling-block of his iniquity before his face and come to the prophet to inquire of me by him: I the Lord will answer him by myself... And when the prophet shall err and speak a word, I the Lord have deceived that prophet.... According to the iniquity of him that inquireth, so shall the iniquity of the prophet be." ib.

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Eternal existence of Matter

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As for self-existent matter, we need only say that nothing which can receive new determinations is self-existent; and since matter receives new determinations, therefore matter is not self-existent. Hence the conception of eternal and uncreated matter cannot be styled a philosophical opinion, but only a dream of unreflecting or uneducated minds. Cath. World. Feb. 1874. Art. Princ. of Real Being.

Hegel.

The Cell

Organic cells are now treated atomically in order to construct organisms as mere mechanisms from them, but the cell is essentially an individualizing power developing itself into a distinct shape. It is not enough to say that organism is endowed with vital force, for the former is, through and through, the nisus formandi, according to Blumenbach, or inner conformity to an end, according to Kant.

Rosencranz on Hegel's Hist. of Phil.

Earth only inhabited

Hegel believes the earth to be the only star upon which life exists. This may easily excite surprise, and it is readily admitted, that, empirically, we cannot know whether or not organic beings exist upon other stars, e. g. Venus and Mars. As a strict systematizer, however, he could not do otherwise than vindicate to the Earth this superiority. Bessel, in a treatise on the physical constitution of the world, and Whewell, in his "Plurality of Worlds", have arrived at the same result. The further conclusion that, in the entire universe, a history has been unfolded only upon the Earth, is unavoidable. The infinite multiplicity of the heavenly bodies did not embarrass Hegel. This he regarded as "mere" infinity which was no more imposing than the infinite multiplicity of infusoria, or insects, &c. ib.

. . . "He that wrongs his friend
Wrongs himself more, and ever bears about
A silent court of justice in his breast."

Tennyson.

Ex nihilo nihil fit

The fact is that nothing is ever brought into existence but from its Contrary – that is from its non-existence . . . . As, however, that which is looked upon as a principle is always conceived to connote the thing principiated, and, on the other hand, absolute nothingness has no such connotation (for connotation is virtual relativity, and cannot spring from nothing), it follows that nothingness, when conceived as a term out of which a being is educed, is to be looked upon, not as an absolute negation of being, but as a negation out of which divine omnipotence, by the production of an act, brings the creature into being. In other terms, nothingness is to be considered, under God's hand, as a negative potency of something real, which can be actuated; and, with regard to any individual reality, as the potency of that individual reality. When viewed in this manner, nothingness assumes a relative aspect, in opposition to that reality of which it is the potency, and thus becomes apt to connote that same reality, in the same way as silence connotes talk, darkness light, absence presence, impurity form. Hence we

Cath. World.

took care to say that a thing is brought into being out of its non-being; because as the fool only by divesting himself of his foolishness can grow wise, so a reality which is to come out of nothing — say, a point of matter — cannot be educed out of the non-being of an angel or of any other thing, but only out of its own non-being. Consequently, non-being, or nothingness, as the term out of which a point of matter is to be educed, means nothing but the potency of that real point; and thus nothingness, under the hand of the Omnipotent, acquires, in regard to that which is educed out of it, that relativity which is sufficient to make it a principle, according to the nature and manner of its principiation.

Cath. World. Feb. 1874

He is above the universe of things,
He is below the universe of things;
Beyond the universe, yet not excluded,
Within the universe, yet not included;
Above all things, ruling them for the best,
Below all things, since on Him all things rest;
Outside, for from his arm nothing can fall,
Inside, — the fulness filling all in all.

Mediæval Latin Poetry.

Creation from nothing

If there be Pantheism, the doctrine that teaches that God predetermines and foresees everything, and that there is not a single event in which God has not a share, is Pantheism of the coarsest description. That God is All, and that all things are in God, is a sound — nay, it is the only rational doctrine. For all things must come from God, if they do not come from nought; but if they come from God, were they even created ex nihilo, there must be something of God — a spark of the divine essence — in them. Consequently those who hold that God is in the world, and that the world is in God, hold a rational tenet. In fact, this parental connexion of God with the World is that which, on the one hand, imparts to the World and to everything that is in it whatever being and perfection they possess, and which, on the other hand, completes, as it were, the perfection of God himself. For if we separate, substantially and absolutely, God and the World, we do not only impair and curtail the being of the World but that of God also. We curtail the being of the World by separating it from its principle; we curtail the being of God, by admitting that the substance of the world is independent of God, and consequently by admitting two absolute substances.

And the creation ex nihilo would not fill up the gap, as the creatio ex nihilo could not

affect the principles and essences of things, which under any supposition must be coeternal with God. But if God be All, He is not so in the sense that he is every individual being and every single phenomenon — so that if I am joyful or sorrowful He should rejoice or grieve with me, or that He should be the insect that crawls or the seed that grows upon the earth — but in the sense that He is the principle of all things, and that all things find their ultimate reason, their essence in Him. Thus being the principle, He is not what the thing is of which He is the principle. And being the All in this high sense of the word, He is not what the individual and fragmentary part is. It is because joy and sorrow, as well as life and death, come from Him, that He does neither rejoice nor grieve, neither come to life nor end in death. For should he come to life or end in death He could give neither life nor death; and if He felt joy and sorrow as we do He could be the principle of neither; as they would be sent to Him as they are sent to us. Besides, being All and the Absolute, He is liable neither to want nor loss, nor to any increase of perfections, which are the Conditions of joy and sorrow and of all similar modifications and changes through which the finite and mortal being must pass. Again, the

seed that becomes and the seed that is (the essence) are two different seeds. The former we see and touch, the latter we think only. But that which we think only, is eternal and immortal. God is the Thought, the Idea, the Essence of the Universe — this is the highest and absolute definition of God, a definition in which are comprised His Providence, His Love, His Power, and all His perfections. For the thought of God is the Providence of things, and, for the very reason it is the essence, it is the Providence of each being particularly. The Providence of the plant is its idea, according to which it is born, it grows, and dies. And so it is with every thing. And, knowing and being the idea, God need not extend His care to individual beings, as not only the knowledge and being of the latter are involved in the knowledge and being of the former, but they find in the former their highest and perfect existence. Thus, for instance, in the knowledge and being of the ideal triangle are comprised all material triangles, whatever be their size, form, and position, as in the knowledge and being of the ideal man — genus or species — are involved the knowledge and being of all men.

Consequently, it must be laid down as a fundamental principle of Metaphysical Science, that God is in the world, and that He is not in the World; that He is all things in their idea, and as

a Whole, and in the Unity of their existence; and that He is not All things individually, or in their particular and fragmentary existence. A. Bra. Introduction to Speculative Logic & Philosophy. See Journ. of Speculative Philosophy. Jan. 1874.

Agassiz on Brown-Séquard's Theory of unconscious Cerebration.

In his lecture given May 1st, 1873, Agassiz, &c. to the report in the N. Y. Tribune, said: "Are all mental faculties one? Is there only one kind of mental power throughout the whole animal Kingdom, differing only in intensity and range of manifestation? In a series of admirable lectures given recently in Boston by Dr. Brown-Séquard, he laid before his audience a new philosophy of mental powers. Through physiological experiments, combined with a careful study and comparison of pathological cases, he has come to the conclusion that there are two sets, or a double set of mental powers in the human organism, or acting through the human organism, essentially different from each other. The one may be designated as our ordinary Conscious intelligence; the other as a superior power which controls our better nature; solves, sometimes suddenly and unexpectedly, nay, even in sleep, our problems and perplexities; suggests the right thing at the right time, acting through us without

conscious action of our own, though susceptible of training and elevation; or, perhaps, I should rather say, Our organism may be trained to be a more plastic instrument, through which this power acts in us.

"I do not see why this view should not be accepted. It is in harmony with facts as far as we know them. The experiments through which my friend, Dr. Brown-Séquard, has satisfied himself that the subtle mechanism of the human frame - about which we know so little in its connection with mental processes - is sometimes acted on by a power outside of us, as familiar with that organism as we are ignorant of it, are no less acute than they are curious and interesting". See Remarks of Dr. Brown-Séquard, Vol. , p. .

Schopenhauer says: "Kant was right, when following Priestley, he regarded the essence of matter as forces."

"I have no doubt," says Coleridge (v. VI, p. 275) "that the Jews believed generally in a future state, independently of the Mosaic law. The story of the witch of Endor is a proof of it."

Coleridge on Spinoza

Spinoza, at the very end of his life, seems to have gained a glimpse of the truth. In the last letter

published in his works, it appears that he began to suspect his premiss. His unica substantia is, in fact, a mere notion – a subject of the mind, and no object at all." ib. p. 361.

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Coleridge on Plato

Plato's works are preparatory exercises for the mind. He leads you to see, that propositions involving in themselves a contradiction in terms, are nevertheless true; and which, therefore, must belong to a higher logic – that of ideas. They are self-contradictory only in the Aristotelian logic, wh. is the instrument of the understanding. ib. p. 362.

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Coleridge on an. mag. &c.

My mind is in a state of philosophical doubt as to animal magnetism. Von Spix, the eminent naturalist, makes no doubt of the matter, and talks coolly of giving doses of it. The torpedo affects a third or external object, by an exertion of its own will; such a power is not properly electrical; for electricity acts invariably under the same circumstances.

Coleridge thought (v. p. 303) that the phenomena were "too fugacious and unfixable to support any theory that supposed the always potential, and, under certain conditions and circumstances, occasionally active, existence of a correspondent faculty in the human soul. And nothing less than such an hypothesis would be adequate to the satisfactory explanation of the facts." ib. p. 303.

Treviranus

Treviranus, the famous botanist, said to Coleridge, in ref. to Mesmerism, – "I have seen what I am certain I would not have believed on your telling; and in all reason, therefore, I can neither expect nor wish that you should believe on mine." p. 303.

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Thomas Cromwell London 1859

The constituents of man, according to Liebig, are oxygen, hydrogen, carbon, and nitrogen, with the addition of a little calcium and phosphorus.

"The Soul & the Future Life. By Thomas Cromwell, Ph.D., F.S.A. – The Philosophic Argument – London: Edward T. Whitfield, 178 Strand. 1859.

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Life

Life is the grand phenomenon to be accounted for; could we find the pristine springs of that, the rest might be comparatively easy. Only endue matter with Life, and we have all the authority of facts for saying that it may as readily effect a mental as a muscular operation. ib.

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Correlation of mental force

By Dr. Carpenter himself "mental agency" is numbered with the correlated forces. Can we then think of mind except as operating through some form of matter, of whose properties it is among the manifestations? .. The truth must be that "mental agency" is made a quality of materiality by being placed among the co-producing forces.

ib. p. 95.

T. Cromwell.

What reason can exist for regarding the qualities called the Spiritual, or mental, as constituting a distinct entity? ... Am. I met with the assertion that we know no more of Matter than we do of Spirit? As regards the essence of Matter this must be admitted. But ... Matter is wherever being is, and we can recognize it. The popular voice is of more value here than the philosophical. ... Matter can be sensibly perceived; Spirit cannot ... Mind appears only in the manner of a property exhibited by Matter. ... A Man's every thought is mind; and will any assert that thought is Substantive being? ... To a quality or property, or collection of qualities or properties, in ourselves or other Matter, in order to distinguish it or them from Matter's other qualities or properties, we may assign the name of "Spirit" if we will: but the name will never make of the qualities or properties a thing, being, or essence; or give them substance even in the philosophical acceptation, wh. is that of abstract Self-Subsistence. it.

Mind is Life's noblest feature and exponent. Mind inheres in Life, as Life inheres in Organization. ib. J. Abernethy says: "Mind might be superadded to Life, as Life is to Structure". And yet Cromwell finds great fault with Abernethy for his notion of Life as a distinct agent. "Mind's existence," says C., "can be traced only in Life." J. it. E. S.

As organization increases, the faculties of the animal extend; and Mind grows with the complexity of the organism. . . .

The reason why organized, as distinguished from inorganic, matter should exhibit mental phenomena, is to us of course inexplicable. . . .

But why should immateriality any more than materiality be mental.[2] . . .

The lower animal, could they philosophize, might claim Spirit as well as the higher. . . .

Life, conferring immortality, is plainly discoverable by no light inferior to that of the Gospel. . . .

Organized bodies present no contrast to unorganized by their elements, for the same appear in both. (v. Liebig, p. 71). . . .

As there are no grounds for referring Life to any distinct agent in an organized body, or independent super-addition to it, so there are none for referring Mind to any such distinct agent or independent super-addition.

A dual Man is no more conceivable than a dual brute or plant. p. 28. But both the brute & the plant may be dual. E.S.

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Abernethy The very term of superaddition is discordant to their ears (the "Modern Sceptics") –; the supposition that there may be any thing which is not an object of sense, or actual demonstration, torments them; they themselves perceive, that the superaddition of life to Structure may,

indeed, warrant the supposition of a substance having the properties of perception and volition being superadded to life; and that there "may be more things in heaven & earth, &c."....

Wherefore do they tell us, that we know not why a muscle acts, or a nerve feels, and that both are properties of organization? Is it not because they wish to persuade others, that when the brains are out the man is dead? Yet surely it does not necessarily follow that perceptivity and consciousness are annulled, because those actions have ceased by which they have hitherto been affected or manifested.

Physiological Lectures by John Abernethy. p. 47.

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Duality? Can it be that when the stimuli of alcoholic fluids mount from the stomach to the head, a separate being is intoxicated? Yet thus it must be if that which thinks in man, and in these instances thinks so extravagantly, be not a thinking organ, but some independent, self-subsistent personality or thing.

T. Cromwell p. 98.

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Soul and mind Dr. Milligen says: "It appears evident that we are born with a soul, but not with mental powers; that the mind can be destroyed, but the soul is indestructible.. Can we refuse a soul to an idiot? - where is his mind? Has a dog, an elephant, no mind? Are not affection, jealousy, &c. mental operations?"

Wigan on The Soul & The Mind

Dr. Wigan, author of "The Duality of the Mind," says: "If mind and soul were identical, then the soul could not be an immaterial principle; for mind, we see, is a thing of gradual growth, increasing, bit by bit, from less than that of the lowest quadruped to the exhibition of the highest intellect. ... Can the mind, then, be a thing per se, distinct and separate from the body? No more than the motion can exist independent of the watch.. The divinely mysterious essence which we call the soul is not the mind ... From no other source but Revelation can we form an idea of the soul's nature or its destination." iv. 106.

Immaterialism.

A petitio principii pervades the immaterialistic argument. "We have the same evidence for the existence of mind, that we have for the existence of body," says Dr. Reid. Doubtless we have like evidence for the existence of both, but it is not the less a sheer assumption that mind and body exist as distinct essences or entities.

.. The ordinary process with the Immaterialist is this. He makes or accepts some such definition of Matter as that it is solid, extended, and divisible; at the same time asserting or implying that it neither has nor can have the other qualities about which is the dispute. He then makes of those other qualities a separate thing or being, because they have no resemblance to solidity, exten-

sion or divisibility. He mak[e] might as properly make the Life, so largely observed in matter, a thing or being separate from the matter that discovers it, because it has no resemblance to solidity, extension, or divisibility.

[Hunter, Abernethy, and many others do regard Life as a separate principle. E. S. I]

Every quality and attribute, says Stewart, must have its substratum or essence ... We may properly style Matter an essence, while professing to know nothing of the nature of its being; but we are without authority for bestowing the same epithet on Mind, were it only for that it has never manifested itself except as qualities and attributes. ...

As Sir Wm Hamilton truly says: "We can justify the postulation of two different substances exclusively on the supposition of the incompatibility of the double series of phenomena to co-inhere in one." "Entities are not to be multiplied without necessity"; "a plurality of principles is not to be assumed where the phenomena can be explained by one." ib. 112.

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Sir Humphrey Davy says: "The Materialists have quoted a passage, in favor of their doctrine, from Locke, who seemed to doubt 'whether it might not have pleased God to bestow a power of thinking on matter.' It appears to me that he might as well

Lowe asked whether it might not have pleased God to make a house its own tenant."

[This involves a petitio principii. The point in dispute is whether the mind be, in the immaterialistic sense the tenant of the house.]

... Dr. Carpenter says: "The essential nature of these two entities is such that no relation whatever can exist between them. Matter possesses extension, or occupies space; whilst mind has no such property", &c. ...

John Stuart Mill, too, though "of the nature of mind we do not know anything", and though "all which we are aware of, even in our own minds, is a certain 'thread of consciousness', a series of sensations, thoughts, emotions, and volitions"; he (Mill) is satisfied to allow mind to be a "substance", "thing", or "being", forgetting that this is precisely what has to be established against the "skeptical System" of wh. he speaks.

Nor does Mr. Mill reflect that, just for the reason that each man's mind is, to his own experience, "a series of sensations, thoughts, emotions, and volitions," there cannot be a ground for deeming it "a thing in itself, distinct from the sensations, thoughts," &c. Mill's Logic, I. 74-82. ib.

Sir Henry Holland (Ment. Phys.) remarks upon the "absolute insufficiency of all theory founded on the connection of memory with organization", and asks,

T. Cromwell.

"What material receptacle can we conceive fitted to contain and conceal these innumerable forms of the past? What material action capable of reviving and re-combining them after years have lapsed away?"

[Cromwell's reply is, not very satisfactory. "A material receptacle and material action," he says, "do all that it is inquired if they can do; or if they do not, there is no more perceivable connection between the performance of such things and the powers of immaterial agents, as such, than of material ones." I ib.

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Innate Morality

Adam Smith says: "Were it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in some solitary place, without any communication with his own species, he could no more think of his own character, or the propriety or demerit of his own sentiments and conduct, of the beauty or deformity of his own mind, than of the beauty or deformity of his own face." (Not so. E.S.)

[But if he had a mirror, he might possibly think of the last - i.e. it might be an agreeable or a disagreeable object of contemplation. E.S.]

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Sir Wm Hamilton describes the soul as "a hyperphysical substance, an immaterial principle of thought."

He says: "It is only on the hypothesis of a

soul within us that we can assert the reality of a God above us; — 'nullus in microcosmo spiritus, nullus in macrocosmo Deus.' Our theology is necessarily founded on our psychology; we must recognize a God from our own minds, before we can detect a God in the universe of nature."

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We make the Brain the Soul no more than we make the eye sight, the ear hearing, the heart circulation, or the lungs respiration. Each organ has its functions, with results proper to their action; and the action of the Brain's functions, we say, results in, or it might be as correct to say is, Mentality, or the Soul.

[Ah, my good Sir, but clairvoyance knocks your assumptions from under you.'] ib.

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On the inductive principle we attribute the apparent actions of all the organs to the organs to which they seem to pertain . . . Did we instead set up a distinct agent in Man, a directing "Spirit" of his organism, it should be Life, which is at once the spring and sum of his operations and consciousness. ib.

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Immaterialism has always been in reality a disguised Materialism; constantly changing mere powers and properties into Substantive existences, and sometimes mere mental acts into objects regarded after much

the same manner as sensible objects are regarded through the eyesight. The true Immaterialism is the pure Non-Materialism of these pages. ib.

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Speaking of the doctrine of "the immortality of the soul as a disembodied spirit," Archbishop Whately denies that any such doctrine is "revealed to us." "The Christian's hope," he says, "as founded on the promises contained in the Gospel, is the resurrection of the body."

Mr. Isaac Taylor says: "That the Christian Scriptures," &c. (See before quoted.

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"Disputes about materiality and immateriality once ran high. When it was supposed that matter was perishable; that all portions of it, when consumed by fire, melted in water, or dissolved in air, were forever put out of being; Man was interested in convincing himself that his soul was differently constituted, and not subject to the same fate. The idea of a material origin was then inseparable from that of material extinction. He therefore labored to persuade himself that all his higher powers must be immaterial, in order to survive the anticipated annihilation of all solid bodies throughout the universe. But the discoveries of Chemistry have gradually dissipated these fears. We are now satisfied that although

tangible and visible substances may be decomposed and disappear, they do not cease to be: their particles are disintegrated, pass into other forms of existence, are resolved into their original impalpable elements; but not one atom is destroyed; it remains to enter again into new combinations, to be employed again in Nature's various but never-ceasing work." Quoted by T. Cromwell from "Purpose of Existence, p. 72." ib.

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Among the Greeks ψυχη stood chiefly for physical life, with the lower desires and affections, while to πνευμα were assigned the loftier attributes ascribed to Spirit. Under all Grecian physiology and psychology lay the assumption that whatever was self-motional was life or soul, matter being essentially inactive. And thus it became necessary to suppose a vital agent wherever activity was manifested, and that equally in the cases of mere physical function, sentience, and intellect; this being the supposition on which alike rested Plato's three kinds of souls and Aristotle's three souls; for to so much the theory of the last-mentioned philosopher seems very nearly, if not literally, to amount. .. The Greeks both refined upon and added to the Oriental conceptions of the soul; but their largest psychological generalization, expressed by psyche, being always convertible with life, betrayed its Eastern root.

The vital energy in organic, as opposed to the lifeless properties of inorganic bodies, and the presumed necessary procedure of all life from the Anima Mundi, the Life or Soul of the Universe, were ever kept in view, though the divisions of "soul" were manifold. The great inclusive idea continued to be that of vitality.

The primitive meaning of both psuche and pneuma (as also of the Latin anima) was wind or breath; and wind or breath, we have seen, gave the earliest appellation to life or soul: moreover, the Hebrew words rendered by our translators of the Bible "soul" or "spirit" (רוח, &c) were employed for wind, air, breath, life, and mind. In Greek psuche was frequently used for life simply, and pneuma as often for either wind or spirit.

... Hunter's "highly attenuated substance" pervaded and gave vital properties to both solids and fluids, and, according to Abernethy, "actually constructed the very means by which it carried on its various processes."

J. S. Mill

In ethics his (James Mill's) moral feelings were energetic and rigid on all points which he deemed important to human well being, while he was supremely indifferent in opinion (though his indifference did not show itself in personal conduct) to all those doctrines of the common morality, which he

thought had no foundation but in asceticism or priestcraft. He looked forward, for example, to a considerable increase of freedom in the relations between the sexes, though without pretending to define exactly what would be, or ought to be, the precise conditions of that freedom. This opinion was connected in him with no sensuality either of a theoretical or of a practical kind. He anticipated, on the contrary, as one of the beneficial effects of increased freedom, that the imagination would no longer dwell upon the physical relation and its adjuncts, and dwell this into one of the principal objects of life; a perversion of the imagination and feelings, which he regarded as one of the deepest-seated and most pervading evils in the human mind.

Autobiog. of Jno. Stuart Mill, pp. 107, 108.

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In proclaiming the perfect equality of men and women, and an entirely new order of things in regard to their relations with one another, the St. Simonians, in common with Owen and Fourier, have entitled themselves to the grateful remembrance of future generations.

ib. 168.

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She (Mrs. J. S. Mill) had the utmost scorn of whatever was mean and cowardly, and a burning indignation at everything brutal or tyrannical, faithless or dishonorable in conduct and

character, while making the broadest distinction between mala in se and mala prohibita — between acts giving evidence of intrinsic badness in feeling and character, and those which are only violations of conventions either good or bad, violations which whether in themselves right or wrong, are capable of being committed by persons in every other respect lovable or admirable. ib. p. 188.

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The argument of Boscovich, showing that we have no grounds for the belief in the existence of solid impenetrable molecules of matter, is unanswerable; yet that other hypothesis which he substituted for it, of mathematical points (that is, points having no dimensions, surrounded by spheres of repulsion and attraction), is even more difficult to realize than that which it was intended to displace. Sir B. Brodie's Psychol. Inq. 2d Part p. 24.

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There are none who really contribute so much to the attainment of the objects which he himself (the utilitarian) has in view, as those who pursue science for its own sake, without reference to the practical results to which it may lead. (Instance navigation from mathematics, electric telegraph from experiments with the "muscles of a frog's leg", &c. ib. p. 33.

If I am not mistaken, it was the late Baron Alderson who on some occasion addressed a jury to the following effect: "The prisoner is said to have labored under an uncontrollable impulse to commit the crime. The answer to which is that the law has an equally uncontrollable impulse to punish him." ib. p. 85.

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Alderson's words were: "A man might say that he picked a pocket from an uncontrollable impulse; and in that case the law would have an uncontrollable impulse to punish him for it." ib.

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The wise man soon discovers to how great an extent his mental faculties are influenced by his bodily condition. ib. p. 86.

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Violent emotions, especially of the depressing passions, disappointment, anger, fear, anxiety of mind, all operate by using up the nervous force, and therefore interfere with the exercise of the intellect. ib.

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Mind as independent of organization

I am aware that, co-ordinately with an extension of the mental and intellectual faculties, there is an extension and greater complication of the nervous system, especially of that part we call the brain. In some modern

Sir Benj. Brodie.

Mind as dependent on organization

works of Physiology, I see the mind spoken of as one of the properties (or, as they now call it, forces) inherent in matter, corresponding to gravitation, electricity, magnetism, and so on; the doctrine, in fact, being, that a certain arrangement of the molecules of matter in the brain leads to the production of mind, as a certain arrangement of metals and acids in a voltaic battery leads to that of electricity. But this is a doctrine I cannot easily accept.

× I cannot perceive the smallest analogy between the processes of mind and what are called the forces inherent in the molecules of matter. . . I have no conception of any form of matter which is not essentially and infinitely divisible; the only thing of which I have any knowledge, which is essentially indivisible, is my own mind. The materials of the body, including those which compose the brain, are in a state of constant change. The brain of to-day is not the brain of yesterday, and probably there is not a molecule left of that which belonged to it a year ago. But amid these changes, the mind preserves its identity. The belief in the identity of my own mind is as much inherent in me, and as much a part of my constitution, as my belief in the existence of an external world; I can in no way emancipate myself from it.

It is said, indeed, that that we have no experience of the existence of mind or intellect, except in combination with material structures; but is it so in reality? The answer to such a question has been briefly and clearly stated by the learned author of "The Physical History of Man" (Dr. Richard), and I cannot do better than refer you to his own words: – "The whole universe displays the most striking proofs of the existence and operation of intellect, or mind, in a state separate from organization, and under conditions which preclude all reference to organization. There is, therefore, at least one being or substance of that nature which we call mind, separate from organized body, not only somewhere but everywhere." Richard on Nervous Diseases. Introduction. Brodie, ib. p.p. 210, 211.

"The argument," adds Brodie, "seems to me very well founded, and it is somewhat remarkable that it should have been so much overlooked, both by physiologists and by Metaphysicians." ib.

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In acknowledging the superiority of Man to all the rest of the animal creation on earth, we must at the same time acknowledge not only the possibility, but the great probability, that there are in some regions of the

universe organized beings endowed with faculties as much superior to those of man, as the faculties of man are superior to those of the humblest quadruped; and such beings might with as much reason regard us as having nothing in common with themselves, as we should deny the same things to the animals below us. ib. p. 215.

The eye, the ear, and the other organs of sense, are physical instruments by means of which impressions are communicated through the nerves to the brain. Without this apparatus, in our present state of existence, there would be no sensations; no knowledge of any thing external to ourselves. It does not, however, follow that the brain itself feels, or that it performs any other than a subordinate office, conveying the impressions received from the organs of sense to a superior principle in connection with it. Brodie. 1st. vol. p. 54.

Memory

Memory is a recurrence of sensations, which existed formerly, produced by the operation of some internal changes, after the causes, by wh. the first sensations were excited, have ceased to exist.

A blow on the head may destroy the memory altogether, or (wh. is more usual) it may destroy it partially. ib.

Brodie relates the case of a man who by a stroke of apoplexy had his memory so affected that he lost the power not only of expressing himself in intelligible language, but also that of comprehending what was said to him by others. . . But while his memory as to <u>oral</u> language was thus affected, as to <u>written</u> language it was not affected at all. If a letter was read to him, it conveyed no ideas to his mind; but when he had it in his own hand, and read it to himself, he understood it perfectly. . . .

Thus the impressions made on the organs of sense, and transmitted to the brain, produce some actual change in the minute organization of the latter, and this is subservient, and in our present state of existence, essential to, the memory. . . Probably there is a special organ for memory, in the brain.

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There are certain fundamental truths the knowledge of which is forced upon us by our own Constitution, and is independent of experience and reasoning. Such is our belief in the existence of a material world; our belief that we remember as having happened did really happen.

T. Cromwell.

Mr. T. Cromwell says: "Mind, while sleep continues, exists not; or exists only in the degree that the sleep is incomplete." If the facts of "unconscious cerebration" are admitted, this assertion loses all its weight.

But of this Mr. C. says: "But let the leader mark that here is a disjunction of functions from functions, as of that of forming ideas from that of being conscious of their having been formed, and of localities of functions from localities, as of the general centres of consciousness, the sensory ganglia, at the base of the hemispheres, from the throne of intellect, the cerebral convolutions, — which completely destroys the notion of the singleness of mind or of its organ. Intellectual acts or states, it seems, may be wrought out or exist at one time and place, and consciousness of those acts or states at another time and place. And while sensations have the sensory ganglia only for the seat both of their action and of its consciousness, they may be produced by those ganglia either with or without the formation in the cerebrum of the ideas appropriate to them."

The attempt here to twist the phenomena of separate consciousness from its legitimate service in proof of the supersensual nature of the mind is wholly unsuccessful. "Unconscious cerebration" certainly does not militate against the spiritual theory. E. S. T.

By Dr. Carpenter himself "mental agency" is numbered with the correlating forces. Can we then think of mind except as operating through some form of matter, of whose properties it is among the manifestations? T. Cromwell, p. 65.

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A late opponent (Richard on diseases of the nervous system, p. 50), aptly for our purpose, observed that "nothing can be more unphilosophical than to ascribe attributes to a thing or being, the existence of which is in any degree a matter of uncertainty, or requires to be previously proved." When, therefore, the Immaterialist accounts for what we regard as the Brain's proper though inexplicable attributes and actions, by ascribing them — not to life, and the Author of life — but to an inner entity, a most intimately associated yet perfectly distinct, nay, utterly heterogeneous being, he is bound, in the first place, and for some independent reason (since the mental faculties, we have seen, may have a less violent solution), to satisfy us of the existence of the entity or being he refers to. . . .

The whole source of the most uncommon perplexity on this subject is the making Mind to be a Substance or being, instead of only a set of qualities and functions.

. . . The "spirit" of a man exhibits, to some extent almost always, and sometimes in a very high degree, the qualities, even the loftiest and most spiritual,

of the man's parents; and, for all that appears, obtains them from his parents. What shall we say then? Can it be agreeable to Immaterialism to suppose the parents to have been the authors of a being of two natures and substances, or rather of two essentially distinct and yet united beings, of which one is an immaterial and immortal Spirit?

T. Cromwell. p. 70.

Morell The following passages occur in J. D. Morell's "Elements of Psychology": "Aristotle saw clearly that the soul is really and truly a production of nature, coming originally in the same great chain of physical causes as all other natural phenomena." "How is mind itself produced? Whence did it proceed? How did it become connected with this material frame?" "The human organism is not produced complete at the fiat of almighty power, and a living soul then added to it. We could imagine, indeed, an infinite creative power giving existence to a human frame, and then adding a corresponding intelligent soul. But this is no explanation of the actual case before us." "We must regard the primitive germ as containing, potentially, the complete individual, both body and soul. The cell, we know, contains the body potentially, for it contains that power of self-development which by degrees builds up the entire frame. But, in like manner, must that primary germ, we conceive, comprehend, potentially,

the soul and all which it ever can become;" &c.

The mysteriousness is unconquerable of the doctrine that the child receives a body of one nature from its parents, and acquires a "spirit" of a perfectly different nature from some other wholly undetected source. T. Cromwell. P. 81.

Immateriality

Our inability to explain the phenomena of nature, and in particular the faculties of mind, from the known and admitted properties of matter, in all probability, led philosophers, who found gross matter insufficient to this explanation, to imagine a more and still more subtile matter, till finding, that, however subtile it were supposed, it would still be matter, and thus incapable of making us comprehend the effects which they would willingly have explained, they ultimately denied the existence of all matter, thus at least arriving at a negative idea. . . .

According to Hartley we have no original ideas but what are impressed by matter: whence we are led to conclude that nothing but matter exists. But as we cannot explain the most ordinary and simple phenomena from our idea of matter, we must either admit an immaterial substance, or else suppose that matter has some powers and properties different from and superior to those wh. appear. But this last supposition is in effect the same as the first, though, from the imperfection of language, it seems to be different.

... As long as we admit that matter is a reality we cannot admit its opposite to be a reality also; hence all the realities that we ascribe to an immaterial substance, when for instance we term it a simple thing, are nothing but words of the same meaning as immateriality, whereby in effect nothing new is advanced. Of this Leibnitz was aware, and to extricate himself from the embarrassment, considered matter & extension, as they strike our senses, to be appearances, refusing them the appellation of real substance, and deeming them the result of the action of many substances, which, not being distinguishable by our senses, appeared to them as one, and indeed, as it must be in all such appearances, as a whole, altogether dissimilar to and distinct from its component parts. These component parts, or rather those things which constitute the basis of this appearance, are, according to this theory, not farther compounded, but absolutely simple and indivisible. But as this idea of simple substance is to our conception another negative idea, in order to make it affirmative, he must give it some power, whence it would become real. Now this power which he gave it, was the power of perception, for of every other power it might be said, that it was only an appearance, as matter itself in which the power was supposed, and this would apply even to the power of motion itself.

The simple power of perception alone is not exposed to this application. It can be no appearance, since an appearance always presupposes a power of perception which represents a thing otherwise than it is, and we must also suppose, that the power of perception in one thing was produced by the power of perception in another, which is absurd. Leibnitz also maintains, that it is easy to explain all the phenomena we admit in matter from this original perceptive power of all its component parts, their various alterations and degrees, their actions and reactions. . . .

To be aware of what Leibnitz has hereby done, and properly to estimate the value of his hypothesis, we must be acquainted with the difficulty Wh. he sought to remove. That difficulty consists in this, that since matter is, as far as it appears to us, a true and real thing, spirit, or an immaterial thing, being the opposite to it, cannot possibly be true and real, whence all real things, and consequently the most real of all things, God himself, must be matter.

But since the idea of God as a self-existent and necessary being absolutely leads us to the idea of his immutability, and these three ideas are so strictly and inseparably connected, that we must either admit or reject the whole; and since the idea of immutability is in direct contradiction to the idea of a compounded substance, or matter;

we must either grant immateriality to the immutable Being, or, if we suppose Him to be material, we must give up the fundamental notions we have of God, namely, his self-existence, necessity, and immutability, that is, we must reject all rational ideas of Him.

Our author seems, in part at least, to grant this, when he says that to admit an immaterial substance, or to suppose that matter possesses certain powers and properties of a nature different from and superior to those we perceive in it, is the same thing. But if these two suppositions signify the same thing, we must admit, not only that the powers and properties commonly ascribed to matter are unable to afford us the desired explanation, but that it requires such powers and properties as are contradictory to our ideas of matter, and thus not merely undiscoverable by us, but absolutely not to be found in it.

This will at least be the case if we would explain the idea of a necessary and self-existent being from the idea of matter, and unite those ideas in our imagination. In such a case we must first admit the mere negative idea of immateriality, and whilst we adhere to this, it must be confessed, that the two suppositions adduced are equivalent. It is the same thing whether I say: there are substances that are not mate-

TRUST IN GOD.

God answers our prayers,
At times and by ways
That are best;
We know not how or
Where it will be, but
There is rest.

In sorrow and pain
His hand guides us well,
Never fear,
We shall reap as we
Sow. In Heaven all
Shall be clear.

O trust in the Lord!
For He will provide
For us all;
He who numbers the
Hairs of our head loves
Great and small.

Cease to do evil,
Learn to do well, and
We shall know
Of the angels in
Heaven, the gifts God
Can bestow.

The society lays no claim to infallibility. We have had occasion to differ from some of its officers in times past on some local acts, and we may again. It has sometimes to deal with questions which require boldness and promptness, besides the wisest circumspection and the most trustful patience. While, on the one hand, it must not be indifferent, on the other it can act in such cases, if at all, only upon partial information, and must run counter to somebody's interests. Differences of opinion are almost inevitable. What the public has a right to expect, and all that it can demand, of this and all other associations for the removal of evils is an intelligent and conscientious fidelity on the part of their officers: not impeccability. The society of which we are speaking has no occasion, we think, to shrink from such a test.

In regard to the larger question, what has

rial, or substances which have powers and properties whereby we may explain what is not comprehensible from our ideas of matter and its powers, or, I must ascribe to matter properties and powers, which are not only of a different nature from those ordinarily admitted, but even of an opposite nature, and not to be conceived of it.

If, however, we would go further, and make the idea of immateriality affirmative, we imperceptibly fall into the Leibnitzian hypothesis of substance and power. We must first in some sort admit, according to our usual mode of thinking, that these different and opposite powers, or rather power (for they may be conveniently reduced to one) exist in some substance, or a subject distinct from the power. But then we should indeed think nothing, since the word immateriality presents to us no real idea, and such a subject is nowhere to be found. Nothing then remains for us, but to take the power itself for the substance. This is in effect something real, and in it, and nowhere else, find we what can realize our idea of immateriality. This, in fact, seems to be the natural and immediate road which the human understanding must take, when it would convert immateriality from an empty sound to an actual idea: and if this be the only way by which we can arrive at such an idea, it is

certainly a justification of, and argument for the Leibnitzian hypothesis.

Notes & Additions to Dr. Hartley's Observations on Man; by Herman Andrew Pistorius.

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Facts of this kind (spiritual) have been reported as occurring in all ages; nor is it more than two centuries since they began to be doubted. Even during the two centuries of partial Skepticism, they have continued to be reported as happening not less frequently than before. Introduction to D. D. Home's 'Incidents in My Life' - Second Series. New York: Holt & Williams. 1872. (By Dr. Robt. Chambers).

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Clearly the mere fact of two centuries of partial Skepticism does not go for much. But then this enlightened Spirit has penetrated the mystery in so many cases, and shown it to be based in nothing but vulgar deception! Has it really done so? Has it not simply flattered itself with illusive compliments to its one penetration? One noted instance of a person professedly affected as Mr. Home has been, was Anne Parsons, a little girl living in Lock Lane, in the City of London, in 1762. If there is any case in which detection of imposture is triumphantly and unchallengedly assumed, it is that of the famous Cock Lane ghost. Mark the facts of the detection. Knockings

and scratchings were for a couple of years heard in connection with little Anne Parsons, and at length a mode of conversation with the unseen agent was hit upon. The so-called ghost averred that a woman who recently lived in Parsons's house, and was since dead, had been murdered by her quasi-husband, a Mr. Kent. It was what Mr. Home would have called a lying spirit. The girl being taken to the house of Mr. Aldrich, a clergyman, a party was formed to put to the test a promise of the "ghost," that it would knock upon the coffin of the deceased in a vault of St. John's, Clerkenwell, at a certain hour in the evening. No knocks occurred — lying spirit again. Then came the grand stroke in the detection. The girl was taken into a stranger's house, put into a bed hung clear of the floor, and watched for two nights, during which no noises were heard. A result, which might be owing merely to the deranged conditions, was held by the sapient committee of investigation as clear proof of imposture; but they were yet to have evidence more positive. Having become impatient with the child, they told her on the third night that if the knockings were not heard that night, she and her parents would be taken to Newgate! Under this threat, the child took a board into bed with her, was seen to do so (why was such a thing never seen before?) and soon sounds admitted to be different from what happened before, were heard. The

bed was then searched, the board found, and the girl proclaimed as a proved impostor. In this clumsy, foolish, and utterly unsatisfactory manner was the "Lock Lane Ghost" "detected". On no other grounds has the fallacy of the case become the proverb it now is. ib. pp. 4, 3.

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If there be a Spirit, is there anything a priori unlikely in the idea that the Spirit, which parts with so much that is dear to it here, may linger in the scenes of its earthly pilgrimage, and desire to hold intercourse with those remaining behind?

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R. Chambers — In reference to a little brochure by a Miss Douglas on Spiritualism, Robt. Chambers wrote — "These twenty-four pages, in my opinion, contain the germ of the greatest discovery, and the greatest revolution of human thought that any age of the world has witnessed." ib. p. 11.

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Inductive Science — The idea is now arising that the cause of the undiminished darkness overhanging all that relates to a state of existence after this life, may be that the right track has never yet been entered on, that the facts really affording in this direction materials for induction have hitherto been disregarded, that they nevertheless abound, that a higher enlightenment will cause attention to be turned to them and reveal their profound significance. ib. p. 12.

Julian — To the reader familiar with Spiritual phenomena it is evident even from the sneering narrative of Gibbon, that the apostacy of Julian, and his intense enthusiasm in the cause of the fallen faith, was in truth due to communication with the invisible world. "We lived in a perpetual intercourse with the gods & goddesses", &c. See Gibbon. ib. p. 15.

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The amount of light which has already been thrown on the nature of spiritual communications precludes their being received henceforth with unquestioning faith. ib. p. 16. See Blanchette.

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Sir David Brewster — According to his daughter, Mrs. Gordon, Sir David Brewster gave it as his belief, that "if modern Spiritualism with its manifestations be a truth, it may be a fulfilment of the prophesied work of the Evil One and his agents." ib.

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Ld. Brougham — In "The Book of Nature" by Mrs. Charles O. Groom Napier, F. C. S., published in 1870, there is a Preface by Lord Brougham, concluding thus: "But even in the most cloudless skies of Scepticism, I see a rain-cloud, — if it be no bigger than a man's hand; it is Modern Spiritualism." ib.

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Jno. Bright — Mr. J. M. Peebles (Sept. 3d 1870) said: "While in England I dined with John Bright. He said he had witnessed some of D. D. Home's manifestations. They

were wonderful. He could attribute them to no cause except it be the one alleged, that of intelligent, disembodied spirits. 'But', he added, with due caution, 'I do not say that this is so, but if it be true, it is the strongest tangible proof we have of immortality'". ib., p. 61.

Dr. Elliotson was a materialist of the most uncompromising and determined type. His views he set forth in his elaborate work on "Human Physiology," and they were eagerly caught up by the atheistic secular party in England, and reproduced in lectures and tracts. He denounced modern Spiritualism in the Zoist, and was one of its most scornful opponents. While at Dieppe in 1863 he was converted by the phenomena through Home. Born in 1785, Dr. E. died in 1868. He had abused Dr. Ashburner for his belief in Spiritualism, and said, when they met at last, "Can you forgive me?" (Dr. A. described the scene to me when I was in London. E.S.)

Dr. Buchanan (J.R.) In the presence of spirits matter is suddenly organized before us, and as suddenly dissipated. The invisible controls the visible. Spirit proves to be a paramount reality and matter but a form wh. vanishes at the command of its master.

One of Spinoza's claims to the consideration of mankind is his broad assertion of the eternal changeless character of the natural laws of God, accepted unconditionally, now in the world of science, still very far, it is much to be deplored, from being admitted in the world of morals and religion. Well would it assuredly be for mankind were God preached to them as the author of eternal, changeless, and inexorable law, and neither a deity to be bought off from his resolves, by a price of any kind, even the sacrifice of that which is nearest and dearest, as the Jews of old conceived him; nor by lip-service or even heart-felt repentance to be induced to pardon sin, condone misdeed, and take the evil-doer into his favor, as the modern Christians hold.

Spinoza on Prayer

... Spinoza himself informs us that he does not deny the use of prayers; the use, the profit is to the mind of the party praying; for to suppose that his prayer influences the Supreme were childish. Spinoza's own and only prayer was meditation on the infinite perfections of God, his worship obedience to the eternal laws ordained by Him for the government of the world.

Spinoza, His Life, Correspondence, and Ethics by R. Willis, M.D. London: Trübner & Co. 1870.

Miracle

Spinoza's assertion of the eternal & changeless nature of the laws of God leads him consistently to the denial of miracle.

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Spinoza on Mind & Body.

According to Spinoza mind and body are virtually one and the same thing, conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under that of extension; so that the order of the actions and passions of the body is of like nature with that of the actions and passions of the mind. Is the pre-established harmony, of wh. Leibnitz and his school have made so much, anything more than is expressed in the above sentence? Eth. xxix.

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Mind and body are in truth correlatives. . . . Many organic acts, however, proceed without our knowledge or consciousness: the heart circulates the blood, the stomach digests the food, &c.

. . . Owen (Anat. of Vertebrata, Vol. i. i. 8vo. London, 1866) regards "thought as bearing the same relation to the brain of man that electricity does to the battery of the torpedo. Both are forms of force and effects of the action of their several organs. (The conclusion here attained, however, is not universally admitted. Some are still of opinion that psychical power is independent of organization. Vide in particular Lotze's Microcosmos, p. 170. R. Willis M.D. p. xxx.)

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Spinoza on Immortality

As there is no effect without a cause, and no manifestation of mind without concomitant corporeal existence, we can imagine nothing, remember nothing, save whilst the body endures. But as God is the cause not

only of the existence but of the essence of the body, & God himself being by his essence eternal, so must the essential element in the nature of man be conceived through him under a certain aspect or form of eternity, and in this way be believed to escape the dissolution that awaits the body. The idea that expresses the essence of the body under the aspect of eternity, indeed, being a mode of thought pertaining to the essence of the mind, is necessarily eternal. And although we have no remembrance of any existence anterior to the present existence of our body, still we have as an element in our nature an intuitive sense or feeling that our thinking part is eternal. And as those things that are intellectually conceived are no less distinctly apprehended than those that are remembered, we conclude that our thinking part is immortal.

... Were it a matter of doubt, however, — did we not know that our soul is eternal, piety, religion, and everything referred to magnanimity, generosity, and our distinguishing humanity, requires us to cherish the belief that it is so in reality. pp. xxxviii, xxxix.

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"As to what certain Churches add when they declare that God assumed our human nature, I say advisedly that I do not know what they mean; and, to own the truth, they seem to me to speak as absurdly as would he who should tell me of the circle assuming the nature of the Square."

Spinoza.

Spinoza - Schiller.

Spinoza concludes that the resurrection of Christ from the dead was truly spiritual and revealed to the faithful alone, according to their capacity, viz. that Christ, endowed with eternity of being, in virtue of the peculiar holiness of his life, the excellence of that he taught, and the example he set to man, may be said to have risen from the dead and to live for ever. p. 99.

"The passion, death, and burial of Christ," says Spinoza, "I receive literally, but his resurrection I understand allegorically. I admit, indeed, that it is narrated by the Evangelists with such circumstances as make it impossible to deny that they themselves believed that Christ rose from the dead and ascended into heaven, there to sit at the right hand of God; and further, that Christ might even have been seen by others than the faithful, had they been present in the places where he appeared to his disciples, — a matter, however, in which they might have been mistaken, the doctrine of the Gospel remaining unassailed. St. Paul, to whom Christ subsequently appeared in a vision, glories in this, that he had known Christ not according to the flesh, but according to the Spirit." 2 Cor. v. 16.
it. p. p. 100, 101

Frederick Schiller, questioned as to his religion, says:

"Welche Religion ich bekenne? Keine von allen
Die du mir nennst. Und warum keine? Aus Religion."

According to J. S. Mill, the mind can only know phenomena, and has no right to reason about real cause and final purpose in the Universe. ... All knowledge is restricted within the limits of scientific demonstration. Science, properly understood, deals only with observed phenomena. Cause, in the scientific sense, is the name given to the required conditions that preserve the balance of fixed phenomena, or antecede phenomenal changes. But of cause in the true sense of the word, as the determining power, as well as of final purpose in the ordering of events, science takes no account. Rev. Henry Jerson. April 1844.

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Consciousness

The consciousness which we have of our transient thoughts or sensations is nothing more than the thoughts or sensations themselves, which could not be thoughts or sensations if they were not felt. Brown. See Townsend's Recreations.

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Of Modes ac. to Swedenborg

Things much compounded take their origin from things less compounded; the less compounded from things still less so; the least compounded of all finally from things simple. But whence or what is this simple? It is the Infinite self-existent cause of itself and operator of effects out of itself. All finite things, therefore, are modes, and so acknowledge a cause prior to the modification whereby they are modified, in virtue of which they are severally

Spinoza.

what they are and nothing else; leaving such a figure and no other, &c. All things out of the Infinite, in a word, have their modifications; but in the Infinite there is no such thing as made, the Infinite being the original Cause of all modifications. Principia. Vol. I p. 47.

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Spinoza — Leibnitz also says: Evil is a consequence of the limitation of good, &c.

I cannot admit that sin and evil are aught positive, still less that aught can be or can happen in opposition to the will of God. On the contrary, I not only say that sin is nothing positive, but that we cannot otherwise than improperly, and speaking humanly only, say that we offend or sin against God. . . . Sins, in as much as they indicate imperfections only, consist in nothing expressive of reality . . . Privation is nothing positive, and is entitled evil in reference to our human understanding only, not to the understanding of God. Spinoza's letter to M. Van Bleyenberg.

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God is not a judge who inflicts punishment; the sin or crime carries its punishment along with it. ib.

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I positively maintain that God is truly and absolutely the cause of all that is — of all essential being whatsoever. If, therefore, you can show that evil, error, sin, crime, &c. are anything that expresses essence, I will forthwith admit that

God is the cause of evil, &c. I think I have sufficiently shown that whatever assumes the form of evil, &c. consists in nothing expressive of essence, and that God, therefore, cannot be said to be its cause.

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Descartes defined a spirit (such as the human soul) by cogitation only, matter by extension, and divided all substance into cogitant and extended, as into their first species or kinds. Which distribution, notwithstanding, is as absonous and absurd, as if he had distributed animal into Sensitive and Rational. Whereas, all Substance is extended as well as all Animals Sensitive. x H. More pr. Joseph Glanvil's (Chaplain to Charles II and F. R. S.) Saddducismus Triumphatus. Or Full and Plain Relation of a Spirit. Page 65. 4th edition. Boston Athenaeum, April 1874. What follows is Dr. Henry More's Enchiridion Ethicum.

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Let us define a Spirit an immaterial Substance intrinsically endued with life and the faculty of motion... A Spirit is Ens or a Being... Now every being is either substance, or the mode of substance, which some call accident... But a spirit is not an accident or mode of substance... Wherefore the second essential degree of a spirit is that it is substance. From whence it is understood to subsist by itself, nor to want any other thing as a subject (in which it may inhere, or by which

it may be the mode or accident) for its subsisting or existing. The third and last essential degree is, that it is immaterial, according to which it immediately belongs to it that it be a being not only one, but one by itself, or of its own intimate nature, and not by another; that is, that though, as it is a Being, it is in some sort extended, yet it is utterly indivisible and indiscerpible into real physical parts. And moreover, that it can penetrate the matter, and (which the matter cannot do) penetrate things of its own kind, that is, pass through spiritual substances. &c.

(Material substance, ac. to more Glanvil) differs from immaterial substance in this: the latter has life and motion in itself, the former has not.) Ac. to G. the Cartesians as well as the "Hobbians" contend that Extension and matter is one and the same thing. G. claims both extension and immateriality for spirit; that the spiritual extension "may insinuate herself into the material," and the mind may conceive them both together as "two really distinct extensions," and "conjoined into one Ubi". G. gives to spirit a fourth dimension wh. he calls Essential Spissitude. He instances a piece of wax wh. may be moulded into any form. So, by its essential Spissitude, Spirit by contraction of itself into a less space, loses nothing of its extension or essence.

The Cartesians imagine that because a thing is extended, it has partes extra partes, and is not Ens unum per se et non per aliud ... But why may not an immaterial extension be so united and held together with itself that, although it can penetrate all things, and be penetrated by all things, yet, nothing can so insinuate itself into it, as to disjoin any thing of its essence any where, or perforate it, or make any hole or pore in it. What hinders is but that there may be a Being, that is immediately One of its own nature, and held together into one by virtue of some other, either quality or substance?

But the Cartesians (Dr. M. calls them Nullibists) say, That all extension inperreth parts, and all parts division ... An extended Thing may be divided logically or intellectually when, in the mean time, it can by no means be discerped ... None of those Parts, as the Nullibists call them, can exist but upon this Condition, that all jointly and unitedly exist together; which Condition or law is contained in the very idea or nature of every Spirit. Whence the indiscerpibility of a spirit cannot be removed from it ... And the extension of a Spirit does not at all hinder the indiscerpibility thereof ..... But why should extended Spirit be more capable of perception than extended matter? To which Q's reply is, that he has

been arguing to prove that Spirit is some real being and true substance, and not a vain figment, such as is every thing that has no amplitude, and is in no sort extended. He concludes that perception and cogitation are the immediate attributes of some substance, and that no physical reason thereof ought to be required, nor can be given, why they are in the subject wherein they are found. ib.

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For as for those that acknowledge there is a God, and that Matter was created by him, it is not hard for them to conceive that there may be a certain faculty in the soul, which in some manner, though very shadowishly, answers to that Power in God of creating matter; namely, that as God, though the most pure of all Spirits, yet creates matter the most gross of all things, so created spirits themselves may emit a certain material virtue, either spontaneously or naturally, by which they may intimately inhere in the subject matter, and be sufficiently close united therewith. ib. Henry More.

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Two substances, matter and Spirit, stand opposite one to another, specifically distinct by their immediate, essential, and inseparable attributes, the one being deadly discerpible and impenetrable, the other penetrable and indiscerpible, sufficiently thus to be discriminated

before we consider any principle of activity in either.
.. Spirit is, therefore an immaterial (which is a penetrable and indiscerpible) substance, intrinsically endued with life and motion. H. More. ib. p. 112.

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If a man will follow the common sentiments of human nature, if he acknowledge a spiritual substance distinct from the material, he will give activity to the one, and passivity or actuability to the other. H. More. ib. p. 115.

You may perfect the division thus: Substance is either Matter or Spirit, as Animal is either Brutum or Homo.

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Substance & accident

The nature of an Accident being such that it cannot exist but in another; that of a Substance is such that it needs no inhesion, as an Accident does, in another Subject, but subsists by itself and stands as it were on its own legs. ...
.. As if one, after he has heard another define Man to be a rational living Creature, should demand, Ay, but what is that which is a rational living Creature? What can be answered, but, That it is a Man? And so, when we define Substance to be a Being subsisting by itself, if one demand, but what is that which subsists by itself? - what can be answered but that it is Substance? ... To perceive the bare essence of any thing beyond its attributes, operations, and habitudes, is not given to any Creature. ib.

H. More — Glanvil.

One of H. More's antagonists tells him that the word immaterial signifies nothing but a negation. More replies: A negative particle, in composition with a word that denotes imperfection, implies positiveness and perfection, as in infinite, immortal, and the like; these remove the imperfections in finiteness and mortality, and imply something positive of a better nature. And so does immaterial remove the imperfections of discerpibility and impenetrability, and implies the contrary.

Distinctness of matter & spirit

... A man would be loth to admit a congeries of atoms, be they never so small or subtile, to be a spirit, no more than he would admit the powder of some crass body to be a spirit, which was so palpably a body before. For magis and minus non variant speciem.

Atoms

... I conceive that all bodies consist of atoms, or little particles of matter. ib.

Spiritual body

It is most fully and plainly proved by those excellent men, Dr. Cudworth and Dr. More, that souls departed are embodied in aerial or ethereal vehicles; and they have largely shewn that this was the doctrine of the greatest philosophers and most ancient and learned fathers. ... Now Samuel appeared here to Saul in this his more pure aerial or ethereal body, which he could form into such an appearance & habit as he had in the terrestrial. Glanvil. p. 262.

There is not only poetical imagery, but real truth, in the words of the poet Rückert:—

"Man is a miracle begotten and conceived,
A miracle, he lives, is born and nursed,
A miracle, he grows, and sees, and feels,
A miracle, he thinks, and what he thinks,
A miracle, he stands, miracles environing,
Miracles precede and follow all his steps;
So them is he so gradually, unconsciously
Inured, that they appear to him quite natural,
And unaccustomed only seems miraculous to him,
Who Nature's wonders unastonished sees."

Christian Doubt & Chr. Belief. By Theodore Christlieb, D.D. Prof. of Theology at Bonn. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. 1874.

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Hegel

Hegel maintained that the development of the universe consists in the inner logical process by which thought proceeds from consciousness to self-consciousness,—pure absolute unqualified Being having first to be developed into Nature before it can pass into its higher form of self-conscious spirit. ib.

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"Our systems of philosophy", says Fichte, "are very often but the reflex of our hearts & lives." ib.

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Plato & Aristotle on God

Even Plato did not make his way up to the idea of a divine, Self-Conscious, personal Being... It is true

that Aristotle maintained more definitely than Plato that the Deity must be a personal Being. But even for him, it was not an absolute, free, creative power, but one limited by primordial matter; not the world's Creator, but only One who gave shape to the crude material, and so not truly absolute. ib. p. 78.

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Cicero

Cicero's question still holds good — "What people is there, or what race of men, which has not, even without traditional teaching, some presentiment of the existence of gods?"

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Relativity

"The perception of his own relativity leads man to the idea of some higher Being on whom his own existence depends, and this Being he can only conceive as one that is absolute — above himself and above nature — that is God." Delitzsch. fr. Christlieb.

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Takes a God to disprove a God

Granted, however, that the existence of a God cannot be proved, still less can his non-existence. .. Before one can say that the world is without a God, he must first have become thoroughly conversant with the whole world. He must have searched through the universe of suns and stars, as well as the history of all ages; he must have wandered through the whole realm of space and time in order to be able to assert with truth, "Nowhere has a trace of God been found!" He must be

acquainted with every force in the whole universe; for should one escape him, that very one might be God. He must be able to count up with certainty all the causes of existence; for were there one that he did not know, that one might be God. He must be in absolute possession of all the elements of truth, which form the whole body of our knowledge; for else the one factor that he did not possess might be just the very truth that there is a God. ... In short to be able to affirm authoritatively that no God exists, a man must be omniscient and omnipresent, that is, he himself must be God; and then after all there would be one. ... Atheism, much more than Theism, depends on faith, that is, on assumptions which cannot be proved.

Pantheism & Materialism

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Materialism merges God in matter; for, according to it, nothing at all exists but matter, — there is no such thing as a separate spiritual substance. Pantheism considers God as the soul of the world, and material nature as his body only.

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Moleschott

"Man", says Moleschott, "is produced from wind and ashes. The action of vegetable life called him into existence. ... Thought consists in the motion of matter, it is a translocation of the cerebral substance; without phosphorus there can be no thought; and consciousness itself is nothing but an attribute of matter."

Liebig on Phosphorus in the Brain

Says Liebig: "The honor of the discovery that phosphorus exists in the brain belongs, not to me, but to Dr. Moleschott; and in my Chemical Letters I have declared it to be a mistaken idea, not based on a single fact" — an utterance which shows at all events, how uncertain is the hypothesis upon which the theory is based. ib. p. 147.

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Nervous functions

Whilst thus, as we see, nothing certain has yet been ascertained as to the material of the nervous functions, these people dare to attribute the mental functions, hitherto held by the whole world to be immaterial, to the nervous activity of the brain, — a totally unknown quantity, about which, forsooth, they claim to be able to set up hypotheses!

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Thought as dependent on the Senses.

What right have we at all to assert the existence of a necessary mechanical relation between the perception of the senses and thought? The one process is separated from the other both temporarily and locally; for, &c. to materialistic principles, thought is evolved by an irritation of the brain, and material perception by a function of the senses.

... A perception of the senses does not by any means necessarily and in all cases call forth a thought ... Cannot I imagine something which I neither hear, see, nor smell, &c.? And how

can the materialist explain dream-life in which the functions of the five senses cease? Are dreams caused by nervous excitement; and if so, whence the excitement without any irritation of the senses? Or how can memory be explained?...

Material perception is therefore very far from forming the whole substance of our intellectual life, and hence cannot be the sole source of our knowledge. Indeed the external influence does not even form the full substance of the material sensations that we are conscious of, but is only the outward incitement thereto. The individual acts of sensation are one thing, and the capability of perceiving light, color, &c. is another. ... Mentions case

L. Bridgman of Laura Bridgman. B. 1829 in Hanover, N. H. Suffered up to 20th month of her age fr. convulsive fits; She then completely lost the senses of sight, hearing, & smell, and almost entirely that of taste, — the sense of touch being the only one left to her, without any recollection of the former possession of other faculties. .. She is still in perfect possession of all the elements of human reason (1863). Her understanding has developed just like that of one possessed of all his senses; and though four classes of material impressions are denied to her, still She is in perfect, &c. (See supra.) How, then, can any one assert that all rational knowledge is nothing but a product of the organs of sense?

Relations between brain & thought.

A mutual relation subsists between the brain and thought, but it has not been proved that this relation is a mechanically binding one. Many facts, indeed, directly contradict this. How does it come to pass that in many cases a morbid alteration of the brain, nay, even a partial loss of brain-matter (by wounds), does not weaken the mental life; or, conversely, that after long and vehement mental aberrations no alteration of the brain can be demonstrated?

... Whence the absolutely inexhaustible pertinacity of the brain in the formation of thoughts?

... Does not the circumstance that man must find out the locality of his own body (limbs) by experience (as with children) indicate that the body is merely an instrument of the soul? ...

There are, then, indications of a dualism existing between nervous or cerebral activity and mental life; and this dualism is rendered still more probable by the comparison – so much in vogue at the present day – between our brain and that of the anthropoid apes. ... An inferior intricacy of the convolutions, a somewhat greater protuberance of the cerebellum, a less delicate molecular composition excepted – in size and weight the two brains are pretty much alike. ... Thus the argument intended to support Materialism in fact refutes it.

Brain of the lower Animals

.. Why is it that the beast, with nearly the same development of brain as man, cannot succeed in producing nearly the same conceptions and ideas? If this question cannot be answered satisfactorily evidently the higher character of thought in man cannot depend on the structure of his organs alone, and is not the product of merely material causes. For "the greater the number of organic similarities which are discovered between man and beast, the more evident is the different nature of the treasure which God has implanted in us," (G. St. Hilaire) and has concealed under similar forms.

It is thus perfectly clear that there is a dualism between the brain and the operations of thought, and that there must be a new factor which constitutes the latter in man.

...(C. admits evidences of animal judgment, memory, &c., but asks, "If these animal feats really indicated a tendency to rational thought, how could we explain the entire want of progress in the brute world?". "The dog is ashamed when he is caught thieving, that is, he is afraid of blows; the man is ashamed of himself.)

Souls of Animals

.. The Holy Scriptures themselves attribute to beasts a soul as the vital principle of the corporal organism. The phenomena in the life of man, on the contrary, all point to some higher power, a substance that marks him as superior to all mere animal life, and gives to his intellect the self-

conscious clearness and power, and to his actions a moral value; and this is the God-descended Spirit, which is not only distinct from the soul but can even be practically opposed to its inclinations, in virtue of its own higher law. Hence the scriptural doctrine, that man consists of body, soul, and spirit. (1 Thess. v 23; Heb. iv. 12 et al). ib. pp. 154, 155.

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Materialistic Explanation of Mind

Granted that the individual acts of our soul-life all resulted from nothing but chemico-physical causes, it can never be denied that these acts are all rooted in a certain fixed, permanent centre, in self-consciousness. Whence then is this? This centre is not identical with the individual acts of thought; for it is not an isolated act, but a continuous condition. Materialism, it is true, would fain make it identical with thought, but again in opposition to all experience. For do we not clearly distinguish ourselves in self-consciousness from any definite act of thought? Are there not conditions in which correct reasoning is co-existent with perturbed consciousness? And vice versa is there not sometimes a continuance of consciousness notwithstanding the cessation of intellectual activity? The materialist, who will hear of no operative factor except the individual agencies-

brain, muscles, nerves, etc., — and who denies as an empty abstraction the bond which unites these separate agents, and preserves its own unity amid all the changes of thought and perception, — that is, the self-consciousness, or the personality as such — makes out man to be "a purely mechanical lay-figure", or as Czolbe openly admits, "a piece of mosaic, mechanically constructed from various atoms", — a theory which explains absolutely nothing of the practical phenomena of soul-life. p. 155.

"I do not wish," says Schleiden, versus Materialism, "to puzzle these gentlemen with the task of unfolding to me in detail the process whereby, for instance, the feeling for beauty is actually secreted in the brain. All I want them to do is to prove to me the possibility that, some day at least, we may be able to recognise the very simplest idea, as for instance tree, law, etc., as a chemical element present in the brain, or as a combination of such. But a naturalist who judges and decides as to the nature of things, the possibility of which (to say nothing of their reality) he is not in a position to demonstrate, appears in this respect not an exact investigator of nature, but merely a superficial talker." ib. p. 156.

... The ideas of God as a Spirit and of the human Spirit as a distinct substance are inseparable. Man's soul is a breath of God's Spirit: absolutely incomposite, indivisible, and immaterial.

Larva Analogies

We would, however, point out in passing, that it is precisely the most exact modern research which increasingly tends to enhance and perfect the ancient arguments for immortality, derived from nature, from the analogy of the Spring, the grub, and butterfly, etc. Here is an example: It has been observed that the larva of the male stag-beetle, when it becomes a chrysalis, constructs a larger case than it needs to contain its curled-up body, in order that the horns, which will presently grow, may also find room. What does the larva know of its future form of existence; and yet it arranges its house with a view to it! Is it then to be supposed that the same Power, which created both the beetle and the man, "instilled into the beetle a true instinct, and into man a lying faith, which makes him arrange his present life with a view to a future one otherwise than he would were this not the case, - a faith which arises as naturally, and is as necessary for the development of mankind, as instinct in the larva?" Ruete ut supra. pp. 156, 157.

Ethics of Materialism

Moleschott says: "Sin lies in the Unnatural, and not in the will to do evil. Speech and style, good and bad actions, courage, half-heartedness, and treachery, are all natural phenomena, and all of them stand in a direct relation to indispensable

causes as their natural consequence, just as much as the revolutions of the globe." "The brain alters with the ages; and with the brain, custom, which is the standard of morals, is altered also." "Wickedness in individuals, like the whole man himself, is therefore only a natural phenomenon. And as the words, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself' form the pith of Christian morals, so the first maxim of the modern gospel should be, 'To understand everything is to tolerate everything.'" p. 158.

Vogt ... Vogt says: "It is indeed true – Freewill does not exist, neither does any amenability or responsibility, such as morals and penal justice and Heaven knows what else, would impose on us. At no moment are we our own masters any more than we can decree as to the secretions of our kidneys. The organism cannot govern itself; it is governed by the laws of its material combination." ib. pp. 157, 158.

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Pantheism Pantheism derives its name from the motto Ἓν καὶ πᾶν, i.e. One and all, which was first brought into vogue by the Greek philosopher Xenophanes. According to this view, God is the universe itself; beyond and outside the world He does not exist, but only in the world. He as the Soul, the Reason, and the Spirit of the world, and all nature is His body). In reality God is everything, and beside him there is nothing.

Pantheism. Pantheism and Polytheism are but a higher & a lower form of one and the same view of the world. p. 162. ib.

Spinoza ... Spinoza says: "I have opinions as to God and nature entirely different from those which modern Christians are wont to vindicate. To my mind God is the immanent (that is, the intra-mundane), and not the transcendent (that is, the supramundane) Cause of all things; that is, the totality of finite objects is posited in the Essence of God, and not in his Will. Nature, considered per se, is one with the essence of God." ... Spinoza himself distinguishes between nature "begetting" and "begotten" (natura naturans et naturata.)

In this system that which appears to be evil is only a necessary point of transition in the development of good, and therefore is not really evil at all. ib.

Spinoza's "universal substance" is in truth nothing but the highest logical conception of universality, in which all individual notions are blended into an undivided unity, and hence it is merely a subjective idea, but not a real objective existence. "Spinoza's whole system", says a modern critic, "is dependent on the postulate, that the logic form of the notion and its attributes is identical with the objective form of real existence."

Spinozism finds it hard to explain the origin of cosmical matter... His "begotten nature" is the mother as well as the daughter of "begetting nature", and so they move in a complete circle.

... Granted, however, that these forces are constantly renewed by their harmonious mutual action, must not this harmony be planned by some intelligence? ... An impersonal unconscious God is assumed. That by which everything is realized with absolute wisdom is supposed to be unable to realize itself in conscious thought.'

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Hegel Whence proceeds Hegel's "Absolute Idea"? It is not conceived by a personal God, for none such exists. Neither can it conceive itself; for if it did, it would become Self-conscious, and thus God would again become personal. How does Hegel get out of the difficulty? He says that the absolute Idea posits itself by means of the eternal position and organization of the world. If we inquire, Whence proceeds the world? we are met by the reply, It exists, and is continually posited by the Absolute Idea. And if we ask, Whence comes the absolute Idea, from what is it derived, and in what does its actuality consist? we are told, It is posited in and with the world, and has none but a mundane actuality. Do you see how we are

Hegel being mocked with a shadow? The world is supposed to be posited by the absolute Idea, and yet the absolute Idea itself has no actual existence only in the world. How, then, can this absolute Idea posit itself? and how can it be looked on as the principle which posits the world if itself attains actuality only in the world? ib. p. 157.

Pantheism desires to realize the Infinite, but because the Infinite always has its actuality only in the Finite, the result is, that Pantheism constantly denies it in its endeavors to realize it... That only which is conscious of itself can posit itself.

..The Hegelian development of the Absolute is illogical. First of all, in its existence per se it is a purely immaterial idea; next it emerges into existence as distinct from itself, and, distorting itself in time and space, becomes Nature; then, from this Self-alienation it reverts to itself, and in Man attains to Self-existence, and becomes Self-knowing thought, or Self-conscious Spirit.... But God, as a Spirit, must be His own Cause, His own object, and the Subject which comprehends, knows, and wills Himself.

... How can personality proceed from an impersonal principle? Whence our Self-consciousness if the soul of the world, from which we ourselves have emanated, has no Consciousness? Can God communi-

God personal

nicate that which he does not himself possess, and create forms of existence which transcend his own? Can the effect contain anything wh. does not exist in the cause?

... The root of personality in the ego lies in its nature before any contraposition to other objects. This contraposition, therefore, does not form the essence of the personality, but is only a consequence of its inherent nature ... Even in the finite subject self-consciousness is the result of its own action based upon an esse per se which is not dependent on the world. How much less can the absolute Subject, God, by reason of his personality, be considered to be entirely dependent upon, and limited by, externals? ib. p. 169.

To none but the Infinite can we ascribe perfect personality ... If personality constitutes the pre-eminence of man over the inferior creation, can this pre-eminence be wanting in the highest Being of all? .. The Absolute can only be imagined as the Absolute Subject, i. e. as the absolute Personality. If the Absolute is to be mere Substance its idea remains incomplete; because then the subjective spirit and the finite personality of man appear as something higher.

.. That which man recognises in himself in a conditioned form, he must ascribe to his original Cause absolutely ... We here perceive the fundamental weakness of Pantheism (in denying divine personality).

God personal

That which is self-existent must also be self-conscious. . . The human spirit can believe of none but the Spirit, that it is a self-positing, unconditioned, eternal Being. . . "We are no more able to believe of Cosmical substance than, for instance, of the sun, that it is per se a necessary eternal being." ib. p. 172.

But the necessity of postulating self-consciousness as inherent in the Divine nature is still more evident if we consider the world not merely as matter, but as the Cosmos; as a well-arranged organism. This brings us to the teleological argument.

Problem of Evil.

. . With regard to the evil in the world, and the want of conformity to purpose shown in certain phenomena, we must first ask whether these incongruities form an intrinsic element of creation, or whether they are a later introduction. Ac. to Scriptures, they are everywhere connected with Sin, the destructive effects of which extend even to nature. ib. This, however, by no means does away with the conformity to purpose which marks the universe as a whole.

. . . If it be said we can derive from this argument only the idea of an architect and not that of a Creator — let us combine the results of this argument — that there must be a world-organizing intelligence — with that of the cosmological argument, that there must be an absolute Substance, which, on

on account of its eternity, we can imagine only as a Spirit, and we then have the cause in the one of the matter, in the other of the form of the world. ib. 174

Origin of Life

The natural Science of the present day shows that at the earliest period nothing but inorganic life existed, and confesses its inability to conceive how organic life can be developed from inorganic matter. The pantheist, however, is, in accordance with his principles, compelled to maintain that this did take place.

Pasteur

(&c. to the latest observations of Pasteur, which are confirmed by the French Academy of Science, the assumption of a generatio spontanea or aequivoca i.e. that organic life should spontaneously spring from inorganic matter, must henceforth be considered as scientifically disproved). ib.

Primal Reason

.. The wisdom wh. manifests itself in animal instinct and in the construction of languages is not derived from the beast itself, nor from the genius of the nation, but from that Power to which both animals & men owe their organization.

.. The primal Reason, from which all that is rational in the world proceeds, cannot be blind but must be self-conscious.. "Since natural Science has demonstrated that matter consists of an infinity of separate and different atoms, it is scientifically impossible to cling to Pantheism as a theory of the world without betraying an utter want of reflection."

Personality .. You must believe either in an accident wh. explains nothing at all, and puts a stop to all scientific investigations, or in a personal Creator.

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× All mythologies are based on the idea of personal historical intercourse between gods and men. ib. p. 183.

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Pantheism Pantheism is nothing but an artificial system of philosophical abstractions, wh. keeps back, subtilizes, and generalizes the original and ever-recurring instinct that leads man to yearn after a personal God and personal intercourse with Him. ib

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Pantheism (just as Materialism) is at last compelled, if consistent with its own principles, to deny the freedom of man, his responsibility; and even the distinction between good and evil, by which means all morality is done away with. ib.

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The personality of God and the moral personality of man must stand or fall together. ib. The man who denies the personality of God undermines the foundation of his own. Pantheism, in doing this, swallows up God in man and man in God.

.. If everything be a product of nature and the laws of nature, whence our conscience, the moral law, and religious consciousness?

Must not the Cause of all things, for this very reason, be something different from the things caused? (Is not this argument a two-edged sword?) E.S.

Trinity

... There is a conception of God which leaves room for the infinite fulness of life in Him, and yet maintains the infinite prerogative of personality. This, as we shall see, is accomplished by the Christian doctrine of the triune personality of God. ib. 190.

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God immanent transcendent

If we adopt from Pantheism the doctrine of the divine activity and immanence within the world, and from Deism that of God's supramundane position and separate personality, we shall have a near approach to the teaching of Holy Scripture. ... The theistic conception holds fast at once God's supramundane and His intramundane character; the one in virtue of His nature and essence, the other of His will and power.

Scriptural Theism

The Scriptural View: An eternally existing unbeginning God, from whose creative activity heaven and earth and time itself took their beginning — an absolute, self-existent One, who hath life in himself, and therefore hath given to the Son to have life in himself. ... Matter is not eternal, but came into existence through an act of the divine will. And God is distinguished from it not only by priority of existence, but difference

Scriptural Theism

of nature. God is a Spirit - i.e. a thinking Being. . God is both antemundane and supra-mundane, and as to His essence distinct and separate from the world, and existing independently of it... The world comes into existence through Him but not from Him.... The world's (essence) origin is derived not from the essence, but from the will of its Creator. He is Personality itself, absolute Freedom, and the highest Self-consciousness. ... Although God is Spirit, He has nevertheless a nature which we may term substantial, but not material. It is designated as light and fire... However, this element of light in God's nature does not exclude its Spirituality, but plainly indicates it.

The truth in Pantheism is that God is omnipresent & universally active in the world. ... But although pervading every thing, and in every thing, yet at the same time he is above every thing... The Bible teaches that God is the fulness of all life, and therefore recognises a veritable presence of God in all forms of the world's life; so that as regards the fulness, multifariousness, and intimacy of the divine presence, it falls short neither of Pantheism nor of Polytheism. p. 217.

Holy Scripture also considers Him not as a single person, but as absolute personality

.. Pantheism likewise demands that a self-

conscious God must from all eternity have had an object wh. might reflect His consciousness back into itself; but ac. to the biblico-Christian view, God has an object of this kind existing from all eternity in
& the distinction between the Persons of the Trinity in His own being — an object wh. renders it superfluous to suppose that the world existed from everlasting. . . He is in Himself both subject and object. . . No conception of God can be the true one wh. does not include every perfection. . . Eternally near, and yet eternally far-off.

x God is Spirit (Joh iv. 24, not "a Spirit"). Man has Spirit, God is Spirit. The whole substance of His nature, His peculiar Self, is Spirit.

(In regard to the Trinity) the very term persons has something objectionable in it, suggesting at first the notion of distinct and separate individualities, which is perfectly inapplicable to the consubstantial, and therefore inseparable hypostases of wh. the Bible speaks as Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.

. . . God the Father is the source and well-spring of the whole Godhead (Fons totius Deitatis), of that of the Son, and of that of the Spirit, who are not separate existences, but in the Father and from Him.

Trinity in the Old Test.

. . . There are hints of the Trinity (ac. to G.) in the Old Testament; also "numerous indications of a certain plurality in the divine nature, an organized

and complex unity, a mutual indwelling and co-operation of the three divine hypostases.

... The Trinitarian doctrine of Scripture is briefly this: The Father is simply God, the God, the divine subject, the source and well-spring of the Godhead of both Son and Holy Spirit; the Son is God, true God, in hypostatic distinction, though derived from the Father; and the Spirit is also truly God in a form which is predicated of the whole divine nature (for God is a Spirit, John iv., 24; and the Lord is the Spirit, 2 Cor. iii. 17), but also in hypostatic distinction from the Father and the Son, by whom He is sent, and from whom He proceeds. There is therefore at once the most essential unity and a threefold hypostatic distinction.

... A trinity of deities is common to all nations... In a commentary on the Rig veda (1300 & 600 B.C.) it is said: There are three Deities, but there is only one Godhead, the great Soul... In the Celtic, Germanic, & Slavic mythology we find the same idea of a Divine Trinity.

Schelling ... Schelling says: "The philosophy of mythology proves that a Trinity of Divine Potentialities is the root from which have grown the religious ideas of all nations of any importance that are known to us." "This idea does not exist because there is Christianity; on the contrary,

Christianity exists because this idea is the most original of all."

.. The fulness of God's being cannot be contained in an abstract Unity, and yet his absolute personality must have unity for its fundamental attribute. ib. 270.

The conception of the triune God furnishes us with the sole bridge that can fill up the breach between God and the world. .. No true Theism without the Trinity. p. 271.

Delitzsch ... Ac. to Delitzsch, "the triune God is — 1. Absolute Life, the impulse of whose development is an act of will. 2. Absolute Love. 3. Absolute Organism, wh. unites in itself the essential characteristics of nature (substantial objectivity without self-consciousness) and Spirit (self-consciousness without substantial objectivity). As the highest identity, it must combine these two factors, wh., in the world, are separated; the latter raises it above created nature, the former above created Spirit, so that it embraces both."

... Because God is love, therefore there must be distinctions in Him, which, however, by love are again brought into unity ... This object cannot be the transitory world, but only the Son.

A human trinity ... Augustine and others speak of a human trinity, consisting in the threefold function of feeling, thought and will. ... Every sentence

Trinity

consists of subject, predicate, and copula — three parts which together express one thought. ... The fundamental schema of all spiritual development is always position, contraposition, higher unity of both (thesis, antithesis, synthesis.) ... We have the one space divided into three dimensions of length, breadth, and height; time, similarly, into past, present, & future; all bodies into solid, liquid, and gaseous. ... The kingdom of sound is governed by the triad as the basis of all (sounds) chords; nor does this destroy the original unity of the key-note, but, on the contrary, makes it an organised unity embracing multiplicity. The three fundamental colors, red, yellow, and blue, dissolve into the unity of white light — so that this may well be called a trinity in unity. But they coalesce in such a manner "that each of the three rays preserves its distinctive attribute. Red is the caloric, yellow the luminous, blue the chemical (actinic) ray." God is Light; and, verily, natural light, the first of His creatures, bears the immediate impress of His triune Being. (Other analogies are drawn from Nature). ib. v. p. 278.

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Hegel on Trinity

Hegel calls the idea of the Trinity "the pivot of the world." &c. to him, the Father is God as self-existent, or as it were self-enclosed; He discloses Himself as the Son, and in this form takes upon Him the

form of individual being, thereby compensating the contrariety between the Absolute and the Individual. The latter, however, is not the adequate form of absolute being; therefore it undergoes death, and rises again as the Spirit; — or, in other words, the Father is God in the abstract, mere universality; the Son is infinite particularity; the Spirit is phenomenality or individuality as such.

.. &c. to Schelling, God is the perfect Spirit in three forms: proceeding from Himself, existing by Himself, reverting to Himself. The Father is the Author of matter, the Son the Author of form, and the Spirit the ultimate Cause of the world as the unity of both.

J. N. Fichte ... J. H. Fichte distinguishes between a real objective and an ideal subjective aspect of the Divine essence, combined in a third and higher principle, viz. that of volition or love.

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Liebig Liebig says: "Some philosophers have affirmed that life has existed from eternity. Natural science, however, has proved that at a certain period the earth's temperature was such that no organic life could exist, and that, therefore, it must have had a beginning."

.. What Müller once said still remains true:

Müller "Only a miraculous interruption of the natural laws can form the living organism out of lifeless matter." Here, at all events, we have a

beginning, which we can only explain through a creative act, i.e. through a miracle. And how did Spirit first enter the world? how man, with the law of Conscience which transcends all the laws of nature?

Humboldt on Strauss

. . . Many years ago, Humboldt remarked: "What I do not like in Strauss is the scientific frivolity with which he finds no difficulty in accepting the generation of organic matter from inorganic; or even the formation of man from some primeval Chaldæan Shine. (Letters to Varnhagen.) ib. p. 305.

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x Miracles post-Christian

Christlieb says: "With regard to the Continuance of miracles after the apostolic age, we have testimonies not only from Tertullian and Origen, who tell us that many in their time were convinced against their will of the truth of Christianity by miraculous visions, but also much later from Theodore of Mopsuestia (†429). The latter says: "Many heathen amongst us are being healed by Christians from whatever sicknesses they may have; so abundant are miracles in our midst." p. 321.

Christlieb accepts what he regards as miraculous as happening as late as 1858. (See p. 333).

Miraculous Cure of a cripple by "an earnest native Christian". "The lame man, with kindred faith, raised himself on his staff & walked," &c.

See p. 335.

If one does not believe in the miraculous creation of man, he must believe in his descent from the monkey, and further back in his generation, from the original Slime. . . .

"Every way of a man is right in his own eyes; but the Lord pondereth the hearts." (Prov. xxi. 2).

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Modern Miracles

Christlieb, who has written the most able and complete vindication of Christian Theism, including the whole evangelical system, pleads not only in behalf of miracles in the apostolic ages and as late as the 4th century, but of miracles in our own age. He says: - - "What a wonderful deliverance that of the crew of the missionary ship Harmony which every year visits the Moravian stations on the coast of Labrador and supplies them with provisions! Some years ago an iceberg was one day perceived drifting rapidly towards the vessel. A moment more, and it would have inevitably been dashed to pieces. At a distance of only one foot from the ship, the monster suddenly stopped in its course, and drifted away again. I myself have heard the captain of the Harmony attest the truth of this incident, which the entire crew declared to be a miracle. Cases of this sort, especially as regards the marvellous deliverances of children, could be multiplied indefinitely, but they belong to miracles in the wider sense."

"You all know with what victorious faith

Modern Miracles

Luther once wrestled with God in prayer at the bedside of the dying Melanchthon, and how he then with firm confidence went up to the sick man, who felt that his last hour had come, and taking him by the hand, said, "Be of good cheer, Philip, you shall not die", and how from that hour Melanchthon revived."

"Albrecht Bengel, famous as the best interpreter of Holy Scripture in the last century, relates that a girl in a little town of S. Germany (Leonberg, near Stuttgart), who had been paralysed for twenty years, was suddenly healed by the prayer of faith. The case was examined and publicly certified to be a miracle. And surely the veracity of an informant like Bengel cannot be questioned."

"But these signs and wonders do not possess the same force and clearness as the biblical miracles."

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Exceptional Laws in regard to water.

And not only does the entrance of higher forms of life interrupt the chain of natural causes: for within the different grades of existence themselves, we see the universal laws broken by exceptions in certain points. The only exception to the law, that heat expands and cold contracts, is water, which is most dense and heavy at a temperature of 4° (Cent.), but expands and becomes lighter below this mark. For this reason, the heavy water of the temperature above-mentioned remains below, otherwise a few cold days would turn all our

waters into ice, and our countries would have the climates of the frigid zones. Thus we see in the case of water how God breaks through an otherwise universal law of nature, in order to make a greater part of the earth's surface habitable." This speaks at the same time against the unconscious mundane soul of the pantheist; for the laws of such a being would allow of no exceptions in favor of a higher aim. p. 305.

Arguments for primal Cause

It is sometimes argued from the effect to the cause, thus: All existence is the effect of some cause, &c., in its turn is the effect of another cause; and so on until we arrive at some first cause, which is not the effect of any other, but is itself the cause of its own existence (cf. the Aristotelian expression, 'first mover' prōton kinoun). At other times it is argued from the accidental to the necessary, thus: That there is no accidental — that is, what can be otherwise or not — without a corresponding necessary (used in this form by the school of Leibnitz and Wolff). Since the time of Kant it has been justly held that this argument only proves the existence of an unconditioned essence, eternal and self-subsisting, which forms the groundwork of everything else; but not that this essence must be an unique and personal Being. ib. p. 172.

Hegel – Finney – Stebbins.

Hegel on the planets

Hegel believed that he had philosophically proved that there could not be more than eleven planets; and in his time there were not more than eleven known. Subsequently, however, more exact astronomical investigation has added several dozens to this number. p. 81. (Hegel also believed, ours is the only inhabited planet. E. S.)

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Finney

The substance of the world is the intelligence of the world, and that intelligence is revealed primarily – not to but in man... The rocks, hills, valleys, rivers, ocean, and stars gleam with the white splendor of the Divine Reason... The glory of sun and stars is eclipsed by the glory of that reason, of that soul, that can weigh and measure sun and stars. — C. J. Finney.

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With the decay of faith in dogmas is coming the better day of faith in the soul, and in the truths of the soul. All that is in the Infinite Spirit is in the spirit of man, less in degree and scope, but the same in kind. Justice, love, freedom, fraternity, immortality, are in and of us.... From the Spirit of man, as from a fountain, the intuitions leap up and sparkle. Love is spontaneous, and asks no leave to be. Justice is from within. So of freedom and fraternity. When Shakspeare said,

"To thine own self be true," &c.

what did he mean? He turned within to those

high qualities of honor and reverence and fraternity that he knew were in and of the spirit of man, making up its very nature and being, and by virtue of which it is immortal. . . The truths within are "first things", and reason and experience will but verify and illustrate them. G. B. Stebbins.

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Spiritism

It is a mistake to suppose that it is sufficient for certain incredulous persons to witness these extraordinary (Spiritual) phenomena in order to be convinced. Those who refuse to admit the existence of a soul or Spirit in man will hardly admit one outside of him; and consequently denying a cause they will deny the effect. Thus almost always they approach the subject with a preconceived idea, and their minds made up to a repudiation which divests them from all serious and impartial observations. Allan Kardec's Qu'est-ce que le Spiritisme. p. 71

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Perispirit

Le corps est pour l'Esprit une enveloppe matérielle qu'il revêt temporairement. Outre cette enveloppe, l'Esprit en a une seconde semi-matérielle qui l'unit à la première, et à laquelle on donne le nom de périsprit. p. 74 ib.

. . La mort n'est ainsi que la destruction de la grossière enveloppe de l'Esprit. . . En se dépouillant de son corps matériel, l'Esprit conserve le périsprit qui constitue pour lui une sorte de corps éthéré, vaporeux, et de forme humaine qui paraît être la forme type. ib. p. 74.

Kardec — E. S.

Marvels Ces phénomènes étant fondés sur une loi de la nature n'ont rien de merveilleux ni de surnaturel dans le sens vulgaire de ces mots : .. Beaucoup de faits ne sont réputés surnaturels que parce qu'on n'en connaît pas la cause ; le Spiritisme en leur assignant une cause les fait rentrer dans le domaine des phénomènes naturels.

Parmi les faits qualifiés de surnaturels, il en est beaucoup dont le Spiritisme démontre l'impossibilité, et qu'il range parmi les croyances superstitieuses. Le Livre des Médiums. p. 14, 15.

.. Miracle, par son étymologie, chose admirable à voir ; aujourd'hui (Selon l'Académie) il se dit d'un acte de la puissance divine contraire aux lois de la nature. p. 16. ib.

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Que sont ces Esprits ? .. On sut bientôt, par eux-mêmes, que ce ne sont point des êtres à part dans la création, mais les propres âmes de ceux qui ont vécu sur la terre ou dans d'autres mondes. ib.

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And in this prospective unity may not matter and mind be reconciled at last ? May not matter prove to be consolidated thought, and the Spirit which manifests mind a form of Sublimated matter ? (E. S.)

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Chemistry shows us how all the elements of the body may exist in a gaseous state ; how even

blood, being mostly water, may be changed into oxygen and hydrogen; how, indeed, all the solid bodies of the earth may be held in solution, invisible to human eyes, in our atmosphere. Thus there is nothing contrary to science in the idea that all the elements of our individuality may inhere in an ethereal, invisible body as well as in a body ponderable, visible and tangible. (E. S.)

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Brown-Sequard

At the semi-annual meeting of the National Academy of Sciences at Washington, D. C. April 21st, 1874, Dr. Brown-Sequard said in regard to the "pretended" localization of the functions of the brain, that he did not believe such localizations to be possible. He said that in certain cases fully one half of a brain had been destroyed, without there being manifested any external symptoms whatever. Had there been any functions localized in that part of the brain, their operation should have ceased. Strong arguments were drawn from the disease called aphasia, or loss of the faculty of expressing ideas by speech. The faculty of speech had been localized in certain parts of the brain, and yet those parts could be entirely extirpated without rendering the patient aphasiac. In one case such a destruction of brain matter lasted over twenty years without any destruction of speech. Dr. Ferrier's recent experiments with monkeys by electricity proved nothing. Again

the power of breathing had been localised in the Medulla oblongata. That could be removed entire without cessation of breathing.

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Men but little dream what it is that secretly prompts them, as Cowper expresses it, –

"— To darken and put out
Eternal truth by everlasting doubt."

The cause lies down in the hidden chambers of the soul: in a strong aversion to recognize physical effects as the operation of Spiritual Causes.

Geo. Bush.

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Ac. to Swedenborg the Lord alone has life in himself; he is Self-existing Substance, the Eternal & all infinite inexhaustible fountain of life, and consequently no created being has any other than derived and momentarily dependent life. He is life because he is Love, and all life is an emanation of Love. Thus Life is not Created. Life, Law, and Wisdom, Light and Heat are not creative (Created.?) Creation is predicated of the organs and receptacles into which these principles flow, but not of the principles themselves.

.. "The conception of man from a father is not any conception of life but only the conception of the first and purest form receptible of life, to which as a stamen or initiament are successively added in the womb the substances & materials adapted to the reception of life in its order and in its degree."

ib.

The essential life is in the Love, or, if you please, in the Love & Wisdom united – that is to say, in the Will & the Understanding – the two elemental receptacles into which the Divine influx flows. . . Love is the life of the understanding and of the thought – hence derived, and hence of the whole man.

Thus the interior life of the spirit is really the life of the material organism, notwithstanding all the attempts of chemical physiology to establish a separate vitality in the body. . . Thus the body is derived from the soul, and a man's life is fundamentally his love. . . .

The departure of the soul or spirit from the body is the departure of the life; the life, therefore, resides in the spirit. . . .

The genesis of Wisdom from Love is this: Love, originating in the Lord as a sun, is the heat of life (or vital heat) in angels and men; consequently it is their life, and the derivations of love are called affections, and by these are produced perceptions, and consequently thoughts; therefore wisdom in its origin is love. . . The life of the love is always the <u>esse</u>, and the life of the understanding the <u>existere</u>, of being; the one the substance, the other the form.

"Man is an organ of life, and what produces sense and perception flows in from an extraneous source and <u>the life itself</u> causes man to feel and perceive as from himself." Swed. G. Bush.

G. Bush - Swedenborg.

A body of water collected in a reservoir, and afterwards cut off from its source, illustrates the common idea of life; that of a lake perpetually fed from a fountain, illustrates the true idea. There is no life in the Universe, but what is momentarily sustained by connection with its source. G. Bush.

.. It is one and the same life, variously modified, which pervades the angelic, human, animal and vegetable worlds.

.. Beasts are expressly said to have a Soul wh. is Spiritual to the same degree with that of men and into this is the influx of the divine life, but the influx does not perpetuate the recipient forms, and consequently their Spiritual organism is destroyed at death never to be restored.

.. "Unless a Spiritual principle from the Lord continually acted upon primitive forms (of the vegetable world) wh. are in the seeds, they never would vegetate and grow in so wonderful a manner and succession."

Mysterious that one and the same divine vital element should manifest itself under such different aspects! But there are some analogies in nature. The divine influx descends through degrees. Take the element Steam, acting on machinery, &c. Descending a degree you find it in the form of water. Continuing our descent downward we have it (apparently deadened to inertia) in the form of Snow & ice. G. Bush.

At one end of the chain a subtle vapor of immense activity, intensity, and force; at the other, a cold, sluggish, inert mass! It is the same agent, existing in different degrees.

... Thus human life is the existence of human beings, or in other words there is no such thing, in propriety of speech, as a vital principle in man's body, distinct from his Spirit as a complex of affections and intellect. There are vital functions, but no vital principle; consequently, there is no such thing as extinction of life, even in the crisis of death. A man dies, and it is common to say that his life ceases; but this cannot be unless his being ceases, for his life is in the esse of his being, and in nothing else. While he was in the body, his Spirit, that is, his being, was the proximate cause of certain vital functions, and when the cause is removed the effect ceases; but the life of the man is commensurate with the eternity of his existence.

... "As love is the esse of a man's life it is evident that such as a man's life has been in the world, such is his lot after death ... By living experience it has been given to know what sort of lot awaits everyone, namely, that it is a lot according to his life."

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The ancients called the Spiritual body "the pneumatic vehicle."

Kant – Meurer.

Kant on Ghosts, &c. Notwithstanding all the narrations of apparitions, and visions concerning the Spiritual world, of wh. a great number of the most probable are known to me, I have always considered it to be most in agreement with the rule of sound reason to incline to the negative side; not as if I had imagined such a case to be impossible, although we know very little concerning the nature of a spirit, but because the instances are not in general sufficiently proved. There arise, moreover, from the incomprehensibility and inutility of this sort of phenomena, too many difficulties. ... This is the position in which my mind stood for a long time, until the accounts of Swedenborg came to my notice. (Referring to Swedenborg's acct. of the fire going on in Stockholm, Kant asks: "What can be brought forward against the authenticity of this occurrence?" See Hobart's Life of Swed. G. H. Lewes says that in Kant's Anthropologie §§ 35 & 39 his energetic contempt for Swedenborgianism and all other Schwärmerei (reveries) is unequivocally expressed.)

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Jul. Meurer Leipzig 1871 If Materialism confined itself to the domain of matter as its legitimate sphere of investigation, it would have a fair claim to the title of "Positivism." But when it presumes to deny altogether the existence of spirit and of occult forces

exerted by spirit on matter, it not only goes beyond its province, but it incapacitates itself from finding any solution whatsoever of the momentous problems connected with man's origin and destiny; since phenomenal man alone as a mere apparitional, material being comes within the scope of his five senses. Jul. Meurer (Re-incarnationist).

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Material man is phenomenal, temporary. Spirit is the real permanent existence or essence. Matter in itself is dead and motionless and can only be moved or called into life by an (superior) active force from without. But Spirit — whether as God, as the parent, or as inferior spirit, as Child — possesses a force wh. it exerts both centrifugally and centripetally; centrifugally, by projecting itself through infinite gradations downwards upon substances of more or less density, and centripetally, by attracting to itself the needful matter to form a sensuous, tangible body. This force is called Spiritual magnetism by some, perisprit by others, and soul or Spiritual body by others. ib. "Philosophico-Spiritualistic Reflections on ~~the~~ Human Spirit." Leipzig, 1871.

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The resurrection of Christ's physical body is no proof of man's immortality. What we want is proof that man has an immortal soul or a deathless entity. If Christ's resurrection is a type of ours

and ours is a res. of the soul out of the body at death, then this must have been the nature of his resurrection to have any bearing in the case. &c. to Sp. These res. are going on every day and ever have been since death invaded the ranks of the human family. Taking the Bible for authority it was just as absolute proof man will have hereafter, when Samuel appeared at Endor in the presence of Saul, or when Moses and Elias appeared on the mount of Transfiguration as was the res. of Christ, whether physical or Spiritual... Nothing has astonished me more than the attitude the churches have assumed towards phenomenal Spiritualism, when I think of the weakness of the attack of the clergy on the citadel of unbelief. "Clericus" in Banner of Light 1868.

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It is no argument against immortality that Souls are inscrutable; for we cannot see the essence of anything whatever; and at best can become only partially acquainted with anything. Dr. P. B. Randolph.

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The appearance of corporeal identity man presents year after year is only an illusion. He begins to die the moment he begins to breathe. One particle after another is removed, interstitial death occurring even in the inmost recesses of the body. Prof. Draper's Human Physiology (pp. 10-12).

The idea of succession is inseparable from that of motion. As motion passes from point to point, its different waves succeed each other, and to this succession as a whole we apply the term time. Thus time is the sum of events, as space is the sum of forms angelic, human, animal, vital, mineral, and atomic. Without events and forms there exists neither time nor space — with them is the all of universal Being. B. of Light.

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Spirit and matter are not identical. Identification, in short, of the human skull with the spinal vertebra of an anthropoid ape accounts not for the existence of spiritual differences arising from one and the same kind of organic cell. Wm Hitchman M.D. (Freelight).

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Wm. Maccall on Dreams

We know from our psychical identity in dreams, and from its countless transfigurements, that we shall be divinely and forever awake when the dreams of earth are no more... The dreamer may have the maddest, most monstrous visions; but he ceases not for a moment to be faithful to his own individuality.
ib.

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Kingsley

If a beast can be changed into a man, then death can change the sinner into a saint — but not else. If a beast would enjoy being a man, then a sinner would enjoy being in heaven — but not else. A sinful worldly man enjoy being in heaven! Does a fish enjoy being on dry land?
Chas. Kingsley.

Every phenomenon presented to our senses, whatever its aspect, is a natural phenomenon, since its elements, the conditions of its existence, of its production, are in nature.

Du Spiritualisme Rationnel. G. H. Love p. 64

Le surnaturel est donc une expression relative qui n'a, vis-à-vis des faits, qu'une valeur provisoire. ib.

Il convient donc de supprimer le mot surnaturel, et de le remplacer par celui de super-scientifique, qui indique nettement le rang qui occupe un phénomène inexpliqué vis-à-vis de ceux accessibles à la science moderne. ib. p. 66.

Un nombre quelconque de faits negatifs ne peuvent inspirer un fait positif. p. 77.

Just before her death, Hortense de Beauharnais wrote the following letter to her son, Napoleon III: "My dear Son, - I am about to undergo an operation which has become absolutely necessary. In case it should not terminate successfully, I send you in this letter my blessing. . . Think upon this (my affection for you) . . and that, assuredly, we shall all meet again. Reflect upon this consolatory idea; it is one which is too necessary not to be true. . . Your affectionate mother, Hortense.

Among the last words of Baron Bunsen, as he lay dying, were the following, addressed to his wife: "Love, love – we have loved each other – live in the love of God, and we shall be united again! In the love of God we shall live on for ever and ever. We shall meet again, I am sure of that. Love – God is love – love eternal." .. Memoir of B. by his wife.

... Dr. M'Cosh, in his vol., The Supernatural in relation to the Nat., says of B., – "He was a firm believer in mesmerism & clairvoyance, & was apt to connect them with the inspirations of the writers of the Bible." He believed his daughter was cured by the laying on of hands by Count Czapansy in 1854.

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Identity Spirits

I have preached as a maxim of my observations in animal magnetism and Spiritual Manifestations that the belief or conviction of a seeing medium as to the identity of a spirit is not evidence per se ... I regard your Spirit-Seeing as unreliable or rather immature experiences, because they have no other basis of credit than your convictions at the time of their occurrence. I have added Swedenborg, Davis, Fishbough, and others as illustrious examples of a like character. Visions are no evidence unless they are supported by other considerations than the assertion of the seer. The seer, while seeing, is

Wigan.

psycho-negative, and receives impressions from whatsoever mind or minds with which he is in mesmeric rapport, with religious reverence as an indisputable revelation. . Vain is it to rely on the integrity and childlike honesty of the seer's outer-life character as a protection against illusion on this topic; the world's history is full to overflowing of the recorded Contradictions of Seers.

John F. Gray to Judge Edmonds Chrismas 1854

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Wigan: The brain itself may be removed, may be cut away down to the corpus callosum without destroying life. The animal lives and performs all the functions wh. are necessary to simple vitality, but no longer has a mind. It cannot think or feel. It requires that the food should be pushed into the stomach; once there it is digested, and the animal will even thrive and grow fat. We infer, therefore, that the part of the brain, the convolutions, is simply intended for the exercise of the intellectual faculties, whether of the low degree called instinct, or of the exalted kind bestowed on man, the gift of reason. Dr. Wigan. See p. 75.

"No case of both cerebral hemispheres being much injured without mental disturbance"
Dr. Brigham.

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Nothing can be more false than the notion that a truly scientific, intelligent acquaintance with Spiritualism could lead, in the present state of the Science of the universe, to anything so degrading to humanity as a worship of Spirits. On the contrary

the great lesson of modern Spiritualism is one that leads us directly away from all such tendencies; for it teaches us that spirits are not at once elevated into a sort of gods, but that they carry with them their human characteristics; that they enter on the next stage of being with the good or evil they have attracted to themselves in this life; and that many of them are in moral enlightenment and mental ability far below a large class of mortals yet in the flesh.

"Spiritism", says Mr. T. L. Harris (the theocrat) as distinguished from Spirituality, belongs to one of the lowest stages of human society. Its phenomena belong (1) to the barbaric era of religious sentiment; and (2) to epochs of religious decay. Races, as they sink into an infirm, obsolete culture (? cultus?) make Spiritism at last their sole religion, as with the dense masses of China. ... Spiritism does not develope Spirituality; it produces rather a ghostly and attenuated materialism. ... It is orderly to communicate with spirits, if our special human uses makes it necessary to explore the ground of their operation in the human frame, in the social body, &c., just as the medical student uses the dead body for purposes of education in his calling, or walks the hospitals, or devotes long and painful days to the sad and terrible days of insanity". E.S. See London Sp. May 2. 1874.

the always determines duty, &c.

Kant on Freedom & Necessity.

Kant

When it is admitted that the intelligible person may, in regard of any given act, be free, even while he, as a person belonging in part to the world of sense, is mechanically conditioned, it still seems as if we must admit that the actions of mankind have their determining ground in somewhat entirely beyond their power, so soon as we admit that God, as the author of all things, is the cause of the existence of substance (a position which cannot be deserted without abandoning all theology). Here it would seem that all man's actions have their last ground in the causality of a Supreme Being different from himself; and in truth, if the actions of man, which belong to his modifications in time, be not mere determinations of him as phenomena, but of him as a thing-in-itself, then freedom would irrecoverably be lost, — man would be an automaton, wound up and set agoing by some supreme artist. His self-consciousness would no doubt make him a thinking automaton, where, however, the consciousness of his spontaneity, if deemed freedom, were illusory, as it could only be called so, comparatively speaking, since the next determinators of his movements, and their series up to their last cause would, it is true, be internal, but the last and highest would be met with in a different hand.

In consequence of this, I cannot see how they

who insist on regarding space and time as modes pertaining to the existence of the things in themselves, can escape the fatality of actions. Or if (as Mendelsohn did) they declare them requisite only to the existence of finite and derived beings, but no conditions of an Infinite and Illimitable Supreme, then, first, it is incomprehensible upon what title this distinction is asserted; and second, how they propose to escape the contradiction of making existence in time a necessary modification of Finites; God being the cause of their existence, while He yet cannot be the cause of the existence of time and space, these being, on this assumption, necessary a priori conditions of the existence of things themselves. And so His Causality would be conditioned in regard of the existence of things; after which, all the objections to God's Infinitude and Independency must again cater; whereas, on the contrary, the determining the Divine Existence as independent on any conditions of time, as contradistinguished from that of a being of the sensible world, is quite easy upon our theory, as it is just the discriminating betwixt the existence of a being-in-itself, and its existence phenomenally. So that if the Ideality of space and time be not admitted, Spinozism is the only alternative, where space and time are taken for essential modes of the Supreme Being; and the

things which depend on Him (i.e., we ourselves) are not substances, but accidents inhering in Him, because, if these things exist only as His effects in time, which time conditions their existence-in-itself, then all actions of such a product would be just actions of this Supreme, which He performed somewhere and somewhen. Spinozism, therefore, notwithstanding the absurdity of its main idea, concludes more logically than the creation-theory can, when beings in time are stated as substances, and as effects of Supreme Cause, and yet denied to belong to God and His actions.

The solution of the said difficulty can be effected shortly and clearly as follows:— If existence-in-time is a mere sensitive kind of representing, appertaining to the thinking subjects in the world, and so quite unrelated to things-in-themselves, then the creating of these latter beings is a creating of things-in-themselves, because the notion of creation has nowhat to do with the sensitive representing of an entity, but refers to Noumena.

When, then, I say of beings in the sensible world, "they are created," so far I regard them as Noumena. And as it would import a contradiction to affirm that God is the originator of the Phenomena, so it is likewise a contradiction to affirm that He is, as creator, cause of the actions which, as phenomena, are exhibited in the sensible world, although He is cause of the existence of the agent as a Noumenon.

And if now it is possible to assert freedom without prejudice to the mechanism of the system of actions as phenomena, then it cannot make the least difference that the agent is regarded as created, since creation refers to intelligible, not to sensible existence, and so cannot be figured as a ground of the determination of phenomena; which result, however, would fall out the other way if the finite beings existed in time as things in themselves, since then the Creator of the substance would be the author of all the machinery attaching to the substance.

Of so vast importance is the separation of time from the existence of real entities, effected in the Critique.

The solution of this difficulty here advanced is exceedingly difficult itself, it will be said, and appears hardly susceptible of a lucid explanation; but is there any other which has been yet attempted more easy and more comprehensible?

... Thus we understand how it is the practical faculties alone which can help us beyond the sensible world, and procure us a knowledge of a supersensible order and combination of things; which knowledge can, however, be extended only so far as is just requisite for a pure practical purpose.

The Metaphysic of Ethics. By Immanuel Kant. Translated by J. W. Semple. Edinburg: T. & T. Clark. 1871.

H. G. Atkinson.

Spirit is the essence and life of matter, or, in other words, its soul and inmost nature, as the efficient cause and formative principle. These expressions, I think, bear as closely upon the fact, as may be, and beyond all is mystery... The possible separation of this essential nature or spirit as an independent progressive being is the problem of the day, and it is a great point gained in the inquiry — the perception that "there is not the slightest antagonism between materialism and Spiritualism when properly understood, or, we may say, understood at all." All intelligent Spiritualists are rising to this highly Spiritual conception of the substance of nature recognised in the change and transmutation of material conditions, as well as now in the transmutations, correlations, and permanence of force. How Spiritual the nature of air compared to Earth! but what is air to that ethereal and Spiritual medium that transmits light from the distant stars, travelling millions of miles, passing through our windows, and to sensitive nerves, giving us the perception of the star. It is sensible and living light, and we cannot suppose that the all-pervading Spiritual substance — if substance we must call it — of the medium of light or other power ever changes its Spiritual character and rare nature. Thus we see how science is bringing us to the conception of a Spiritual nature, permanent and pervading all things, at once the source and medium of all life and of all power.

To have got rid of the stupid notion of a dead matter is a great step, and to spiritualise matter instead of materialising Spirit in the old notion.

Henry G. Atkinson in Medium & Daybreak, May 15, 1874.

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The death of dogma is the birth of morality .. Kant.

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They call us materialists because we affirm what science affirms, and deny what science denies. Where they place in the first of our race a blessed innocence, we see only a tottering infancy; where they affirm an original sin, condemning all mankind, we see only the first awakening of conscience, a primal notion of good and evil, and the earliest step of progress. We do not believe that life was intended to be a torment, nor a lazy contemplation of the joys beyond the tomb, but a scene of activity in striving for perfection here on Earth. Filippo de Boni's Reason & Dogma Milan. 1866.

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We may say with Hook that the believing strange things possible may perhaps be an occasion of taking notice of such things as another would pass by without regard as useless. ... The facts recorded concerning these matters (clairvoyance, mediumship, &c.) are facts in one sense or another, and they demand explanation, either as new phenomena, or as the result of combined credulity and imposture. Jevons. See over.

Jevons.

A phenomenon which entirely fails to be explained by any known laws may indicate the interference of some wholly new series of natural forces. (The doctrine of the loadstone was anciently thought to contradict the law of gravitation. But there is no breach in the general law of gravity). We may expect that from time to time new and extraordinary phenomena will be discovered, and will lead to new views of the laws of nature. The recent observations, for instance, that the resistance of a bar of Selenium to a current of electricity is effected in an extraordinary degree by rays of light falling upon the Selenium, points to a wholly new relation between light and electricity.

. . . No one can have lived long without experiencing sorrowful events of which the significance is inexplicable. But if we cannot succeed in avoiding contradiction in our notions of elementary geometry, can we expect that the intimate purposes of existence shall present themselves to us with perfect clearness?

I can see nothing to forbid the notion that in a higher state of intelligence, much that is now obscure may become clear. We perpetually find ourselves in the position of finite minds attempting infinite problems, and can we be sure that where we see contradictions, an infinite

intelligence might not discover perfect logical harmony? ... Our science will not deny the existence of things because they cannot be weighed and measured. It will rather lead us to believe that the wonders and subtleties of possible existence surpass all that our mental powers allow us clearly to perceive. The study of abstract logical and mathematical forms has seemed to convince me that even Space itself is no requisite condition of Conceivable existence. ... For all that I can see, then, there may be intellectual existences to which both time and space are nullities. ... I do not accept Kant's doctrine that space is a necessary form of thought. I regard it as an accident, and an impediment to pure logical reasoning.

... Among the unquestionable rules of Scientific Method is that first law that whatever phenomenon is, is. We must ignore no existence whatever; we may variously interpret or explain its meaning and origin, but if a phenomenon does exist, it demands some kind of explanation. If then there is to be a competition for scientific recognition, the world without us must yield to the undoubted existence of the Spirit within.

The Principles of Science. A Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method, by W. Stanley Jevons F. R. S.
Macmillan & Co. 1874.

Our own hopes and wishes and determinations are the most undoubted phenomenon within the sphere of consciousness. ib.

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Recompense kindness with kindness, and injury with justice. .... Tze-Kung asked, Is there one word which may serve as a rule for one's whole life? Confucius answered, 'Is not Reciprocity such a word? What you do not wish done to yourself, do not to others.'
The Sacred Anthology. Collected by Moncure D. Conway.

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'Who can deservedly be called a conqueror?' He who conquers his rancorous passions, and endeavors to turn his enemy into a friend.
ib. Talmud.

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Moses cried, 'Where, O Lord, shall I find thee?' God said, 'Know that when thou hast sought, thou hast already found me.' ... One asked a Bedouin, 'How knowest thou that God exists?' He answered, 'Does the dawn then need a torch to be seen?' Arabic.

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They say that on the last day there will be Settlements, and that the dear God will give himself up to wrath. But from goodness itself only good can emanate. Fear not; the end shall be full of sweetness. Persian.

The man who considers all beings as existing even in the Supreme Spirit, and the Supreme Spirit as pervading all beings, henceforth views no creature with contempt. Hindu. ib.

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If because I have done ill Thou shouldst do ill to me, what were the difference, O, Lord, between Thee and me? Persian.

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Aboo-Hanifah died in prison at Bagdad, wherein he was cast by the Calif Almansor for refusing to subscribe to the doctrine Cadha (absolute predestination). This famous teacher having once received a severe blow, said to the man who struck him, 'I am able to return injury for injury, but this will I not do: I am able to complain of thee to the Calif, but will not complain: I am able to utter in my prayers to God the outrage you have inflicted, but from that I shall guard myself most carefully. Finally, in the day of judgment I shall be able to demand upon thee divine vengeance: but if that day should arrive this moment and my intercession should avail, I would not enter Paradise unless in thy company.' Arabic 7th Cent. (D'Herb.)

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It is the determination of the spotless not to do evil in return to those who have done evil to them. Hindu.

Huxley.

never will I seek, nor receive, private individual Salvation – never enter into final peace alone; but for ever, and everywhere, will I live and Strive for the aniversal redemption of every creature throughout all worlds. Until all are delivered, never will I leave the world of Sin, Sorrow, and Struggle, but will remain where I am. Chinese. Kwan-yin, a Buddhist divinity.

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Thou Sayest, 'When I leave enough I will relieve the distressed.' How I pity thee! Thou wilt never relieve them. Chinese (Albiti).

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Prof. Huxley Says: "The question of questions for mankind – the problem which underlies all others, and is more interesting than any other – is the ascertainment of the place which Man occupies in Nature and of his relation to the universe of things. Whence our race has come, what are the limits of our power over nature, and of nature's power over us, to what goal are we tending, are the problems which present themselves anew and with undiminished interest to every man born into the world."*

And yet Prof Huxley could say of the phenomena of Spiritualism: "But Supposing the phenomena to be genuine – they do not interest one." Phenomena which so wonderfully illustrate that "power over Nature", referred to above!

* Evidences of Man's Place in Nature.

Pantheism
Chas. Hodge

The leading principles of the Pantheistic theory are, – (1.) That there is an Infinite and Absolute Being. Of this Being nothing can be affirmed but actuality. It is denied that it is conscious, intelligent, or voluntary. (2.) It is subject to the blind necessity of self-evolution or development. (3.) This development being necessary is constant; from everlasting to everlasting. According to the Brahminical doctrine, indeed, there are successive cycles of activity and repose, each cycle being measured by countless milliards of centuries. According to the moderns, self-evolution being necessary, there can be no repose, so that Ohne Welt kein Gott. (4.) The Finite is, therefore, the existence form of the Infinite; all that is in the latter for the time being, is in the former. All that is possible is actual. (5.) The Finite is the Infinite, or, to use theistic language, the World is God, in the sense that all the world is and contains is the form in which God, at each successive moment, exists. There is no power save only the power manifested in the world; no consciousness, intelligence, or voluntary activity, but in finite things, and the aggregate of these is the power, consciousness, and activity of God. What we call sin is as much a form of God's activity as what we call virtue. In other words there is no

such thing as free agency in man, no such thing as sin or responsibility. When a man dies he sinks into the abyss of being as a drop of water is lost in the ocean. (O.) Man is the highest form of God's existence. God is incarnate in the human race. Strauss says, that what the Church teaches of Christ is not true of any individual man, but is true of mankind.

What is Darwinism? By Chas. Hodge. Princeton. N.J.

Hodge. Epicurus

Epicurus assumed the existence of matter, force, and motion. He held that all space was filled with molecules of matter in a state of rapid motion in every direction. These molecules were subject to gravity, and endowed with properties or forces. One combination of molecules gave rise to unorganized matter, another to life, another to mind; and from the various combinations, guided by unintelligent physical laws, all the wonderful organisms of plants and animals have arisen. To these combinations also all the phenomena of life, instinct, and intelligence in the world are to be referred. The theory has been adopted in our day by a large class of scientific men, especially in Germany. H.

Spencer

"It is," says Herbert Spencer, "rigorously impossible to conceive that our knowledge is a knowledge

of appearances only, without at the same time conceiving a reality of which they are appearances, for appearance without reality is unthinkable." "There are an Ego and a non-Ego, a subject and object. These are not identical." "That is the noumenon which underlies the phenomenon, it is impossible for us to know."

As the question, "What is matter?" is a crucial one, he dwells upon it in various parts of his writings. Newton's theory of ultimate atoms; Leibnitz's doctrine of monads; and the dynamic theory of Boscovich, which takes matter mere centres of force, are all dismissed as unthinkable. ib. p. 14.

Spencer "Our conception of matter," Spencer says, "reduced to its simplest shape, is that of coexistent positions that offer resistance, as contrasted with our conception of space in which the coexistent positions offer no resistance. (p. 166). Resistance, however, is a form of force; and, therefore, on the following page, Spencer says, "That forces standing in certain correlations, form the whole contents of our idea of matter." ib.

Spencer "Let those who can," says Spencer, "believe that there is eternal war between our intellectual

faculties and our moral obligations. I, for one, admit of no such radical vice in the Constitution of things." ib. p. 18.

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Jacobi. "I confess to Anthropomorphism inseparable from the Conviction that Man bears the image of God; and maintain that besides this Anthropomorphism, which has always been called Theism, is nothing but Atheism or Fetichism." ib. p. 19.

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We have then no God but Force... We doubt not Mr. Spencer would indignantly reject the imputation of atheism; nevertheless, in the judgment of most Men, the difference between Antitheist and Atheist is a mere matter of orthography. Hodge. (ib.) p. 20.

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Hylozoic Theory. This theory assumes the universe to be eternal. There is nothing extra, or antemundane. There is but one substance, and that substance is matter. Matter, however, has an active and passive principle. Life and rationality are among its attributes or functions. The universe, therefore, is a living Whole pervaded by a principle not only of life but of intelligence. The hylozoic doctrine, some modern Scientific Men, as Prof. Tyndall, seem inclined to adopt.

ib.

Mr. Alfred Russell Wallace, the companion and peer of Mr. Darwin, devotes a large part of his book on "Natural Selection", to prove that the organs of plants and animals are formed by blind physical causes. Toward the close of the volume he teaches that there are no such causes. He asks the question, "What is Matter?" and answers, "Nothing. We know," he says, "nothing but force; and as the only force of which we have any immediate knowledge is mind-force, the inference is "that the whole universe is not merely dependent on, but actually is, the will of higher intelligences, or of one Supreme Intelligence." This is a transition from virtual materialism to idealistic pantheism.

Hodge. p. 24.

V. "The Theory of Natural Selection. By Alfred Russell Wallace. London 1870. p. 358.

"Science", says the Duke of Argyll, "in the modern doctrine of Conservation of energy and the convertibility of forces, is already getting a firm hold of the idea, that all kinds of force are but forms of manifestations of one central force issuing from some one fountain-head of power. Sir John Herschel has not hesitated to say, "that it is but reasonable to regard the force of gravitation as the direct or indirect result of a consciousness or a will existing Somewhere."

Hodge – Haeckel.

Haeckel

Dr. Ernst Haeckel, Professor in the University of Jena, is said to stand at the head of the living naturalists of Germany. His Natürliche Schöpfungsgeschichte, Natural History of Creation, was published in 1873.

He says there have ever been two conflicting theories of the universe: the one, monistic; the other, dualistic. The one admits of only one substance, matter; the other of two, matter and mind. He prefers to call the former monism rather than materialism ... All natural science, with the law of causation at its head, is thoroughly materialistic. ... Agassiz has carried out to the utmost the absurd anthropomorphic doctrine of a Creator ... The monistic theory Haeckel calls mechanical and causal; the dualistic, teleological or vitalistic, because it refers natural organisms to causes working for the accomplishment of a given end. ... Some one adopted the idea of a metaphysical ghost called vitality.

The grand service rendered by Darwin to science is, that his theory enables us to account for the appearances of design in nature without assuming final causes, or, a mind working for a foreseen and intended end. ... All natural bodies with which we are acquainted are equally

endowed with life (gleichmässig belebt sind); that the distinction between living and dead matter does not exist. ... As to the much vaunted design in nature, it is a reality only for those whose views of animal and vegetable life are to the last degree superficial. ... Design does not exist, any more than the vaunted goodness of the Creator (die vielgerühmte Allgüte des Schöpfers).

The Spirit-body.

The spirit-body is the real individual; and though for a time it is clothed with fluctuating atoms, its identity is absolutely the same when those atoms are dispensed with. It is preserved after the death of the earth-body in precisely similar sort as it exists now, veiled in grosser matter. To us the Spirit body is clear and plain. Our view is not hindered, nor are our movements impeded by matter as it exists on your plane. What seems to you solid is to us pervious. The atoms which the Spirit-body attracts to itself, and which it keeps in a state of perpetual change around it, by the attractive power which is inherent in it, are no real part of the personality. They are not even permanent for the time of existence in this sphere; and when they are replaced by others, no change is perceptible to you. We see otherwise. To our eyes those atoms, accidents of earth-existence, are no bar. We see

the spirit-body; and when the earth-atoms are laid aside it is but the throwing off a veil which has shrouded, but has not concealed, the real individuality. The magnetic rapport which unites the Spirit body with the earth body is not severed until death. Then the cord which unites them is broken, and the Spirit body is no longer able to resume its temporary covering. "Spirit Teachings" through M. A. (Oxon.) in the London Spiritualist Jan. 10th 1874.

E. S. Is it any more surprising that from a Newton or a Shakspeare an immortal being should be evolved, than it is that from a little gum-like unsentient drop a living, thinking man should, in the process of time, be evolved? E. S.

Gasparin Catholics, Jansenists, Protestants, each attributes the extraordinary acts of the other to the devil. They all reserve miracles to themselves alone, according to their adversaries only Satanic prodigies. Now, this is natural enough, for they all understand that the truth alone has a right to miracles, if miracles there be.

Science & Religion Religion implies the supernatural; a God separate from and greater than Nature, who has a personal will and character. The pantheistic God of the Scientist does not satisfy the higher demands of the reason and the moral sense. . .

Might we not say that the Parsee religion is more scientific than the Christian? Can that be scientific which has no property of fixedness, which is undergoing modification and change from age to age? Exact knowledge does not appear to be the condition or concomitant of religion. ... That there may be a conscious projection into objectivity, a deification, of one's subjective conceptions or self-hood, I am not unaware; but where is the ground or test of certitude? How can we make this intuitional assumption scientific, as we understand scientific knowledge? A. A. Adams (Fair Haven Ct.) in Index, June 18, 1874.

Filopanti. On Pantheism

Prof. Filopanti (of Italy) writes: "I cannot honestly allow you to think that I am a Unitarian in the narrowest meaning of the word. ... I am, somehow, a Pantheist, yet a thorough believer in the unity and spiritual personality of God. ... The spiritual God controls all the parts of the material universe, from the largest sun to the smallest atom, with as much ease and harmony as the human soul can move the body to which it is united. The intimate union of the Spiritual God with the material universe constitutes the one Infinite and Supreme Being. Thus even our individual mind holds to God the relation of both a partial identity and personal distinction."

Bowles's Unitarian Review. Boston. July 1874.

Joseph Cook.

Le Conte on Deity

The region of second causes and this only is the domain of science. But the region of second causes cannot exclude the idea of the existence of God. If in tracing the chain of causes upward we stop at any cause, or force, or principle, that force or principle becomes for us God, since it is an efficient agent controlling the universe.

Prof. Joseph Le Conte, Prof. of Geology and Nat. History in University of California. 1874.

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The Root of Science in Intuition.

Teachers of the inductive sciences must not be allowed to play fast and loose with the axioms which lie at the basis of the inductive method. Physics scorning metaphysics is the stream scorning its source. Science of course is not science unless it is inductive. But behind the inductive sciences is an inductive method; and behind the inductive method are the laws of thought. Inductive science implies inductive method; inductive method implies syllogism; syllogism implies axioms; axioms, intuitive beliefs. Of necessity resting on metaphysics, science has nothing surer than its axioms of intuitive truth. But on precisely those axioms rest the inferences of free will, responsibility and the existence of a personal First Cause. Plainly wrote Aristotle, after mentioning self-evidence, necessity and universality as the traits of intuitive truth, that

they who reject the testimony of the intuitions, will find nothing surer on which to build.

As science progresses, it draws nearer in all its forms to the proofs of the Spiritual origin of force; that is, of the Divine Immanence in natural law; that is, of the omnipresence of a personal First Cause; and the religious value of this proof is transcendently great. Wherever science finds heat, light, electricity, it infers the motion of the ultimate particles of matter as the cause; wherever it finds motion of the ultimate particles of matter, it infers force as the cause; and wherever it finds force, it infers, or will yet infer, Spirit... From a paper read before the Ministers' Meeting at the Congregational House, Boston, Oct. 5, 1874, by Rev. Joseph Cook of Boston. Boston Daily Adv. Oct. 10, 1874.

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1. Matter and Mind have two sets of qualities, each the reverse of the other, and absolutely incapable of co-existence in the same substance.

2. We know that the two sets of qualities exist.

3. We know, therefore, that there are two substances in which the qualities inhere.

4. There is, therefore, a separate immaterial substance. ib.

Whoever would acquaint himself with it (the great body of testimony in favor of the phenomena of Modern Spiritualism) can do so, by consulting what has been contributed on this subject by many of the most reliable witnesses of the age; men who have been trained by their scientific pursuits to make the most searching investigations into the subject without bias and without self-deception. The best Compendium of such testimony may be found, perhaps, in that most scholarly work on Spiritualism, entitled "Planchette; the Despair of Science. Being a full account of modern Spiritualism, its phenomena, and the various theories regarding it. With a Survey of French Spiritism. Boston: Roberts Brothers, 1869." Since the publication of this work vast additions to the testimony wh. it contains on this point have been made among wh. may be particularly mentioned those by Crookes and Wallace, whose scientific reputation needs no propping here.

Prof. Hiram Corson in the Cornell Review, a Monthly Mag. by Lit. Societies of C. University. Dec. 1874.

A merely positive nature, were such possible, could never have glimpses even of the higher truths that lie within the potentialities of the Spirit of man; a merely negative nature, were such again possible, would sink into a death-in-life listlessness. The

highest form of life is that wherein a just equilibrium is preserved between the positive and the negative, or the active and the passive. All the great seers of the race, they who have penetrated deepest into what Goethe calls "the open secret", – open to all, seen by but a comparatively few, – have realized to a greater or less extent, a well-balanced dual condition; – to an all-subtilizing intellect, they have united an all-comprehensive impressibility.

A scientific education, as it is understood and usually conducted, tends toward a merely positive condition of mind, – a condition in which the subject of it may be, indeed, as is shown by a large number of distinguished scientists of the present day, as sharp as a razor, but, for that very reason, ill-adapted for opening the uncut leaves of the book of spiritual knowledge. Rev. Hiram Corson. ib.

If it takes mind to construe the world, how can it require the negation of mind to constitute it?
Jas. Martineau.

Such extremely clever Matter – matter that is up to everything, even to writing Hamlet, and finding out its own evolution, and substituting a molecular plebiscite for a divine monarchy of the world, – may fairly be regarded as a little too modest in its disclaimer of the attributes of Mind. Ib.

Truths that we cannot help believing I define as absolute truths. They do not come to us through testimony and induction.

The modern position, that truth lies in facts, we must forsake, and, with the ancients, we must place it in ideas.

The object of scientific investigation is to reach a truth wh. can neither be denied nor doubted. If religion is willing to content itself with any lower form of truth, it cannot support its claims to respect, let alone reverence.

Dan. G. Brinton, M. D. 1876.

Here is the arena of the theology of the future; not in the decrees of Councils, nor in the records of past time. Inspiration, in its religious sense, we may, therefore, define to be that Condition of Mind in wh. the truths relating to deity and duty become in whole or in part the subjects of immediate perception. ib. ... All inspired men have commenced by freeing themselves from inherited forms of belief in order that with undiverted attention they might listen to the promptings of the divinity within their souls. ib.

Ubi inveni veritatem, ibi inveni Deum meum, ipsam veritatem, quam, ex quo didici, non sum oblitus. St. Augustine. ib. p. 105.

The Hindu Skeptic.

"I think till I weary with thinking",
Said the sad-eyed Hindu King;
"And I see but shadows around me,
Illusion in everything.

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How knowest thou aught of God,
Of his favor or his wrath?
Can the little fish tell what the eagle thinks,
Or map out the eagle's path?

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Can the finite the infinite search?
Did the blind discover the stars?
Is the thought that I think a thought,
Or a throb of the brain in its bars?

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For aught my eye can discover,
Your God is what you think good—
Yourself flashed back from the glass
When the light pours on it in flood.

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You preach to me to be just;
And this is his realm, you say;
And the good are dying of hunger,
And the bad gorge every day.

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You say that he loveth mercy
And the famine is not yet gone;

Stewart & Tait.

That he hateth the shedder of blood,
And he slayeth us every one.

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You say that my soul shall live,
That the Spirit can never die —
If he were content when I was not,
Why not when I have passed by?

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You say I must have a meaning —
So must dirt, and its meaning is flowers;
What if our souls are but nurture
For lives that are greater than ours.

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When the fish swims out of the water,
When the birds soar out of the blue,
Man's thoughts may transcend man's knowledge,
And your God be no reflex of you.

London Spectator.

The Earliest Egyptian records attest the belief of this nation in the immortality of the Soul: — Dissolution, according to them, is only the cause of reproduction — nothing perishes which has once existed, and things which appear to be destroyed only change their natures and pass into another form." Wilkinson. Quoted in "The Unseen Universe", Macmillan & Co., 1875.

Boston, in his "Fourfold State", adopts the idea that a single particle of insensible perspiration which has escaped from us during life, will be sufficient to serve as a nucleus for the resurrection body. — ib. So that according to the disciples of this school, the resurrection will be preceded by a gigantic manufacture of shoddy, &c. — ib. . . . At the same time professing themselves unable to conceive such an existence as a disembodied spirit, they were forced to conclude like Priestley that the soul in its nature is not immortal. ib. (See Prof. Huxley's Birmingham Lecture.

[It is evident from what the writer of "The Unseen Universe" says, pp. 42, 43, of Spiritualism that he is poorly qualified to discuss the great theme he has ventured on. E. S.]

There must in the first place be an organ connecting the individual with the past, and in the next place there must be such a frame and such a universe that he has the power of varied action in the present. ib.

In fine, we do not hesitate to assert that the visible universe cannot comprehend (include?) the whole works of God, because it had its beginning in time, and will also come to an end. Perhaps, indeed, it forms only an infinitesimal portion

of that stupendous whole which is alone entitled to be called The Universe. ib.

A transperence from the present visible universe to an order of things entirely unconnected with it ... would be a manifest breach of the law of Continuity. ib.

Let us assume that the objective reality of the universe has been proved, and that this reality is strongly impressed upon us in virtue of that principle wh. we have called the Conservation of Matter. ib. But as soon as we grant this we are obliged by our reason ... to allow objective reality to whatever is found to be in the same sense Conserved. ib.

Energy has as much claim to be regarded as an objective reality as matter itself. (This the author proves scientifically. v. p.p. 80, 81. ib. ... But while matter is always the same, though masked in various combinations, energy is constantly changing the form in wh. it presents itself. ib. p. 81. ... The available energy of the visible universe will be appropriated ultimately by the invisible. p. 118. ib.

"Mr. Babbage", says Jevons, "has pointed out that if we had power to follow and detect the minutest effects of any disturbance, each particle of existing matter must be a register of all that has happened." p. 157. ib.

An argument derived from the beginning rather than the end of things assumes us that the invisible universe existed before the visible one. From this we conclude that the invisible universe exists now. .. It is moreover closely connected with the present system, inasmuch as this may be looked upon as having come into being through its means. .. The energy of the present system is to be looked upon as originally derived from the invisible universe. ... Whether is it more likely that by far the larger portion of the high-class energy of the present universe is travelling outwards into Space with an immense velocity, or that it is gradually transferred into an invisible order of things..? ... May we not at once say that when energy is carried from matter into ether it is carried from the visible into the invisible; and that when it is carried from ether to matter, it is carried from the invisible into the visible?.." Thought conceived to affect the matter of another universe simultaneously with this may explain a future State." p. 157. ib.

... Material or physical memory. Other parts of these motions are, however, communicated to the

Spiritual or invisible body, & are there stored up, forming a memory &c. May be made use of when that body is free to exercise its functions.

Dr. Thos. Young, in his Lectures on Natural Philos. says: "We know not but that thousands of Spiritual worlds may exist unseen forever by human eyes; nor have we any reason to suppose that even the presence of matter, in a given spot, necessarily excludes these existences from it." ib. p. 151.

Spirit Body

"We only maintain that we are logically constrained to admit the existence of some frame or organ not of this Earth, which survives dissolution — if we regard the principle of Continuity and the doctrine of immortality as both true.

(Your argument will apply to the brute Creation as well as to man) To wh. the reply is: We know nothing about the laws of the invisible universe except that it is related by bonds, probably of energy, to the present. ib. p. 153.

Objection 4th. If there be, as you say, this duality in the present human frame, how can the Spiritual part remain latent so long as it does?

Ans. It is possible that there have been and that there are occasional manifestations of this Spiritual nature.

Obj: 5th (Scientific.) Your doctrine of immortality does violence to that great principle, the Conservation

of energy. Reply. — In reply to this we assent the conservation of energy as a principle applicable to the whole universe, & not to one portion of it, except under special limitations. It is only by assuming the continual passage through ether of a large portion of the energy of the visible universe that the doctrine as at present held can be maintained. Now the only addition that our theory demands is the gradual absorption of some part at least of this energy into the invisible universe; and we have said that it has been supposed that there is evidence of an absorption of this nature. Our hypothesis is not upset, and never can be upset, by any experimental conclusion with regard to energy. ib. p. 164. .. The visible universe cannot have lasted forever, but must have made its appearance in time.

X Thus the scientific argument is in favor of the production of the visible universe by means of an intelligent agency residing in an invisible universe.

By the principle of Continuity we are led not only to regard the invisible universe as having existed before the present one, but the same principle drives us to acknowledge its existence in some form as a universe from all eternity.

... Is it equally easy to conceive a dead universe to have existed in the same way during

immeasurable ages? ... Is not this something without meaning — an unreality — a make-believe?

.. The hypoth. of a permanently dead universe will hardly appear to satisfy the principle of Continuity, wh. prefers to proceed from one form of the fully conditioned to another. p. 168.

... Now, what the principle of Continuity demands is an endless development of the conditioned.

... Our argument has led us to regard the reproduction of the visible universe as brought about by an intelligent agency residing in the unseen.

The material substance of (0) is a phenomenon of that of (1), that of (1) of that of (2), & so on. Go back as far as we choose, we are only led from one phenomenon to another.

... The Great Whole is infinite in energy, & will last from eternity to eternity.

... It does not mean that the antecedent to the primordial germ must be a like germ, for we know from experience that while life is always produced from life, like is not always produced from like. In this case more especially the living antecedent must be in the invisible universe, & therefore very different from the germ.

... The visible universe must have had its origin in time, no doubt from a nebulous condition. But in this condition it can hardly have been fit for the reception of life. Life must therefore have been

created afterward. We have thus at least two separate creations – the one of matter and the one of life. If x denote the date of the advent of life, and $x + a$ that of the advent of matter, a being a constant quantity, the two operations cannot be made simultaneous by merely increasing the value of x without limit.

.. It certainly appears most probable that the visible universe is not eternal, and that it has not the power of originating life. In fine, life as well as matter comes to us from the Unseen Universe. ib. 188.

... The principle of Continuity asserts that we shall never be carried from the conditioned to the unconditioned, but only from one order of the fully conditioned to another.

.. There is an intelligent Agent operating in the Universe, whose function it is to develop energy; and a similar Agent whose function it is to develop life.

... If our view of the invisible universe be accepted, the scientific difficulty with regard to miracles will entirely disappear. p. 189.

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Deity must be the highest reflection of man to himself. – Mrs. Hyser.

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The disciple whom Jesus loved was the disciple who loved Jesus.

A. R. Wallace

Mr. A. R. Wallace, however, sees in the production of man the intervention of an external will. He remarks that the lowest types of savages are in possession of a brain, and of capacities far beyond any use to which they could apply them in their present condition, and that therefore they could not have been evolved from the mere necessities of their environments.

(The Unseen Universe p. 138. By Stewart & Tait)

Let us therefore begin by supposing that we possess a frame, or the rudiments of a frame, connecting us with the invisible universe, which we may call the Spiritual body. Now each thought that we think, is accompanied by certain molecular motions and displacements in the brain, and part of these, let us allow, are in some way stored up in that organ, so as to produce what may be termed our material or physical memory. Other parts of these motions are, however, communicated to the Spiritual or invisible body, and are there stored up, forming a memory which may be made use of when that body is free to exercise its functions.

ib. by Dr. Balfour Stewart of Manchester, Eng., and Prof. P. G. Tait (Nat. Phil. Prof.), University of Edinburgh. p. 159.

Again, one of the arguments (Art. 84) which proves the existence of the invisible universe demands that it shall be full of energy when the present universe is defunct. We can therefore very well imagine that after death, when the spiritual body is free to exercise its functions, it may be replete with energy, and leave eminently the power of action in the present, retaining also, as we have shown above, a hold upon the past, inasmuch as the memory of past events has been stored up in it, and thus preserving the two essential requisites (Art. 61) of a continuous intelligent existence. ib. p. 180.

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Everything is evolved from spirit alone. Cells themselves are composed of the same four elements in exact ratio, yet differ in mental and spiritual functions, and the very foundation stones of the material universe never vary. Each molecule is ruled by mind, and executes its vibrations mathematically. Wm Hitchman

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Most learned Don, I know you by these tokens:
What you can feel not, that can no one feel;
What comprehend not, no one comprehend;
What you can't reckon is of no account;
What you can't weigh can no existence have;
What you've not coined, that must be counterfeit.

Goethe's Faust. Trans. by E. S.

Shelley on Immortality

In an article entitled "Shelley on the Immortality of the Spirit", contributed by Charles Sotheran to the Spiritual Scientist (Boston) Oct. 14th 1875, the writer gives the following as an extract from an unpublished letter to his father-in-law, Wm Godwin, "the property," says Mr. Sotheran, "of my friend C. W. Frederickson of New York, one of the most enthusiastic admirers of Shelley":

"With how many garlands we can beautify the tomb. If we begin betimes, we can learn to make the prospect of the grave the most seductive of human visions. By little and little we hive therein all the most pleasing of our dreams. Surely, if any spot in the world be sacred, it is that in which grief ceases, and for which, if the voice within our hearts mock us not with an everlasting lie, we spring upon the untiring wings of a painless and seraphic life — those whom we love around us — our nature, universal intelligence, our atmosphere, eternal love".

Here is Shelley's description of a disembodied Spirit:

"it stood
All beautiful in naked purity,
The perfect semblance of its bodily frame,
Instinct with inexpressible beauty and grace,
Each stain of earthliness
Had passed away, it re-assumed
Its native dignity, and stood
Immortal amid ruin."

A Poet's Last Song.

By Hans Christian Andersen.

I Sung at his funeral in Copenhagen, July 11th, 1875, and translated for the Golden Rule by N. Sindberg. I

Now lift me up, thou mighty Death! to spirit realms so vast;
God is my trust; on Him alone were all my burdens cast.
All that I gave, God, it was Thine; my riches not I knew;
My song was only like a bird's that twittered while it flew.

Farewell each rose-bud fresh and red! farewell all ye I love!
Fair is the world, yet welcome, Death! that wafts my soul above.
Praise be to God for what He gave, and praise for what shall come:
Eternal summer greets the soul when it is safe at home.

Guizot — Guizot says, Ch. 6 lecture of the "Cours d'Histoire Moderne": "I could multiply these citations to infinity, and they prove that in the first centuries of our era the <u>materiality of the soul</u> was an opinion not only permitted, but dominant."

Roy. Boutlerow on Spiritualism

Dr. A. Butlerow of St. Petersburg, Russia, who investigated the Spiritual phenomena through Bredif with Prof. Nicholas Wagner and M. Alexander Aksakof, (March 1875) writes in "Psychic Studies", – "The phenomena were of that fugitive character, which often – tho' by no means always – accompanies medial operations. But be the character of these appearances what it may, the reality of them is beyond all doubt. The recognition of their reality will very soon be the inevitable duty of every honorable observer, and finally, of all humanity. This recognition will destroy many of the present prevailing views; life and science will have to come to terms with it. Our old notions about the essential nature of matter dissolve in the light of the actuality of these facts, and new ideas present themselves of the endless variety of degrees and forms of existence." See London Spiritualist Oct. 1. 1875.

Reid

If ever our philosophy concerning the human mind is carried so far as to deserve the name of science, which ought never to be despaired of, it must be by observing facts, reducing them to general rules, and drawing just conclusions from them. – Reid's Collected Writings, p. 122.

In one sense, science is knowledge, arranged, correlated, or systematized.

Spiritualism & the Religion of the Future

Religions are not made; they grow. Their progress is not from the enlightened to the vulgar, but from the vulgar to the enlightened. They are not mere products of the intellect, but manifest themselves as physical forces too. The religion of the future is in our midst already, working like potent yeast in the minds of the people. It is in our midst to-day with signs and wonders uprising like a swollen tide, and scoring the barrier of Nature's laws. But however irresistible its effects they are not declared on the surface. It comes veiling its destined splendors beneath an exterior that invites contempt. Hidden from the prudent, its truths are revealed to babes. Once more the weak will confound the mighty, the foolish the wise, and base things and things despised, it may be even things that are not, bring to naught things that are, for it seems certain that whether truly or whether falsely, Spiritualism will re-establish, on what professes to be ground of positive evidence, the fading belief in a future life — not such a future as is dear to the reigning theology, but a future developed from the present, a continuation under improved conditions of the scheme of things around us. Further than this it is impossible to predict the precise development which Spiritualism

may take in the future, just as it would have been impossible at the birth of Christianity to have predicted its actual subsequent development; but from the unexampled power possessed by this new religious force of fusing with other creeds, it seems likely in the end to bring about a greater uniformity of belief than has ever yet been known.—Westminster Rev., Oct. 1875.

M'Cosh The physicist who has kept a register of the heat of the atmosphere at nine o'clock in the morning for the last five years, and the naturalist who has discovered a plant or insect distinguished from all hitherto known species by an additional spot, cannot conceal their contempt for a department of inquiry which deals with objects which cannot be seen nor handled, weighed nor measured. Jas. M'Cosh's Intuitions of the Mind, p. 295.

Bacon A writer in the Popular Science Monthly (N. Y. for Dec. 1875 says of Bacon: "He was grossly inappreciative of the science and scientific men of his day, rejecting the Copernican system, and neglecting the immortal researches of Harvey."

"The promise and potency of all terrestrial life"

Shakespeare (Timon of Athens) says:

"Common mother thou,
Whose womb unmeasurable and infinite breast
Teems and feeds all; whose selfsame mettle,
Whereof thy proud child, arrogant man, is puffed,
Engenders the black toad and adder blue,
The gilded newt and eyeless venomed worm,
With all the abhorred births below crisp heaven."

Freedom of the Will

As soon as we strictly examine the action of our own will we perceive that every apparently free action of the will is the result of previous ideas which are based on notions inherited or otherwise acquired, and are therefore dependent on the laws of adaptation or inheritance. Haeckel's History of Creation.

Prof. Tyndall's Materialism

Prof. Tyndall's materialism is of that harmless, intangible, negative kind which merely ends where philosophy and psychology begin. In the same way modern scientific Atheism neither asserts nor denies the possibility of a God; it is merely negative, not positive Atheism, and ends where Theism begins. Now this is surely the true legitimate position of science. It is concerned only with secondary causes, and would be encroaching on the domain of philosophy if it either asserted or denied the existence of Soul

or a God. Its business is with finite existences, and it has no business to infer the infinite therefrom. Such an inference would be illogical, say Prof. Tyndall and others. Science, therefore, is essentially and necessarily atheistic. . . W. W. Fawcett in London Spiritualist, p. 9. Jan. 1876.

George Stearns. American 1876

What? is answered by Science; Whence? and Wherefore?—by Philosophy. Science is the comprehension of perceptible truths; Philosophy, of non-perceptible, yet conceptive truths. Faith is the apprehension of incomprehensible truths.

. . . Purpose and use are correlative, use being the object of purpose; and the realm of existence is replete with special uses, all relevant to human development, implying a corresponding oneness of purpose in their Universal Cause, which is thus also identified with Mind.

Mind is the realm of absolute Being, antecedent to existence (ex sistens, out-standing—that which is made to stand out from being), and so utterly foreign to the scope of Science, which pertains exclusively to the world of phenomenal truth. Science asks—and aims to answer—What exists? It never puts the question, Whence existence? It regards the works of Mind, not as such, but as "operations of Nature," the personification of

an ontingic power whose veil of mystery it can never part. . . . Mind is supernatural, that is discrete from and above Nature, which is the work of Mind. The universe of existence is comprised of matter and Spirit, this being superlative to that. The sideveal system is spherical as a whole, and constitutes the sphere of matter, which is enveloped and permeated by the sphere of spirit. The sphere of existence thus constituted is immense, yet finite, being infolded and penetrated by the realm of Mind, whose infinitude is unparalleled save by the negative reach of space. Matter and Spirit are products of Mind, being conceptively resolvable into diverse species of force, which Mind generates at will, as exemplified in animated nature by voluntary evolutions of muscular force. Mentality is the organic aptitude for a finite inspiration of Mind, which, as the seed of personality, ripens into the spiritual pericarp of human development. All the issues of mentality, motory, affectional, rational, and moral, are imputable to finite inspirations of Mind, whose executive faculty is Will through which Omnific Mind generates all the forces of Nature.

Mind is thus identified with the Universal Cause, whose worshipful name is God. Shall we call Him personal or impersonal? That which most ennobles our conceptions of His character

as the Supreme Being. Persons are the highest development in Nature. Personality cannot proceed from an impersonal Cause. God, as the Father of persons, cannot be less than personal, though He may be more — is more than any human Conception of personality. Being more than personal, He is not *im*-personal, but personal *and* — we know not what. .. The Soul is Mind; therefore human nature mirrors the divine. The soul is an infinite learner; to know ourself is to know something of God, who, otherwise than by introspection, is "The Unknowable". .. Science pertains to existence; and God does not exist. It is only in the world of being that God is manifest. He is neither matter nor spirit. God is Mind. Existence is His shadow. ... Thus the Atheism of Science is penetrated. Geo. Stearns. Sp. Scientist, Jan. 20. 1876.

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Atkinson I had a Somnambulist, who, during many months in which she remained in that Condition, would fall alternately into five different States of Consciousness, in each state having no recollection of what had occurred in any one of the other states... H. G. Atkinson. Medium & Daybr. April 2. 1875.

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Memory The facts of memory are very remarkable, such as the unconsciously receiving impressions which may long afterwards come into consciousness. ib.

Memory

My late friend, Barry Cornwall, the poet, at eighty-five, had, when in bed in the night, all the petty incidents of his school-days come before him as in a vivid picture, matters of no moment at all, and all which he was certain had never crossed his mind for 70 years. ib.

Spirits may be one cause, but not the sole cause of the facts that have been set down to their account. Then, again, if a so-called solid body can pass through a solid body, it is folly to talk of gross matter as essentially different from spirit.

Invisible gas is spirit compared to the black coal, and yet a brilliant light comes equally from both; and why may not the brain think and register thought in memory as well as a substance called Spirit, since conceivability is as difficult in the one state as in the other? — that is, of sensible phenomena issuing from an insensible substance, for that is the difficulty, but a difficulty that really applies to every other fact in nature. ib. Red & Daybreak. April 2. 1853. p. 219.

If Heaven be not within, though we ascend to the brightest sphere in the celestial, it would appear dark as the lowest sphere, and vice versa Spheres of darkness would appear bright. Bedlam.

Baxter (Richard) has no scruple in admitting the immortality of brutes. [Tillotts God & Human Nature p. 511.

F. Clavairoz. The Union of Soul & Body.

God is all in the universe, and all that lives only lives by Him. He is the infinite receptacle in which all the energies emanating from Him called souls are elaborated. These energies, unique in their essence, differ in their manifestations according to the degree of perfection of the instrument to which they belong. They penetrate what is called inorganic matter just as they do organized matter, and communicate to it faculties which it requires in order to accomplish its entire work. Matter has, then, its organic soul — that is to say, its own impulsion, which causes it to develop and preserve itself. This is the force that the Child possesses in its mother's womb; it is a being already distinct from her, for it carries in itself the rudiments of all the aptitudes which later will enable it to face the formidable struggles of life; but this force is circumscribed in the limits of the material expansion. Man only takes the place of the foetus when, the work of preparation being finished, the Child makes its appearance separated from the mother. It is at this precise moment that the Spiritual soul which is in God penetrates the organs, and amalgamates itself with the material soul that governs the body. No soul, either Spiritual or material, is created. All emerge from God himself at the appointed time; all spring from the same source, provided with the same attributes, tending to the same goal. The

material souls return to the great reservoir after having accomplished the mission which had been confided to them. The spiritual souls alone gain immortality, thanks to the instrument which has permitted them to know God, and to support the formidable trial of responsibility. But there is in space but one soul, of which individual souls are part. This soul is God Himself, from whom all emanate and to whom all converge. It is this common origin that makes us all children of God, and that makes brothers of all mankind, to whatsoever globe they belong. F. Clavairoz. Wed. 4 D. March 20th, 1875.

The Phenomena Tested. Barkas

Mr. T. P. Barkas, before the Newcastle-on-Tyne Association (May 3rd, 1875) says:

I have experimented & investigated under every kind of reasonable test that my ingenuity could devise; in my own private rooms, in the private rooms of personal friends, in public rooms, & in the private rooms of mediums. I have examined the rooms with utmost care. I have personally fitted up the recesses for the reception of mediums. I have personally provided every thing connected with the séances, and am certain that no arrangement or trick was in the room. I have tied, sealed, nailed, and held the mediums in almost every possible manner. I have undressed the medium & re-dressed him in clothes of my own providing. And notwithstanding all tests & all precautions, phenomena have taken place that are utterly inexplicable by

Barkas's Testimony

reference to any known physical or psychological law. All this I have done with the cold eye and steady pulse of a scientist. . . . I am prepared to give £100 to any man or woman who by trick can produce similar phenomena under similar conditions.

. . . The phenomena appeal not to one sense merely, but to all the senses — sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch, — are all called into requisition during the course of our séances. . . Mesmeric subjects can be placed under illusion, but when relieved from the influence of the operator they are conscious of the change; such is not the case at séances; the Sitters are not conscious of having been under any influence whatever. (See in Med. & Daybr., May 14, 1895, Mr. Barkas's acct. of remarkable séances under perfect test conditions. The boy Mr. Petty was undressed & redressed in dark clothes Mr. B. had provided. The boy stripped himself absolutely naked. He had not a white or light article of any kind on his person. Mr. B. had prepared the Cabinet & excluded everything that had the appearance of whiteness. Under these conditions a figure draped in white, about 4 ft. high, came out, moved about the room, and cut from its garments a piece 7 inches by 2½ sq. It was found to be very fine lawn. There were present two ladies & 7 gentlemen; and all will, if required, authenticate this Statement).

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Spirit-forms

Of these materialized forms, Mrs. Tappan proceeding to speak under influence of Jas. J. Mapes, London May 9, 1875, said: Do not mistake these forms for the actual Spirit-forms of yr. friends. They are neither composed of the same substance, nor are they in any way constructed as is the Sp. body in the Sp. land. They are produced temporarily out of the atmosphere and of materials that surround the earth, &c.

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Matter & Spirit

Persons cannot understand how matter can condition matter, and so insist on force being an entity passing from one body to another, as though such an idea was any more conceivable or explanatory, and the idea of a different substance called Spirit explains nothing. We have a change of terms, nothing more... The physical origin need not derogate from the immortality of the soul, and materialism rightly considered would not be opposed to Spiritualism.

Henry G. Atkinson, F. G. S. Red. & Daybr. May 21. 1875.

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Spirit-forms

A Spirit at Bastian & Taylor's (See Red. & Daybr. May 28, 1875) said: We are a band of Spirits who collect from the sitters and the atmosphere all the materials necessary for these forms, &c. We then condense through the body of our medium. The Spirit wishing to materialize then draws the particles for his form from the body of the medium, which we use as a condenser. We instruct Spirits as to the process, and assist them when necessary."

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Buguet & photogr.

In the case of M. Buguet (Spirit photographer) we have the case of Galileo over again. And if we can afford to rank the latter among philosophers for his discoveries, notwithstanding his recantation, shall we kick to perdition M. Buguet, who has illustrated by his photographs even a more important fact than did Galileo, and under Jesuit threats has humbugged the priests to save his liberty?

Medium & Daybreak May 28, 1875.

Hardinge on Apparitions

Mrs. Emma Hardinge Britten says, she has always inclined to the opinion of her Spirit-guides, to wit: that spirit, matter, and life are three distinct, original, coëqual and coëternal elements, not mutually convertible, but entirely distinct, although mutually dependent on one another for organic existence. B. of L. Aug. 28. 1875.

The human body, with all its organs of sense, that of sight included, is composed of matter in its three several states of solid, fluid, and gaseous. The "vital principle", whatever that may be, and the element of intelligence vaguely called "the soul", constitute the spirit, and this is composed of elements in no one particular related or analogous to matter. ib.

The philosophy of apparitions involves two propositions; the first is that Spirit is a distinct element from matter,

and requires spirit to perceive it; next, that we, as human beings, have senses of a per more sublimated nature than our material senses, and that these, under certain conditions not yet known to us, or under our control, can be so exercised as to perceive purely spiritual existences. -- ib.

When more than one person perceives the same object, it is to be inferred that something analogous to a material substance is present, and this proposition is clearly demonstrated when, as in "materializations", all present can behold the same form with the material eye and with equal distinctness.

ib.

There is still another class of apparitions in which the Spirit is not materialized, nor yet beheld thro' psychological impression. ib.

An individual (or Spirit?) with strong magnetic power, projects his life forces on a susceptible subject with a negative will; the mind of the latter becomes a blank, and he thenceforth sees, hears, smells, tastes and feels only what his operator wills him to do. ib.

Thus there may be electro-biology also from the Spirit world. It may become just as potent for impressing the mind of susceptible mediums as it is whilst performed by earthly operators on susceptible subjects.

ib.

In the presence of the Fox sisters Spirits have been seen and touched in conditions of more or less density, varying from thin vapor to substance apparently as material as that which constitutes the human form. ib.

At the sittings of Mrs. Underhill, the eldest of the Fox sisters, spirits have frequently been seen by the natural eye of those present, and their appearance was that of the human form enveloped in a shining mist, as if draped in a thin gauzy tissue, brightly illuminated from within. ib.

In the case of the apparition of Mrs. Nellie Butler of Sullivan, Me., as in many examples cited by Owen, Mrs. Crowe, and Ennemoser, the witnesses beheld the spectre with different degrees of clearness — one perceiving the full form, another only a small luminous figure, and still another, at the same time, only able to distinguish a mass or column of white vapory light.... ib.

The blundering innocence, or deliberate courage, ib. was required to state a case of spectral manifestations up to even thirty years ago, is not demanded now... ib.

Spirit Materializations

The actuality of Sp. materializations is a fact beyond denial, and involves revolutionary ideas of science, life, death, and the limitations of the Soul's possibilities, which transcend all the other marvels that the page of human history records.

ib. B. of L. July 31. 1875.

How many long months of embryonic growth, and through what wonderful processes of material life-building does Creative Wisdom construct the tiny hand of the new-born babe? and yet a single minute of time suffices the invisible Chemists of the higher realms to organize out of unknown pabulum, and thro' unknown laws, spirit hands, feet, forms, flesh, blood, hair, nails, throbbing pulses, vital warmth, fabrics resembling the product of earthly looms, in a word, a fully grown and fully furnished human being, garments whose manufacture by human means would cost years of time and various mechanical processes to make, and then — to dissolve them all back again into invisibility just as rapidly! Whence comes this wonderful building of the human structure thus suddenly reared up? Whence these garments, jewels, and panoply of earthly fabrics? And, again, into what are they dissipated? into what realm of being thus magically dissolved? Where is the human Chemist who can explain the process? ib.

See in Banner of Light July 31, 1875, cases described by Mrs. Barkas, already referred to supra, p. 208, &c.

The mystery of life-force is in the spirit, with the spirit — must come from the realm of spirit — and at death returns to the realm of spirit.

Mrs. Harding-Britten. ib.

Britten.

Clairvoyance

Clairvoyance reveals a new phase in the Science of optics; and whereas mortal sight depends on a physical object to observe, the physical eye to observe with, time and space to define the sphere and focus of observation, Spiritual sight exists without any of these limitations. It sees without human eyes; beholds objects that have perished out of material existence perhaps; is bounded by no limitations of space, and sees as well in time past or future as time present; yes, clairvoyance is a fact. ib.

Matter is the gross envelope in which, as in a mold, our Spirit grows, expands, and takes on individual form and character. The soul is dual, and consists of Spirit and life, the latter of which is composed of all the fine unparticled and infinitely sublimated elements wh. make up, in combination, Force. ib.

Assuming the assertion of the Spirits to be correct, namely, that the life-principle or Spiritual body is force, and departs with the spirit in the act of mortal dissolution, becoming the outer covering or body of the Soul, and we have then all the elements necessary for a magnetic rapport between disembodied and embodied Souls. ib. (Badly expressed).

Force is the life-principle and Spiritual body of men and spirits. ib.

Spiritualism demonstrates that mortals at death are not taken in hand by an Almighty Master and at once transformed into perfect beings; but that growth is a necessity of perfection, and that the spirit-world is filled with individualities and grades of development wh. differ from one another as widely as in physical life; that the soul, on entering the realm of the hereafter, has not to look about it for some outside being who would praise or condemn it for deeds done in the physical body, but must simply look at the state in wh. it finds itself, and wh. is the legitimate outcome of those deeds; and if that state is not a pleasant one, then the individual intelligence must do its best to improve its own condition by rendering itself fit for a better. Dr. H. B. Storer. B. of L. July 3. 1875.

Man, passing through the change of death, continues to live in the universe under the conditions and influences of an environment in the Spiritual World, wh. has just as much to do with the development of his character as the circumstances wh. acted on him in the physical life; in other words he is there, as here, the creature of circumstances — the product of the influences acting upon him and within him, and that he cannot therefore claim any virtue for being as he is, neither can he decide that he is blameworthy, in the absolute sense, for a failure to attain to his highest ideal. . . I do not say this to excuse human conduct, or in mitigation of the verdict we pass so freely on one another. . . ib.

Bloede. Letter fr. Dr. G. Bloede, Brooklyn, N. Y., Jan. 16, 1876: Though Poninski (Adolf Graf) does not state his source, I doubt not in the least that in a lecture held at that great seat of learning (Leipzig) he would have dared to make an incorrect quotation, although he gives it in the indirect language. For your better understanding I will translate the opinion (Kant's) as expressed by Poninski literally:–

Kant on Spirits "The immaterial beings perhaps constitute a great whole, a mundus intelligibilis (a world understandible, perceptible to the senses), the parts of which stand to each other in mutual (reciprocal) connection and communion, even without the mediation of corporeal things, and it may perhaps be proved yet that the human soul even in this (earthly) life, is in an indissolubly connected communion with all the immaterial natures (existences) of the spirit-world, that it (the human soul) works into these (the immaterial beings) and receives impressions from them.

Herder "Whilst the Spiritualism of Kant was more of an abstract character, J. G. Herder, author of "Ideas toward a Philosophy of the History of Mankind," inclined more toward the concrete Spiritualism of the present. His idea was that the human organization was effected in a realm of spiritual forces, and as the body grows through nutriment, so mind through ideas. Here two rule the laws of assimilation, growth, and reproduction.

Herder "Our humanity is only a preparatory exercise, the bud of a future flower. Nature step by step throws off the ignoble and cultivates instead the spiritual, refines still more the fine, and thus we may hope that through her artist-hand the bud of our humanity we may appear in that (the next) existence in its proper, true, divine human form.

"The present condition of man is probably the connecting link – middle-link – of two worlds, the combining ring between two dovetailing systems of creation. It represents to us two worlds at once, and this is the cause of the apparent duplicity of its essence. Life is a struggle, and the flower of pure immortal humanity a hard-won crown. ... Our brethren of the higher round (or step), therefore, certainly love us more than we can seek and love them, for they see our condition clearer, and perhaps they educate us to be future partners of their happiness."

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The substance of matter is weight; the substance, the essence of spirit is freedom. ... Matter has its substance out of itself; spirit consists in being with itself. .. Hegel.

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Prayer is to religion what thinking is to philosophy. To pray is to make religion. – Novalis.

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We conceive God personal just as we conceive ourselves personal. God is just as personal and as individual as we are; for what we call I is not our true I, but only its off-glance. ib.

Lavater

Truth, physiognomy, and the voice of God proclaim aloud to man, Be what thou art, and become what thou canst. ... To force a man to think and feel like me is equal to forcing him to have my exact forehead and nose. ... Each man is an individual self, with as little ability to become another self as to become an angel. .. Lavater

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The bodily senses imply their objects; so the spiritual senses, demonstrated by clairvoyance, &c., to be resident in man, imply their objects, and are prophecies of an endless life.

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Berkeley

You see, Hylas, the water of yonder fountain, how it is forced upwards in a round column to a certain height, at which it breaks and falls back into the basin from whence it rose; its ascent as well as its descent proceeding from the same uniform law or principle of gravitation. Just so, the same principles, wh. at first view, lead to skepticism, pursued to a certain point, bring men back to common sense.

Bishop Berkeley

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Glanvill

To the knowledge of the most contemptible effect in nature, 'tis necessary to know the whole syntax of causes, and their particular circumstances and modes of action. Nay, we know nothing till we know ourselves, which are the Summary of all the world without us, and the Index of the Creation.

Glanvill, Vanity of Dogmatizing, Chap. xxii. Ed. 1. p. 217.

Carlyle "'To the eye of vulgar Logic,' says he, 'what is man? An omnivorous Biped that wears clothes. To the eye of Pure Reason what is he? A Soul, a Spirit, and divine Apparition. Round his mysterious Me, there lies, under all those wool-rags, a Garment of Flesh (or of Senses) contexture in the Loom of Heaven, whereby he is revealed to his like, and dwells with them in Union and Division; and sees and fashions for himself a Universe, with azure starry spaces, and long Thousands of years.'" - Sartor Resartus, Chap. X.

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Somewhere in this Universe must surely be contained things brighter and better than those we now possess. Else, why is it clothed so lavishly with half-revealed charms, adapted to touch our most delicate sympathies, to win us from our worse selves, and allure us like willing captives to its loveliness? Awakened in our senses, awakened in our souls, we desire to know, to feel, and to attain; - these three impulses become our fixed and enduring aspirations.

Philos. of Nat. Theology. By Rev. Wm Jackson B. A., F. S. A. 1875

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What are the realities of the Universe, and what is the essential ground of all we see and think? is it.

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Can we tell the secret of our own individuality? We feel it every day; - it endues us with a separate existence, distinctly several, and apart from others, and so intensely vivid to ourselves, that we seem

in our own eyes like small centres of the Universe, with men and women, say, worlds and stars, revolving around us. . . We are always changing, yet to each of our bodies continues its one individual configuration; within each of our minds its self-collection, its memories, its expectations, and its individual consciousness. . . . If in no proper sense we know ourselves, need we feel surprised if we fall short of conceiving the self-subsistent God? As to the value, therefore, shall we rate skeptical arguments drawn from our failure? and resting on the fallacious consequence that the inconceivable (or unthinkable) is therefore or likewise the impossible? ib.

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Martineau In the very act of declaring the First Cause incognizable, you do not permit it to remain unknown. For that only is unknown, of which you can neither affirm nor deny any predicate; here you deny the power of self-disclosure to the 'Absolute', of which therefore something is known; viz, that nothing can be known. — J. Martineau

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You cannot constitute a religion out of mystery alone any more than out of knowledge alone. ib.

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J. S. Mill's Idealism I do not believe that the real externality to us of anything except other minds is capable of proof.

J. S. Mill.

We live an individual life – we know not what. We see and perceive – we know not how. Yet such are the facts and we thoroughly believe and act on them. On this same pivot turns our primary affirmative argument for natural theism. Rev. Wm Jackson

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The Materialist assumes as his primary postulate that which is by no means the primary fact accepted by mankind. He starts with taking matter for granted; but, if he inquires, he will discover that matter is known to him in the second place only; he really first knew Mind. When he questions sensation or consciousness, he questions Mind. Mind is dearer to him and more strongly evidenced than any other possibility whatsoever. ib.

Such then is the first heavy burden of an unthought postulation, viz. the Materialists' theory binds upon him. ib. . . Mind being an absolute necessity must be got in some way (from matter of course) evolved, correlated, secreted. No account is given how matter could have been thus transformed & glorified. . . We encounter the same unbridged gulf at every turn of the Materialistic hypothesis. ib.

Von Feuchtersleben puts the practical state of the question thus: – "All we can say is, that an intellectual world reveals itself to us by the law of the true, the good, and the beautiful, and that a physical world manifests itself by those laws which act in Space and

time. What lies beyond these laws, as it were the substance of both worlds, we know not; we only call that of the physical world, matter or body in the abstract, that of the super-physical, we call spirit (Geist), and must never forget that hereby we have only pronounced an abstraction.

"But now we ask further, wherein does this higher law manifest itself to us, as the physical law does in the material world? Nowhere but in man, and in him only through the medium of his cultivated and refined reason. What we feel, what we remember, nay, the inmost sensations of our individual existence, may be referred to the world which surrounds us. Thought alone, exalted to the highest degree, shows us another world. We are ourselves therefore not spirit, but we watch, as it were, what we call by that name, and which manifests itself to us only by its laws. (Est Deus in nobis.) Man, therefore, should be the link which connects the two worlds; and this is the problem, this is the enigma, which can never be solved." He adds in a note: "Materialism, that is, the view which will not allow the separation of the intellectual principle from the corporeal, but looks upon the former as a higher power of the latter, not only explains nothing, but makes the enigma more obscure." Medical Psychology, Ed. Sydenham. pp. 15-16. ib.

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Are the Mechanical laws of Matter the laws of Universal Nature, including human Nature? Jackson.

To live is to think and to will. To think is to see the chain of facts in creation, and passing along its golden links to find the hand of God at its beginning, as we saw his hand work in its course. And to will is to be able to know good and evil; and to will aright is to submit the will entirely to a will higher than ours. – Archbishop of York.

No one holds the doctrine of Natural Selection more firmly than Mr. Wallace; – he is, in fact, known to have anticipated the Darwinian theory of evolution. But he also holds that natural selection cannot account for certain of the physical peculiarities of Man; much less for his consciousness, his language, his moral sense, or his volition. Mr. W. maintains likewise that

1. Atoms are centres of force.
2. Force is known to us as will.
3. The will that governs the world is the will of higher intelligences or of one supreme intelligence.

He quotes as representing his own thoughts the following lines from an American poetess:

"God of the Granite and the Rose,
Soul of the Sparrow and the Bee
The mighty tide of Being flows
Through countless channels, Lord, from Thee.
It leaps to life in grass and flowers,
Through every grade of Being runs,
While from our Creation's radiant towers
Its glory flames in Stars and Suns."

Wm Jackson – Faraday.

To the above-mentioned points Mr. W. adds a spiritualistic belief in many sublime intelligences intermediate between the Deity & the Universe.

Rev. Wm Jackson

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There is surely a piece of divinity in us; something that was before the elements, and owes no homage unto the Sunn. – Sir Thomas Browne.

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If the Universe began in a shining nebula, the question remains unsolved, – what first brought the thin cloud into being? – ib. (Jackson.)

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Last analysis Matter — Faraday &c.

This problem – the incorporeity of matter, or a near approach to it – has been a favorite subject of speculation in all ages: from the pre- & post- Christian Greeks through Arabian & Jewish philosophers to the Schoolmen. Faraday (then in his 53rd year) looked at the subject: "a speculation respecting that view of the nature of matter wh. considers its ultimate atoms as centres of force, and not as so many little bodies surrounded by forces. ... The particle, indeed, is supposed to exist only by these forces & where they are it is". Faraday objected to the use of the term atom. Gravitation, he says, is a property of matter dependent on a certain force, and it this force wh. constitutes the matter. In that view matter is not only mutually penetrable, but each atom extends, so to say, throughout the whole of the Solar system, yet always retaining its own centre of force.

"We know nothing of matter but its forces – nothing in the creation but the effect of these forces; further our sensations and perceptions are not fitted to carry us; all the rest ah. we may conceive we know is only imagination." Faraday. And Dr. Bence Jones quotes from F's note thus: "I was led to consider the nature of space in relation to electric conditions, and so of matter; i.e. whether continuous or consisting of particles with intervening space, according to its supposed constitution... See how little of general theory of matter is known as fact, and how much is assumption. Final brooding impression: that particles are only centres of force; that the force or forces constitute the matter; that therefore there is no space between the particles distinct from the particles of matter; that they touch each other just as much in gases as in liquids or solids; and that they are materially penetrable, probably even to their very centres. That, for instance, water is not two particles of oxygen side by side, but two spheres of power mutually penetrated, and the centres even coinciding. Bence Jones, Life of Faraday, Vol. II. pp. 197–98.

These views, best known as Boscovich's theory, tho' not generally held in scientific circles, are favored by Bacon's most able commentator, Robert Leslie Ellis, & are pronounced by Proz. Huxley a "tenable hypothesis". Mr. Spencer poises the balance thus: "That, he (a disciple of Boscovich) may ask (of a disciple of Newton), is it that holds together the

parts of these ultimate atoms?' 'A cohesive force,' his opponent must answer. 'And what,' he may continue, 'is it that holds together the parts of any fragments, into wh., by sufficient force, an ultimate atom might be broken?' Again the answer must be — a cohesive force. 'And what,' he may still ask, 'if the ultimate atom were, as we can imagine it to be, reduced to parts so small in proportion to it, as it is in proportion to a tangible mass of matter — what must give each part the ability to sustain itself, and to occupy space?' Still there is no answer but — a cohesive force. Carry the process in thought as far as we may, until the extension of the parts is less than can be imagined, we still cannot escape the admission of force by which the extension is upheld; and we can find no limit until we arrive at the conception of force without any extension. First Principles, p. 54.

Spencer says: "Of the two it seems easier to translate so-called matter into so-called Spirit than to translate so-called Spirit into so-called matter, which latter is, indeed, wholly impossible."

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There are eyes fitted to long distances — almost telescopic — eyes so contrived as to be absolutely microscopical. ... Mind in the universe is thus presented to us, as in the New Testament, — wide as the whole arch of heaven, but cognizant of a sparrow or a lily.

Rev. R. Jackson p. 348.

There is much conveyed by the truth that the world is beautiful. If, when we examine natural production, intelligent operation is seen to imply an operative intelligence, is it not also true that realized beauty implies an ideal beauty, intelligently preconceived in a mind itself beautiful? Had there been nothing in earth or sky to soothe, elevate, and make happy, with what different feelings should we have attempted to picture productive mind at work through an unlovely universe! Ib. p. 348.

To my apprehension then, that so complex an instrument as an eye should undergo a succession of millions of improvements by means of a succession of millions of accidental alterations, is not less improbable than if all the letters in the 'Origin of Species' were placed in a box, and on being shaken and poured out millions on millions of times, they should at last come out together in the order in which they occur in that fascinating and, in general, highly philosophical work. Savilian Prof. of Astronomy at Oxford, 1867, quoted by Jackson p. 349.

Prof. Huxley's "cosmic vapor" is a potential Universe, not a cause, but an already caused production. What, then, caused it? Ib. p. 360. The Sufficient is only spoken of as a possible interpreter or prophet. And Prof. H. is wise in his reticence. Prof. Tyndall is equally wise in saying "Science knows nothing of the origin or destiny of nature." Ib.

Wm Jackson.

No one endowed with clearness of vision will think the universe as likely to be adequately accounted for by an eternal nebula, as by an eternity of Mind. No one will exactly state to himself the meaning of such words as Chance, Time, Law, and others of a like description, and, with those meanings in remembrance, pronounce that any or all of these can explain the origin of anything. A universe of conditions may not possibly be creative. – 360 p. ib.

We know that Will is a Cause, and we do not actually know of any other Cause in the wide universe. Therefore if we wish to go beyond nebula, Law, or Force, wh. are merely physical antecedents, – and ask what caused one or all of them, we are obliged (so far as we are disciples of experience) to say their Cause was a Will. And when we say this we allege a sufficient reason. ib. p. 368.

We see where physics terminate – in a nebula. This is the limit of Scientific thinkers.

A volitional or First Cause can never belong to the physical chain of antecedent and consequent, bound together by natural law. And the reason is plain: in no true sense can such Cause ever be a necessary consequent at all. ib. p. 367.

... The First Cause & 2d Cause apply not to difference of sequency alone, but to an intrinsic and essential distinction. And this distinction is so vast, that between the World's First Cause & any given Secondary Cause,

there is fixed a gulf of separation as wide as the whole potential universe. ib. p. 368.

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There can be no Cause — no First to stand before (not in) the series of sequences, except a Being, Will, Personality. ib.

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Physical science is right to speak of it as unknowable by physical investigation. . . But it involves theoretical difficulties wh. we must acknowledge to be inexplicable. We cannot forget, however, that many other truths and matters of fact are inexplicable. Inexplicability attaches to the most certain and necessary of all truths.

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If we place a non-theistic theory in relation to our human inner nature, there ensues the same monstrous incongruity. The plenitude of loveliness, which overflows creation, as it were with multitudinous waves of light, we are asked to think of as the work of blind non-being. But, there is a greater plenitude of loveliness in the good and noble acts, words, and thoughts of one bright soul of heaven-aspiring Man. Must we then believe that truth, sincerity, justice, rightness, goodness, purity, are all the offspring of a something infinitely lower than our weakest human will?

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D. G. Brinton on Prayer. — Man cares nothing for God — can care nothing for him practically — except as an aid to the fulfilment of his desires, the satisfaction of his wants, as the ground of his hopes. The root of the "religious sentiment," I have said, is "a risk whose position depends upon unknown power."

Chas. Beard.

Berkeley. Philosophers, though they acknowledge all corporeal beings to be perceived by God, yet they attribute to them an absolute subsistence distinct from their being perceived by any mind whatever, which I do not. Besides, is there no difference between saying, There is a God, therefore he perceives all things: and saying, Sensible things do really exist: and if they really exist, they are necessarily perceived by an infinite mind: therefore there is an infinite mind, or God? This furnishes you with a direct and immediate demonstration, from a most evident principle, of the Being of a God. Bishop Berkeley.

Religion — C. Beard London 1875

Why should we think that even in the light of religion all dark places in this vast and complex all of things will be suddenly illuminated? Why expect that any knowledge that we can attain to will so enlarge and elevate the character of our intelligence as to place us on a level with the eternal secrets and immemorial laws of the universe? Can anti-theistic theorists say that the mystery of the world is not mystery still under their solution. Theism is an explanation, though not a complete one. It gathers up the facts of life into a unity and supplies us with a theory in the light of which they may be correlated and understood. More than this it furnishes a practical rule of living, and it dignifies existence with a purpose, and brightens it with immortal hopes. — Chas. Beard.

The opposite theory leaves the obscurities of life just

as it finds them. Pain and sin and loss are with it ultimate facts, nor has it the faintest glimmer of light to throw upon their absolute blackness. To human nature asking Whence? Whither? it makes no reply, but stoniest silence. Instead of gratifying the highest wants of human nature it bids them pine and die. And yet the mystery does not cease out of the world because some men shut their eyes to it.

Religion is a thing more than knowledge, more than obedience, more even than inspiration and affection; it is aspiration and affection that have found their divine object, and are met by God half-way. It seems to imply an activity of God towards us as well as our activity towards God. Sometimes we see him, and again he hides himself in thick darkness. The dawn of our passionate and persistent yearning is not always the hour of his most complete and satisfying manifestation. Hence there is a deep sense in which all religion is revelation. He the Omnipresent One makes known his presence in the secret recesses of our hearts and fills us with love and awe. Religion in its highest sense is God making himself known to us, helping us, strengthening us, filling us with peace. More than this we cannot, more than this we need not know.

The thoughts of God cannot but include a moral element, and any worthy apprehension of him represents him not only as Strongest and Wisest but also as Best. We find him when we are at our best and most completely when by some great effort, some supreme self-sacrifice

ve are for a moment better than our best. "Blessed are the pure in heart." "If any man will do his will, he will know of the doctrine whether it be of God."

While these things are so, and religious men, looking upon God and immortality, not as desirable probabilities but as facts, find in them the source of all their finest striving, can the race ever learn to be satisfied with a mode of thinking and a rule of living which ignore them? Shall we be told that humanity has been upon the wrong track in seeking God and must learn to retrace its steps? Oh! brethren, believe it not. Once these sacred fires are kindled they can never more be quenched. Men will never consent to this narrowing of power and of life. Eternity and infinity may still hold their secrets in inexorable grasp, but we shall never cease to go in search of them, and to hold ourselves higher and better for the quest. Should I starve these noble instincts, kill them out, when I have done I am still face to face with the facts of existence. I have still in some way to come to terms with nature and such years as fall to my share. In ceasing to believe in a God you have made no progress in explaining the mystery of the universe. In denying the theistic hypothesis without substituting another in its place, you have only returned to the standpoint of absolute uncertainty and blank perplexity. But even this is less than the whole truth. The world by common consent is full of what at least looks like the operations of mind. The way in

which the phenomena fall into order at the bidding of our analysing and organising thought, seems to show that it stands in some definite relation to an intelligence not wholly unlike our own. It was the apparent exceptions to this for which Theism failed to account, but it is the rule itself which becomes the difficulty of Atheism. A universe in which lives and moves no higher mind than that of man is a far deeper enigma than any which religion fails to solve.

Theism has had hard work to account for the evil in the world. Can Atheism explain the good? How should the whole creation move to "one far-off event," and rise upon the circling wheels of time higher and ever higher, unless at the call and under the inspiration of God?

You, without this thought of God and immortality, what do you make of the inexhaustible ness of human growth, the imperishableness of human love? Can you reconcile the priceless worth of the treasure with the meanness and brittleness of the earthly vessel in which it was hidden?

"Why trouble ye us with your God?" ask the philosophers of to-day. "We know not whether there be a God, or any other light than that which streams from yonder all-vivifying sun; one thing we have resolved, and that is to bow down before no phantoms, to reverence no illusions, to seek and hold fast the truth alone." Ay, and even so is God with you, though you know it not; and

when the time is, your eyes will be opened. For whatever light guides and makes possible your search is the Light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world. Lord, lighten Thou our darkness, and we shall see, for Thou art the eternal Light!

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J. S. Mill Mr. Mill's account of a complete induction is: "When observations or experiments have been repeated so often and by so many persons as to exclude all supposition of error in the observer, a law of nature is established;" and he asserts that a law of nature of this kind has been established against miracles. Matthew Arnold's "God & The Bible." He asserts that no affirmation of any twelve men would be sufficient to overthrow a law of nature, or to save, therefore, the Christian miracles. Now these assertions are exaggerated and will not serve it.

M. Arnold We want first to know what being is. Existence, again, means a stepping-forth, and we are told that God's essence involves existence, that is, that God's being necessarily steps forth, comes forth. Perhaps it does, but we require first to know what being is. it.

The truth is, the reasons from metaphysics for the Divine Personality got their real nourishment and support out of the reasons from miracles. But the miracles proving to be an insubstantial ground of reliance, the metaphysics will certainly not stand long. it.

We urge them to take as their foundation in reading the Bible this account of God wh. can be verified, "God is the eternal power, not ourselves, wh. makes for righteousness," instead of this other, "God is a person who thinks and loves," which cannot. Mat. Arnold p. 119.

Power is a better word than Being, in speaking of God. ib.

Many excellent people are crying out every day that all is lost in religion unless we can affirm that God is a person who thinks and loves. We say, that unless we can verify this, it is impossible to build religion successfully upon it; and it cannot be verified. Even if it could be shown that there is a low degree of probability for it, we say that it is a grave and fatal error to imagine that religion can be built on what has a low degree of probability. . . . Even of that much-decried idea of God as the stream of tendency by which all things fulfil the law of their being, it may be said with confidence that it has in it the elements of a religion new, indeed, but hopeful, solemn, and profound. ib. p. 121.

Religion is morality touched with emotion. ib. 161.

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Constitution of Matter.

The authors of "The Unseen Universe" hold that in the so-called ether we have simply a state of matter more primitive than what we know as the gaseous state... &c. to Sir Wm Thomson that which is permanent or indestructible in matter is the ultimate homogeneous atom; and this is probably all that is

permanent, since chemists now almost unanimously hold that so-called elementary molecules are not really simple, but owe their sensible differences to the various groupings of an ultimate atom which is alike for all. Relatively to our powers of comprehension the atom endures eternally; that is, it retains forever unalterable its definite mass and its definite rate of vibration. Now this is just what a vortex-ring would do in an incompressible frictionless fluid. Thus the startling question is suggested, Why may not the ultimate atoms of matter be vortex-rings forever existing in such a frictionless fluid filling the whole of Space? (See "The Unseen World, by John Fiske, Atlantic Monthly, Feb. 1876.) Of course the ether wh. conveys thermal and luminous undulations is not the frictionless fluid postulated by Sir Wm Thomson.

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A calm indifference toward the source of any doctrine is the true position of every Spiritualist. He must shake off the shackles — must look at the thing enunciated, and try it by the supremest court of judicature, his own interior sense of truth and justice. To him nature was the exponent of God's holy will. He wanted no authority; he wanted knowledge. Spiritualism has placed man under his own vine and fig-tree. The church of the future will be in the individual man. Dr. Gray.

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Alfred Wallace says: "Compared with our wonderful progress in physical science and its practical applications, our system of government, of administering justice, of national education, and our whole social and moral organization remains in a state of barbarism."

This social and moral barbarism we shall never overcome by the artificial and perverse training, the one-sided and defective teaching, the inner untruth and the external tinsell of our present state of civilization. It is above all things necessary to make a complete and honest return to Nature and to natural relations.

Our Theory of Development explains the origin of man and the course of his historical development in the only natural manner. We see in his gradually ascensive development out of the lower vertebrata the greatest triumph of humanity over the whole of the rest of nature. We are proud of having so immensely outstripped our lower animal ancestors and derive from it the consoling assurance that in future also mankind, as a whole, will follow the glorious career of progressive development and attain a still higher degree of mental perfection.

This return, however, will only become possible when man sees and understands his true place in nature. He will then come to arrange his life with his fellow-creatures — that is, the family and the state — not according to the laws of distant centuries but according to the rational principles deduced from knowledge of nature. Politics, morals, and the principles of justice, which

Haeckel.

are still drawn from all possible sources will have to be formed in accordance with natural laws only. An existence worthy of man, which has been talked of for thousands of years, will at length become a reality. The highest function of the human mind is perfect knowledge, fully developed Consciousness, and the moral activity arising from it. "Know thyself" was the cry of the philosophers of antiquity to their fellow-men who were striving to ennoble themselves. "Know thyself!" is the cry of the Theory of Development, not merely to the individual, but to all Mankind.

The simple religion of nature which grows from a true knowledge of her and her inexhaustible store of revelations will in future ennoble and perfect the development of mankind far beyond that degree which can possibly be attained under the influences of the multifarious religions of the Churches of the various nations - religions resting on a blind belief in the vague secrets and mythical revelations of a sacerdotal caste.

Ernst Haeckel

Man's knowledge à priori was like all other knowledge originally acquired by our remote ancestors à posteriori, by strenuous experience. It is evident that knowledge à priori arose only by long-enduring transmission, by inheritance of acquired adaptations of the brain, out of originally empiric or experiential knowledge à posteriori. ib. 2 vol. p. 345.

Max Perty On Jacolliot's accounts of the mediumship of Indian Fakirs, Max Perty remarks: "We find ourselves with regard to them face to face with the vexed question as to whether they are produced by magical forces in living men, or by unseen beings called spirits, who make use of the organisms of particular persons, called mediums, to produce certain effects. These pages prove that the Indians have held the latter opinion from the earliest ages, and that they consider their pitris, or spirits of their ancestors, to be the motive power. . . . In my "Mystic Phenomena, vol. 1., p. 92" it is mentioned how dangerous it is to induce visionary or clairvoyant power by means of incense-burning. . . It is almost necessary to assume a special working of Providence in all these things; therefore, also, in the so-called stigmatizations. They follow the same law of order and continuity that governs other events. . . We cannot argue with those who, in complete ignorance of the subject, think they can annihilate the facts with the terrible name deception, and who prove to their own satisfaction from natural laws which in no way affect the question, the "impossibility" of mystic phenomena, and who prefer the applause of the unjudging crowd to open and earnest investigation.

Lon. Spiritist Jan. 21, 1876.

E. S. Friday, Feb. 11th 1876. Attended séance at Mrs. Seaver's, No. 34 Bromley Park, Roxbury. Séance began about ¼ to 7 P. M. After various phenomena of quite a satisfactory

character, I was called to the aperture of the curtain by the beckoning of a materialized spirit. Felt the hands of the Spirit, but could not recognize the features, as the face seemed almost like a flat disk. Thinking there had been a mistake I retired to my seat, when it was announced by some in the audience that the spirit was beckoning to me again. I went up and to my astonishment recognized my wife's mother who departed this life not quite two years ago. The recognition on my part was instantaneous, and the Spirit seemed much delighted by my ready recognition, patting me and caressing me and finally kissing me on the lips affectionately. Her own lips seemed to me, so far as I could judge by the touch, very like those of Brother Reid. "Shall I tell Lizzie it is you?" I asked, when an affirmative was expressed by her affectionate pattings; and then she tore from one of the strings of her cap some pieces of lace which I took home and showed to my wife, who recognized them at once as resembling those which her mother used at times to wear. She seemed to sink and vanish as I left her. (Written Feb. 12th, 1876).

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Haeckel What should we say of an unscientific person who presumed to express an opinion on the cell-theory, without ever having seen cells, or of one who presumed to question the vertebral-theory without having studied comparative anatomy.

Haeckel. Vol 2. p. 340.

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Haeckel. Between the highest (most highly) developed animal souls and the lowest developed human souls there exists only a small quantitative but no qualitative difference, and this difference is much less than the difference between the lowest and the highest human souls, or the difference between the highest and the lowest animal souls. ib. 2d vol. pp. 362.

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J. P. Hazard But spirit has its function still, and it would seem nothing can be quite proved without it. Whoever looks for a doubt will be sure to find it, even if it concern his own existence. It seems difficult indeed to prove anything.

Private letter fr. Jos. P. Hazard, Peacedale, R.I. in regard to materializations, &c. (Jan. 24, 1876.)

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I said (to the Spirit), "I suppose suppose suspicion, vexation, trouble, cynicism, and the like, wh. seem to us only so many mere expressions of nothing but thoughts, are to your blocks of matter barring your way to us." Strong rapo answered in the affirmative. "A perfectly harmonious circle means, then, the liquidity of our aura, to make passage easy to you, and antagonistic minds harden it as ice the river?" Showers of rapo expressed assent. C. Reimer. Lon. Sp. Ist, Jan. 28. 1876.

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Lessing.

Lessing — The goal of education (ac. to Lessing) is the absolutely unselfish love and practice of virtue, the sole happiness of which consists in man's consciousness of unity with the absolute primeval Cause of his being.
Life of L. 2 vol. p. 364

ib. — Lessing believed in an all-pervading development in nature. He says: "God creates only simple essences; and the complex is nothing but a sequence of his creation. Since each of these simple beings has something wh. the others have not, there must be harmony between them; which harmony serves to explain what takes place in the world." ib. p. 366

ib. — The soul (says Lessing) is a simple essence, wh. is capable of endless perceptions. But it is at the same time an infinite essence. It attains, therefore, these infinite perceptions only gradually, in an infinite succession of time... The senses are matter; for they fix the limits of the conceptions. As soon as the soul began to perceive, it possessed a sense, and was, consequently united to matter, but not immediately with an organic body, for the latter consists in the union of several senses. Each note of matter can serve as a sense to a soul; that is, the whole material world is animated, even into its smallest particles.
ib. p. 367.

ib. — The combination of possible senses, although not infinite, cannot be exhausted with the present human organism; the soul, therefore, in passing through the different stages of its development hitherto, has not yet arrived at the goal of that

Lessing

development; and thus he is led to the assumption that far more senses are possible, just as the soul has already possessed each sense separate, and all according to their simple combinations, before it arrived at the final union of five senses. p. 367. ib. As, for instance, the sense of sight corresponds to light, so there can, and certainly will be, special senses corresponding to electrical or magnetic matter. There will be opened to us new worlds of phenomena.

J. C. Hare

"When a man is told that the whole of religion and morality is summed up in the two commandments to love God and to love our neighbor, he is ready to cry like Charoba in "Gebir:," at the first sight of the sea, "Is this the mighty ocean? is this all?" "Yes, all!" but how small a part of it do your eyes survey! Only trust yourself to it, launch out upon it, sail abroad over it; you will find it has no end; it will carry you round the world. - Julius C. Hare.

Carlyle

The wealth of a man is the number of things which he loves and blesses, which he is loved and blessed by. - Carlyle.

M. Arnold

Matthew Arnold's definition of God is: The eternal not ourselves that makes for righteousness: his dogma that what we call God is a subjective experience.

Beard – Mrs. Crowe.

To love God and to love man are twin duties never to be disjoined: who best trains and disciplines his own soul is full of an eager hope for humanity. Would you learn how to hasten the kingdom of heaven? Have faith in man, in duty, in God. Forget yourselves in toil for others. (Altered)
C. Beard.

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St. Theresa saw in a vision – so runs the story – a strange and awful woman, bearing in one hand water, in the other fire. And on being asked whither she went, "I go," she replied, "to burn up heaven and to quench hell, that henceforth men may love God for himself alone." Is there nothing here which finds a ready echo in our noblest instincts?
ib. p. 274

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Why, at least, good should not win purer victories over ill, I cannot tell; and I am tempted to cry out in complaint against God. Then a voice comes: Peace, O troubled soul! peace and be still! Wouldst thou, from this insignificant outpost of creation, understand the ordered majesty of the whole? wouldst thou in an instant comprehend eternity? – ib. (altered).

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Passavant Dr. Passavant, author of a work on vital magnetism, clairvoyance, &c., says it is an error to imagine that the ecstatic condition is merely the product of disease. He says it is sometimes exhibited in persons of very vigorous constitutions, and he instances the case of Joan of Arc. (Mrs. Crowe p. 216.)

Sam'l Clark's à priori argument

The à priori argument of Sam'l. Clarke: "Nothing is necessarily existent, the non-existence of which is conceivable. We can conceive of the non-existence of the world; therefore, the world is not necessarily existing and eternal. We cannot, however, conceive of the non-existence of space and duration; therefore space and duration are necessary and infinite. Space and duration, however, are not substances; therefore there must be an eternal and necessary substance (i. e. God), of which they are the accidents."

Hodge's Theology.

Continued. Unless we accept the absurdity of an infinite succession of changeable and dependent beings, there something must be one unchangeable and independent Being. . . . As the Cause of all things, He must have in Himself the highest degree of the perfections of all things, among which are intelligence and liberty. As self-existent, He must be all-powerful; as the supreme Cause and Author of all things, He must be infinitely wise. . . There must be infinite goodness, justice, and truth. . .

T3 † Thinking cannot be a property of matter unless the conception of matter be so enlarged that it no longer answers the purposes of the atheistic hypothesis. . . Dr. Sam'l. Clarke.

E. H. Gillett's "God In Human Thought," p. 583.

R. Baxter. As I will learn from nature itself that I can, so also from these Students of nature (Plato, Cicero, Seneca, Antonianus, Epictetus, Plutarch, etc.) All that is true and good in their religions, as far as I can discern it, shall be part of mine.
E. A. Gillett's "God in Human Thought", p. 511.

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H. More. God reserves his choicest secrets for the purest minds, and it is uncleanness of spirit, not distance of place, that disseveres us from the Deity.
Henry More. ib. p. 451.

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ib. The theory of apparitions is one on which More frequently falls back for proof of the immortality of the soul. He notes phenomena that "are neither from man nor beast." "Such are speakings, knockings, opening of doors, when they were fast shut, sudden lights in the midst of a room, stirrings of men, etc." He expatiates upon ghosts and witches, and the testimony to their existence, in ancient and modern times. ib. p. 452.

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ib. As to the immortality of brutes More will neither confidently assert nor deny it. ... He questions with Plotinus, whether the soul after death is perfectly released from matter, however pure & tenuous. ib. p. 453.

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× True virtue is independent of every religion, and incompatible with any which is accepted on authority ... W. von Humboldt.

Archbishop King

The universe is a vast organized aggregate of parts, each of which is to be judged with reference to the whole. Natural evil comes from the very nature of created beings, and could not be avoided without a contradiction. The evils wh. spring from men's depravity are permitted & justified by their relation to the good of the universe and of mankind.
ib. p. 513.

As to evil, it has the character of privation. It is a negative, and not a positive. Regarded from a higher standpoint, evil is not evil, but only a means for the realization of the eternal end of the world. Eckhart. ib. p. 413.

For God, evil has no existence. Yet, the good cannot exist without the antithesis of evil, and sin in the individual is subservient to the revelation of good wh. becomes known by it. "Divine goodness will consume evil, and eternal life will absorb death & misery." Sin punishes itself. No part of the world was created to subserve the ends of punishment. The light that cheers the sound eye, pains that wh. is diseased. To the evil, good itself becomes evil and penalty. Erigena. ib. p. 398.

Avicebron (Arabic) maintained that even Spiritual substances are in some sense material. Albertus Magnus says that his work rested on the hypothesis that things corporeal and incorporeal were of one

Nature of Evil.

Matter, all substances — the soul included, and God alone excluded — being compounded of matter & form. ib. p. 394.

Boethius — Evil in a finite world is a necessary condition of good. Ac. to Boethius: The salvation (health or blessedness) of the soul is righteousness. Virtue is its own reward; vice, its own punishment. His conclusion is: "detest and flee every vice; cultivate and pursue every virtue; exalt your mind to God, the only true hope." ib. p. 383.

Augustine — Ac. to Augustine: Evil is simply negative, the absence of good. There can in fact be no evil where there is no good, and the evil of sin can inhere only in an intelligent moral nature, which, as such, is good. As disease is the privation of health, so "what are called vices in the soul are nothing but privations of natural good." ib. 374.

Tertullian — Tertullian maintained "that the souls, sprung from the first soul wh. arose immediately from the breath of God, are immortals endowed with free-will, in possession of a faculty of divination — evident signs of their heavenly origin." ib. p. 352.

Proclus — Ac. to Proclus: Evil is privation. Evil, as evil, is that wh. is separated from the fountain of good. 341.

Plotinus — As to the evil wh. exists, it is necessary & indispensable, the result of dependence & limitation, but when considered in all its connections, the discord resolves itself into a higher harmony; the very evil is subservient to good. 335.

Plutarch

Plutarch says: "The corruption or death of any creature is not its annihilation or reduction into a mere nothing, but rather a sending of the dissolved being into an invisible state." ib. 288.

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Seneca

Thou bearest God about with thee ... and thou dost not feel that thou art defiling Him with thy impure thoughts and thy filthy deeds? If an image of God were present, thou wouldst not dare to do any of these things & thou does; but God himself, being present within thee, and overlooking and overhearing all, thou art not ashamed to think and to do these things, O man, insensible of thine own nature, and visited with the wrath of God.' Seneca. ib. 276.

Some barking objector may ask, Why do you talk more bravely than you live? ... One says, you speak one thing, you live another. Malignant spirits made the same objection to Plato, Epicurus, Zeno. All these told not how they lived themselves, but set forth the proper rule of life. I speak not of myself, but of virtue. ... No malignity shall prevent my persevering praise, not of the life I lead, but of the life that I ought to lead. ... I have loved a good conscience, good aspirations. ib. p. 273.

The soul of man is great and generous, admitting no other bounds to be set to her than what are common with God. First, she acknowledgeth not any terrestrial city, as Ephesus or Alexandria, etc. No, she claims for her country the universe. ... Nor, secondly, does she

Seneca – Pliny.

suffer herself to be confined to any number of years. All years, she says, are mine. When the day shall come that will separate this composition, human and divine, I will leave this body here where I found it, and return to the gods; not that I am altogether absent from them even now, though detained from superior happiness by this heavy earthly clog. This short stay in mortal life is but the prelude to a better and more lasting life above. ib. 269.

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Ac. to Seneca, to live according to Nature may be regarded as the substance of all rules of duty & all conditions of happiness. ib. 264.

What is God? The mind of the universe ... What is the difference between his nature and ours? The better part of ours is the soul. With him, soul is all. He is reason entire. Seneca. ib. 253.

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Pliny

Pliny (the Younger), with evident reluctance, gives in his adhesion to the belief that phantoms of the dead re-appear to man, and that events occur prophetic of an inevitable doom, which a wise man might sometimes interpret correctly. 249.

He wd. have Licinius Sura advise him of his opinion, whether these phantoms were real figures, carrying in them some kind of divinity, or were empty, vain shadows, occasioned by fear acting on the imagination. ib. 249.

Plutarch "There is one and the same reason to confirm the providence of God and the immortality of the soul. Neither is it possible to admit the one, if you deny the other." ib. 286.

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Socrates Socrates did not tell his disciples that his future life was to be separated from his life here; it was the continuation and unfolding of that life which he looked for. p. 135.

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Anaxag. Anaxagoras ridiculed the wild speculations of some of his predecessors as to the genesis of things. "Enough," said he, "do the Greeks suppose that aught begins or ceases to be; for nothing comes into being or is destroyed; but all is an aggregation or secretion of pre-existent things." "It is impossible that any thing should come from non-being, or that there should be more than the all. p. 93.

The first moving force is νους, intellect. The order of mundane things must have its origin in a rational being. 94.

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Lactantius If there were no evil, no danger, nothing injurious, every occasion and necessity for human wisdom would be taken away. With good only in view, what need of reflection, understanding, reason? Men might always remain infants, and without experience. But mingle the bitter, the useless, the poisonous with what they have, and

wisdom becomes a necessity. Man must be no more irrational — a mere child, but wise, experiencing that there is more of good and pleasure in wisdom, than of bitterness, in the ills of life. Such was the solution opposed by Lactantius. ib. p. 608.

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Shaftesbury If everything wh. exists be according to a good order, and for the best, then of necessity there is no such thing as real ill in the universe — nothing ill with respect to the whole. Shaftesbury. ib. 610.

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King Created things must be necessarily imperfect. Evils, therefore, inseparable from the good are tolerated by God... No arrangement of the world in respect to the sun could have made all parts of it equally habitable or productive... That men are born weak and helpless is expedient for their social training... Brutes are not tortured by the fear of dissolution, and, that men are, is a sign that the present life is a prelude to a better... If wild beasts or venomous creatures multiply, or deserts are made by war or indolence, man is in fault, and those things are of the nature of punishment, or possibly subserve some useful end. Dr. Wm King, Archbishop of Dublin, "On The Origin of Evil." p. 609, 10. (See p. 247).

&c. to Leibnitz only so much evil has been admitted as could not have been avoided without the sacrifice of more than equivalent good. 615.
No possible world could have been constructed which would, on the whole, have been preferable to this. Thus evil is made incidental to the scheme which aims at the best results. 615.
... If being is to be individualized, it must be limited, and it is limited in the plan of God. Without limits or imperfections, there could be no definite powers, no individuality, no freedom; Men must take the right stand-point, and then he will see pain and suffering to be but the shades in the picture, the dissonance in the music, which the perfection of art cannot dispense with, which add to the charm of the whole. They are instrumental or subsidiary to the good, as storms to purify the air and make the earth fruitful. An act of iniquity led to the change of the Roman Constitution, and made Rome a world-ruling republic. Earthly calamity, moreover, is of short endurance, while souls are immortal. Death is only the passing over to a new life. "Bayle sees in the world only prisons and hospitals, but there are many houses beside." God's wise goodness willed the possibility of evil and wickedness, but only as the means and condition of good. Without the spur of evil, there had been no moral worth, no freedom, no merit of right

dealing. God allows the evil for the sake of the good. The world is a climax of development up to ever higher perfection. Human blessedness does not consist in idle enjoyment or effortless attainment, but in a free, and yet pre-ordained activity, directed to right ends. p. 619. Leibnitz.

Thus harmonizing his philosophy and theology, his monads and his pre-established order, does Leibnitz propose to vindicate the wisdom and the goodness of God.

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Says Ernest Renan: "If for a certainty we could every one of us, but once a year, exchange two words with the loved and lost, death would be no more death." This is so true (says quaint John Wetherbee) that we make no hesitation in saying, the one human voice from the other side is the heart's desire; we would prefer a Bacon or a Shakspeare, but we are thankful to the peddler for his utterance in Haydesville, 28 years ago, and would have been if it had been the soul of a villain who had been hung for killing his mother – for the fact settles the question of life for all.

B. of Light March 18 1876.

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We shield the thermometer from our own breath when we wish to obtain reliable readings of temperature; we should be as thoughtfully careful with the sensitive medium. ih.

The fundamental fact of Modern Spiritualism has put in its appearance, and being a fact, sticks, as the Copernican system did after it was announced, for it explained so many mysteries in astronomy, although Bacon, the wisest man in the world at the time, died insisting that the sun was nearer the earth at sunrise and sunset than at noon day. The light or truth was in the world, but the Bacons did not know it. So to-day the soul's existence seems to be hidden from the wise and prudent Bacons, and revealed to us who may be babies.

John Wetherbee
Jr.

W. Howitt Spiritualism has, by vast and consentaneous testimony, established anew the great fact of the immortality of man. That is enough for us and for all men, if it never add another word.

Wm Howitt

J. Pierpont In the London Medium and Daybreak of March 3d, 1876, is a report of an address by Mrs. Kimball, an American medium. While she was "under control," reference was made to the Rev. John Pierpont, "first Pres't of the Society of American Spiritualists"; he, in fact, presented himself in spirit-form and was clairvoyantly visible to Mrs. Kimball and to Mrs. Tebb, who knew him in earth-life. He appeared to wish the medium to relate a circumstance respecting him, which she did. It was to the following effect:–

The last time he officiated as one of the conventions

and apparently in excellent health, a medium said to him, "I feel I shall not see you again till we meet in the other world. Will you come back to me?" "Certainly I will", he replied. "But", said he, "do you think I am going soon?" "Yes, I do", was the reply... Two days afterwards, as the lady was in her room, she heard a voice speaking in her ear, "My child, I told you I would come again, and here I am." The lady stood amazed, and said to a friend, "If I did not know that Mr. Pierpont was living, I should think it was he." The spirit then appeared, saying, "I told you I would come back, and here I am." Stamping his foot and throwing up his arms, he exclaimed, "I am young again" alluding to a conversation at the last interview. It was indeed he. After leaving the convention he had gone home. He was found early in the morning asleep in his bed, but it was the sleep of death. Mrs. Kimball has since stated that she was the medium in question.

D. Lyman
B. of Light
March 25th
1876

The facts of Spiritualism certainly cannot be expected to generate a code of morals any more than a painters colors can be expected to create rules for the pictorial art... The effect will in the majority of cases be determined rather by the believers nature than his will. The mission, so to speak, of the facts seems to me to be precisely this: to render it forever impossible for any body of religious believers to impose authoritatively a system of religious morals. I say religious because

Stewart and

there is a vast difference between natural and religious ethics.... The fountain head of the mischief of which religious despotism is capable is to be found in the prevalent belief that one person may constitute himself a guardian of the religious life of another, and that societies may impose religious duties. .. The Spiritual phenomena arouse inquiry into the grounds of all kinds of obedience, and diffuse a general dissatisfaction with all authority that cannot show a reason for its behests. Their work as a fermenting leaven has but just begun.... The new paths of peace in morals and religion are to be looked for in the necessary relations of things, and not in the teachings of religious guides, however ancient or however sacred.... Corporate religious societies that make it their business to sever religious from natural duties, are to disappear, and men are to learn first to be reconciled to their brothers, before hastening with offerings to their gods. ... Religion may be defined in common language as the doing of some act or acts for God's sake; or, to use a more scientific definition, it is the effort to conform human life to the demands of an assumed supersensual, personal agency.

Shall we know each other in the future life? We shall if we possess kindred hearts; if not, we shall be separated, and moreover have no desire for acquaintance. White's Swedenborg, p. 234.

Swedenborg On the Unreliability of Spirits.

Swedenborg

And they asked the angel, "What, then, is heavenly joy?" And the angel answered in these few words: "It is the delight of doing something which is of use to one's self and to others; and the delight of use derives its essence from love, and its existence from wisdom." Swedenborg. True Chr. Relig., p. 488.

" From the universal order of Heaven and Hell it appears, that evil punishes itself and tends to its own abolition. Such is the divine law in the permission of evil. It is also a universal law that love shall reward itself. Thus it fares with every one just as he wills to others. Swedenborg. See White's Life of, p. 174.

" Swedenborg consulted the spirits in regard to the size of editions of his books, but found them poor advisers. He says: "I have been taught by manifold experience that angels and spirits will sanction counsels as wise and advantageous which are quite the reverse. They only regard the good intention, and can be induced to affirm anything which promises to advance it". ib. p. 177.

We carry with us into the next world whatever we think, wish, do, hear, and see, to the least minutiæ, in the whole course of our lives. ib. p. 224.

In our Father's kingdom perhaps we shall be blessed with what here has been denied us: to know one another merely by seeing one another, and thence more thoroughly to love one another. — Lewes's Goethe. ii. 232.

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No revelation infallible.

Spiritualism teaches us experimentally that no revelation can be accepted as infallible; that its matter is but the opinion of the communicating spirit or spirits. The study of the facts of the material plane is, in its way, just as important to the truth-seeker as the study of those of the spiritual; each tends to check and correct false conceptions regarding the other. The more we understand of the working of Providence on both planes, the clearer it seems that Infinite Love reigns over all. . . N. B., Balt., Eng. in Med. & Daybreak. March 17. 1876.

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Lewes Sp-ism more Immortality?

Spiritual atoms may be scattered, like material atoms; and then, where is the individual? When we speak of immortality are we not thinking of the self-conscious ego. But I suspect we shall even find that the spirit of man (I use the word 'spirit' as an intermediate condition of existence between body and soul) is as much a perpetually fluctuating mass of spirit-atoms as the body is of material atoms. . . .

When every possible variety of theory concerning the human individuality and its immortality has been propounded, there remains the fact that the thought atoms forming the spirit of a man are selected with a recurrent precision which marks the presence of an

indwelling selecting power. This selecting power in one person is variable, and, I suppose, inevitably persists in selecting thought-atoms different to those selected by another person, so that our individualities are always distinct. This selecting power which ranks the individual (if it be not the individual) must be of a nature more persistent than are the atoms and forces it employs, and therefore it is presumably of a nature not purely material, and hence will not be much affected by the mere material change of physical death. What the scientific Spiritualist has to do, is to gain evidence on the degrees of consciousness possessed by immaterial beings, or, rather, of beings somewhat less material than human beings are in their earth-bodies. And I think we shall find that a death-surviving individuality is as various in its strength and degree as is individuality within material organisms here. I think it will be proved that many existences, lower than the human, may, at the dissolution of death, leave only a vague deposit of individual Spirit - a form, but not a perfectly individualized form - which deposit can be taken up with numberless others, and used towards the formation of a human being, just as millions of atoms and germs are used in his physical manufacture. It is the destiny of this human being to work out his own development, thereby improving the condition of all the vague deposits of Spirit which are now within him, and which will go to produce

one death-surviving individuality. And it is in the training of all his surroundings, circumstances, experiences, and laws of life, to help to develope this something within him which shall survive the dissolution of death.

The evidence of this death-surviving faculty is found in the attainment to a consciousness of a life larger than his own, of feelings which transcend thought, of a good more beautiful than he can imagine, of principles substantiating all phenomena. Most especially is this death-surviving faculty proved by his exercise of a will, restraining, and urging, and compelling his physical faculties. Indeed, the power to judge and control our instincts implies the presence of a something new and non-existent in the lower forms of life; a something whose (as yet only feebly developed) presence we should cultivate with the utmost care, as the nurturing heir of immortality.

R. D. (Odon.) wrote that "Immortality is given at incarnation." To me it seems that what is given at incarnation is the capacity to develop the latent germ of immortality. G. T. C. R. in the London Spiritualist of March 17, 1876, p. 127. (As he speaks of seeing "with his psychic eyes" "the material vitality of a tree," &c. I presume that G. T. C. R. is a medium.) E. S.

The only God that nature points to is an adamantine fate. . . D. G. Brinton.

Hallock – Weiss – Brinton.

Is Sp-sm a Religion?

According to orthodox theology, sin is a debt which another may pay; in Spiritual theology, it is a blunder demanding personal rectification. With respect to the other life, two fixed conditions are affirmed by the one, while eternal progress is asserted by the other. Orthodoxy declares that revelation and inspiration – intercourse of every kind with the spiritual world – ceased with the apostolic age. Modern Spiritualism, in every name, signifies the living presence of these blessed realities.

Thus Sp-sm has a theology at least; a theology which rests on personal experience and observation of spiritual facts and principles; a theology as demonstrative as the foundation upon which it rests. And this is the body (so to speak) of the religion of Spiritualists ... Sp-sm, by its revelation of facts and principles, is entitled not only to be called a religion, but the religion which, like the mathematics, is to find universal acceptance wherever it is understood. R. T. Hallock. Banner of Light. March 26/60

See Lyman p. 256.

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Jno. Weiss

Morality is not an outgrowth of theology or religion, or dependent on either in any sense. The Christian religion owes what of life and vital force it has as a good influence in the world to the idea of morality which exists with mankind universally. Morals have not been the fruit of the Chr. relig.

Brinton

The world is growing to perceive that morality is separable from religion; that it arose independently. It is debasing to religion to make it a substitute for police magistracy. – D. G. Brinton.

The prayer of Apollonius of Tyana was: "Give me, ye gods, that which I deserve": — the direct contrary of the prayer, "Forgive us our debts."

Saunder's Hist. of Christ. Relig.

According to some, but not by any means the most intelligent or best educated of the American Spiritualists, there is no God at all, only a "principle", and nothing higher in the scale of being than the spirits of their deceased friends and kindred; but these materialistic philosophers form but a small part of that intelligent nation of thinkers, and their teachings have but little weight beyond a few score of poor people, who gather together, and in grandiloquent phraseology congratulate each other on being the great I Ams of the Universe.

Art Magic. p. 93. Ed. by Bro. H. — Britten. 1876.

La Religion du Progrès par L. Cortambert

La terre est évidemment la mère de tous les êtres dont l'échelle ascendante aboutit à l'homme. C'est en elle qu'étaient originairement contenus les germes de toutes les espèces. Les autres planètes jouent un rôle pareil au sien dans l'économie du monde, et nous reconnaissons dans le soleil la puissance génératrice qui exerce son action fécondante sur toutes les planètes de notre système.

Si nous remontons dans l'histoire de ce système jusqu'à l'époque où l'espace qu'il occupe était occupé par une nébuleuse, nous devrons considérer celle-ci comme la mère des astres qui ont pris ensuite

une forme distincte, c'est-à-dire du Soleil et des planètes. Par conséquent, elle contenait les germes de tous les êtres que ces planètes ont enfantés depuis et doivent enfanter encore. Cette nébuleuse et toutes celles qui ont donné naissance aux divers systèmes solaires qui peuplent l'espace ont été fécondées par l'astre central de l'univers, suprême générateur des êtres.

In Heaven, in the boundless Universe, He is the Macrocosm, the infinitely large; on earth and in Myself, He is the Microcosm, the infinitely little... Art. Magic.

Whilst there is abundant evidence to prove the Constant interposition of human spirits in human affairs, and the identity of such spirits with a vast amount of the occult phenomena produced in every age of the world, we may also rest assured that the Realms of the Elementaries can and do exercise considerable influence upon humanity, especially in relation to animal propensities and earthly things; also that Planetary Spirits rule, guide and interpose in human destiny, and that Tutelary Spirits take charge of and govern nations, planets, and all bodies in space, — That all these Spirits can be seen, communed with and invoked, is also sufficiently proved in the course of this work.

Art Magic, p. 450. Ed. by Mrs. Waldinge-Butler. 1876.

He is within the universe, and yet
Outside this universe; whoever beholds
All living creatures as in him, and him —
The universal Spirit — as in all,
Henceforth regards no creature with contempt.
The man who understands that every creature
Exists in God alone, and thus perceives
The unity of being, has no grief
And no illusion.
Alpanishad — the Isa. M. Williams's "Indian Wisdom"

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As the web issues from the spider, as little sparks proceed from fire, so from the one Soul proceed all breathing animals, all worlds, all the gods, and all beings. p. 39 ib.

Those who know him as the life of life, the eye of the eye, the ear of the ear, and the mind of the mind, have comprehended the eternal pre-existing Spirit. ib.

Soul alone
Knows Soul, to none but Soul is Soul revealed.
ib. p. 44.

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Buddhism The Buddha recognised no supreme deity. The only god, he affirmed, is what man himself can become. In Brahmanism God becomes man; in Buddhism man becomes a god... That all existence is an evil is a fundamental dogma of Buddhism. Hence the great end of the system is Nirvāṇa, 'the being blown out', or non-existence. ib. p. 57.

Brahmanism – Cicero – Plato.

Kalpanalistic Brahmanism holds the eternity of soul, both retrospectively and prospectively. It looks upon soul as of two kinds: a, the Supreme Soul; b, the personal individuated soul of living beings; and it maintains that if any entity is eternal it cannot have had a beginning, or else it must have an end. Hence the personal soul of every human being, just as the Supreme Soul, has existed everlastingly and will never cease to exist.

[Cicero expresses it thus: "Id autem nec nasci potest nec mori." Plato, however seems to have given no eternity to individual souls, except as emanations from the divine; and in Timaeus he distinguishes two parts of the soul, one immortal, the other mortal. ib. p. 52.]

Plato appears to have held that the elements before the creation were shapeless and soulless, but were moulded and arranged by the Creator (Timaeus 27) out of some invisible and formless essence.

Aristotle says: "It is necessary there should be a certain nature (φύσις) – either one or more – out of which other entities are produced. ib. 63.

The Hindu asks: "How can an entity be produced out of a nonentity?" 63.

Sp. body

All the Brahmanical systems seem to have assigned to each person two bodies: a. an exterior or gross body (sthūla-śarīra); b. an

interior or subtle body (Sûkshma-Sarîra). The last is necessary as a vehicle for the soul when the gross body is dissolved, accompanying it through all its transmigrations and sojournings in heaven or hell, and never becoming separated from it till its emancipation is effected... The Platonists and other Greek and Roman philosophers seem to have held a similar doctrine as to a subtle material envelope investing the soul after death, serving as its ὄχημα or vehicle. See Plato, Timæus 17. 54

An evil act follows a man, passing through a hundred thousand transmigrations; in like manner the act of a high-minded man. As shade and sunlight are ever closely joined together, so an act and its agent stick close to each other. Pañca-tantra, iv. 65.

The transmigration of the soul through a constant succession of bodies, &c. is as much a fixed doctrine of Buddhism as of Hinduism, so to be regarded as the root of all evil. Moreover, by it all the misery, inequality of fortune, and diversity of character in the world are to be explained. 68.

The summum bonum of philosophical Brahmanism is, the loss of all personality and separate identity by absorption into the supreme and only really existing Being — mere life with nothing to live for, mere thought viz. nothing upon it. That is to be exercised. 70.

The Soul

Ac. to Nyāya souls are infinite, ubiquitous, and diffused everywhere throughout space, so that a man's soul is as much in England as in Calcutta, though it can only apprehend and feel where the body happens to be. 86.

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Origin of the World

In the Nyāya the universe is supposed to proceed from a concurrence of innumerable eternal atoms; in the Sankhya from one original eternal element called Prakriti (that wh. evolves everything else); both operating independently, though associated with eternal souls and, according to one view, presided over by a supreme soul. But in the Vedānta there is really no material world at all, as distinct from the universal Soul. The universe exists, but merely as a form of the one eternal essence, the only really existing substance.

Plato Brahma

Plato seems to have insisted on the doctrine that mind preceded and gave rise to matter.

The name Brahman is in fact derived from the root brih or vrih, 'to grow and expand', and therefore means literally the one essence wh. grows or expands. 114.

Aristotle

Aristotle's idea of God is that he is a Being whose essence is love, manifested in eternal energy, the final cause of this energy being the happiness of his creatures, in which he himself participates forever. p. 125.

I am the pattern
For man to follow; know that I have done
All acts already, nought remains for me
To gain by action, yet I work forever
Unweariedly, and this whole universe
Would perish if I did not work my work.
Bhagavad-gita. iv. p. 157

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The Bhagavad-gita accepts the doctrine of a supreme presiding Spirit as the first source of the universe, but asserts the eternal existence of Prakriti and Purusha – that is, of an original eternal element and a soul – both emanating from the Supreme Being. It maintains the individuality and personality of souls.

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Seneca

Seneca says: God comes to man; nay, what is nearer, comes into men. – Let him who hath conferred a favor hold his tongue. – If you wish to be loved, love. – We are all wicked: therefore whatever we blame in another we shall find in our own bosom. – God is nigh to thee, he is with thee, he is in thee. – The severest punishment a man can receive who has injured another, is to have committed the injury.

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Epictetus

If you always remember that in all you do in soul or body, God stands by as a witness, in all your prayers and actions you will not err; and

you shall have God dwelling with you. — How should a man grieve his enemy? By preparing himself to act in the noblest manner.

Marcus Aurelius — The best way of avenging thyself is not to become like the wrong-doer. p. 154.

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Aryan Belief — There is evidence that when the Aryan race first settled on the plains of Hindustan, even at that early epoch, there prevailed among them an evident belief in the soul's eternal existence and the permanence of its personality hereafter.

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From the Law-books (Dharma-Śāstras) of Manu. v. Indian Wisdom. W. H. Allen & Co. London, 1875.

— Speak what is true, speak not agreeable falsehood.
— Treat no one with disdain, with patience bear
Reviling language; with an angry man
Be never angry; blessings give for curses.
— None sees us, say the sinful in their hearts;
Yes, the gods see them, and the omniscient spirit
Within their breasts. Thou thinkest, O good friend,
'I am alone'; but there resides within thee
A Being who inspects thy every act,
Knows all thy goodness and thy wickedness.
— The soul is its own witness; yea, the soul
Itself is its own refuge; grieve thou not
O man, thy soul, the great internal Witness.
— When thou hast sinned think not to hide thy guilt
Under a cloak of penance and austerity.

— The Firmament, the Earth, the Sea, the Moon,
The Sea, the Fire, the Wind, the Night, and both
The sacred Twilights, and the Judge of Souls,
The god of justice, and the Heart itself —
All constantly survey the acts of men.

— Thou canst not gather what thou dost not sow;
As thou dost plant the tree, so will it grow.

— Depend not on another; rather lean
Upon thyself; trust to thine own exertions.
True happiness consists in self-reliance.

— Never despise thyself, nor yet contemn
Thy own first efforts, though they end in failure;
Seek Fortune with persistency till death,
Nor ever deem her hard to be obtained.

— Contentment, patience under injury,
Self-subjugation, honesty, restraint
Of all the sensual organs, purity,
Devotion, knowledge of the Deity,
Veracity, and abstinence from anger —
These form the tenfold summary of duty.

— Innumerable Souls, endued with form,
Issue like scintillations from the substance
Of the great Self-existent, constantly
Impelling beings multiform to action.

— He who by firmness gains the mastery
Over his words, his mind, and his whole body,
Is justly called a triple-governor.

— He who with fixed abstraction sees himself
And all things in the universal Self,

Cannot apply his soul to wickedness.
— He man who sees by means of his own soul
The universal Spirit present there,
Present in every creature everywhere,
With perfect equanimity may wait
Till he has reached the state of bliss supreme—
Complete absorption in the eternal essence.

From the Yājñavalkya. — ib.

The success of every action depends on destiny and on a man's own effort; but destiny is evidently nothing but (the result) of a man's act in a former state of existence.

From the Mahā-bhārata — ib.

— This is the sum of all true righteousness:
Treat others, as thou wouldst thyself be treated.
Do nothing to thy neighbor, which hereafter
Thou wouldst not have thy neighbor do to thee.
In causing pleasure, or in giving pain,
In doing good, or injury to others,
In granting or refusing a request,
A man obtains a proper rule of action
By looking on his neighbor as himself.
— Reflect that health is transient, death impends;
Ne'er in the day of youthful strength do aught
To grieve thy conscience, lest when weakness comes,
And thou art on a bed of sickness laid,
Fear and remorse augment thy sufferings.

— Conquer a man who never gives by gifts;
Subdue untruthful men by truthfulness;
Vanquish an angry man by gentleness;
And overcome the evil man by goodness.

— Two persons will hereafter be exalted
Above the heavens: the man with boundless power
Who yet forbears to use it indiscreetly,
And he who is not rich and yet can give.

— Darts, barbed arrows, iron-headed spears,
However deep they penetrate the flesh,
May be extracted; but a cutting speech,
That pierces, like a javelin, to the heart,
None can remove; it lies and rankles there.

— Repeated sin destroys the understanding,
And he whose reason is impaired, repeats
His sins. The constant practising of virtue
Strengthens the mental faculties, and he
Whose judgment stronger grows, acts always right.

— Bear railing words with patience, never meet
An angry man with anger, nor return
Reviling for reviling, smite not him
Who smites thee; let thy speech and acts be gentle.

— Do naught to others which if done to thee
Would cause thee pain; this is the sum of duty.

— Enjoy thou the prosperity of others
Although thyself unprosperous; noble men
Take pleasure in their neighbors' happiness.

— What need has he who subjugates himself
To live secluded in a hermit's cell:

2/4 Where'er resides the self-subduing sage
That place to him is like a hermitage.
— Death will not wait to know if thou art ready,
Or if thy work be done. Be active now,
While thou art young, and time is still thine own.
This very day perform to-morrow's work,
This very morning do thy evening task.
— Before infirmities creep o'er thy flesh;
Before decay impairs thy strength and mars
The beauty of thy limbs; before the Ender,
Whose charioteer is Sickness, hastes toward thee,
Breaks up thy fragile frame and ends thy life;—
Lay up the only treasure; do good deeds;
Practise sobriety and self-control;
Amass that wealth wh. thieves cannot abstract;
Nor tyrants seize; wh. follows thee as death,
Wh. never wastes away, nor is corrupted.

"Indian Wisdom" From the Raghu-vaṇśa X. 16-33. The inferior gods are supposed to be addressing Vishṇu as the Supreme Being:
Hail to thee, mighty lord, the world's creator,
Supporter and destroyer, three in one —
One in thy essence, tripartite in action!
.... Full of all pity, yet thyself untouched
By misery; the ever ancient one,
Yet never growing ancient; knowing all,
Yet never known; unborn, yet giving birth
To all... love, love alone, for these thy worlds
Moves thee to act, leads to thy incarnations.

The noble-minded dedicate themselves
To the promotion of the happiness
Of others — e'en of those who injure them.
True happiness consists in making happy.

The following is a metrical version of the prayer of Parāśara, from the Viṣṇu-purāṇa: —

Hail to thee, mighty Lord, all potent Viṣṇu!
Soul of the Universe, unchangeable,
Holy, eternal, always one in nature,
Whether revealed as Brahma, Hari, Śiva —
Creator or Preserver or Destroyer —
Thou art the cause of final liberation;
Whose form is one, yet manifold; whose essence
Is one, yet diverse; tenuous, yet vast;
Discernible, yet undiscernible;
Root of the world, yet of the world composed;
Prop of the universe, yet more minute
Than earth's minutest particles; abiding
In every creature, yet without depilement;
Imperishable, one with perfect wisdom.

The following is the prayer of Mucukunda: —

Lord of the Universe, the only refuge
Of living beings, the alleviator
Of pain, the benefactor of mankind,
Show me thy favor and deliver me
From evil; O creator of the world,
Maker of all that has been and will be,

Of all that moves and is immovable,
Thyself composed of what possesses form,
And what is formless; limitless in bulk,
Yet infinitely subtle; lord of all,
Worthy of praise, I come to thee my refuge,
Renouncing all attachment to the world,
Longing for fulness of felicity —
Extinction of myself, absorption into thee.

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From Bhartri-hari's apothegms: —
There in this world love's only fruit is won,
When two true hearts are blended into one;
But when by disagreement love is blighted,
'Twere better that two corpses were united.

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Any one who studies the best Hindu writings cannot but be struck by the moral tone which everywhere pervades them. Indian writers, although they do not trouble themselves much about the history of past generations, constantly represent the present condition of human life as the result of actions in previous existences. Hence a right course of present conduct becomes an all-important consideration as bearing on future happiness.

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From the Pancatrantra: —

Praise not the goodness of the grateful man
Who acts with kindness to his benefactors;
He who does good to those who do him wrong
Alone deserves the epithet of good.

Indian Wisdom.

—By drops of water falling one by one,
Little by little, may a jar be filled:
Such is the law of all accumulations
Of money, knowledge, and religious merit.
—Disinclination to begin a work
Through fear of failure, is a mark of weakness:
Is food renounced through fear of indigestion?

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Is such a thing as an emerald made worse
than it was, if it is not praised? — Marcus
Aurelius. Farrar's 'Seekers after God', p. 306.

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From Bhartri-hari's apothegms written about
A. D. 530–544 :—
Now for a little while a child, and now
An amorous youth; then for a season turned
Into the wealthy householder; then stripped
Of all his riches, with decrepit limbs
And wrinkled frame, man creeps toward the end
Of life's erratic course; and, like an actor,
Passes behind Death's curtain out of view.
... The parallel to Shakspeare's "All the
world's a stage" need scarcely be suggested.

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The truly virtuous man, says Aristotle, never
has occasion to practise self-denial.
... True freedom, real being, is only possible
where law as such is inexistent. D. G. Brinton
Only the lawless make the law.

Brinton.

The religious feeling must assume at least these three postulates:

I. There is an Order in things.

II. This order is one of Intelligence.

III. All Intelligence is one in Kind.

The conscious or unconscious purpose of the religious sentiment is the fruition of a wish, the success of wh. depends upon unknown power. The votary asks help where he cannot help himself.... "Science has been correctly defined as "the knowledge of system." Its postulate (fundamental) is that order exists. It is the same as that of the religious sentiment.

The 2d postulate embraces what has been called the "Principle of continuity;" "the trust that the Supreme Governor of the Universe will not put us to permanent intellectual confusion." It is the identification of order with reason.

The 3rd postulate is "the very foundation and essence of religion." ... Mr. Spencer is justified in condemning "the transcendent audacity which passes current as piety," if his definition of the underlying verity of religion is admitted — that it is "the consciousness of an inscrutable Power wh., in its nature, transcends intuition, and is beyond imagination." They are but following the orthodox Sir Wm Hamilton, who says: "Creation must be thought as the incomprehensible evolution of power into energy." We are to think that which

by the terms of the proposition is unthinkable.' At most wise master! . . .

Such writers deny that all intelligence is one in kind. Some accept this fully, and concede that what are called the laws of order, as shown by science, are only matters of experience, true here and now, not necessarily and absolutely true. This is a consistent inference and applies to all moral laws and religious dogmas.

If no statement is really true, then this one, to wit, "no statement is really true," also is not true; and if that is the case, then there are statements wh. are really true. If all truth is relative, then this at least is absolutely true.

. . . Every thought is made up of a positive and a privative, and it is absurd and unnatural to separate the one from the other. The unknowable is really a part of the thought of the knowable; the infinite of the finite.

. . . The very fact that we have learned that our senses are untrustworthy, and that experience is always fallacious, shows that we have tests of truth depending on some other faculty.

. . . The folly lies not in claiming reason as the absolute, but in assuming that the absolute is beyond and against reason.

. . . Only on the principle wh. here receives its proof, that man has something in him of God, that the norm of the true holds good throughout,

Brinton.

can be know or care anything about divinity. "It takes a god to discern a god," wrote Novalis.

... Least of all should a believer in a divine revelation deny the oneness of intelligence.

... We are brought, therefore, to the momentous conclusion that the manifestation of Order, whether in material or mental processes, "affords a presumption, not measurable indeed but real, of the fulfilment of an end or purpose"; and this purpose, one wh. has other objects in view than the continuance of physical processes. The history of mind, from protoplasmic sensation upward, must be a progression whose end will be worth more than was its beginning, a process, wh. has for its purpose the satisfaction of the laws of mind. This is nothing else than correct thinking, the attainment of truth.

But this conclusion, reached by a searching criticism of the validity of scientific laws, is precisely that wh. is the postulate of all developed creeds. "The faith of all historical religions," says Bunsen, "starts from the assumption of a universal moral order, in wh. the good is alone the true, and the true is the only good."

A religion wh. would persuade man that he should always act in accordance with the dictates of right reasoning, should therefore be addressed primarily to the intellect.

"The Religious Sentiment, by Dan. G. Brinton, M. D."
New York. Holt. 1876.

As man can attain to certain truths which are without any mixture of fallacy, wh. when once he comprehends them he can never any more doubt, and wh. though, thus absolute do not fetter his intellect but first give it the use of all its powers to the extent of those truths; so he can conceive of an Intelligence in wh. all truth is thus without taint of error. Not only is such an Intelligence conceivable, it is necessary to conceive it, in order to complete the Scientific induction of "a Sphere of thought from wh. all limits are withdrawn", forced upon us by the demonstrations of the exact Sciences. Thus do we reach the foundation for the faith in a moral gov't of the world; but a gov't., as thus analytically reached, not corresponding easily with that wh. popular Religion speaks of. ib.

Confucius did not deny the existence of unseen powers; on the contrary, he said: "The Kwei Shin (the most general term for Supernatural beings) enter into all things, and there is nothing without them;" but he added, "Be busy for them and do not see them; we listen, but do not hear them."

The prayer of St. Chrysostom, unsurpassed in its grand simplicity, is: "Almighty Father, ** grant us in this world knowledge of thy truth, and in the world to come life everlasting."

Brinton.

As a matter of history we know that in abundant instances the decay of nations can be traced largely to the base teachings of their religious instructors. To maintain that such religions were "the best possible ones" for the time and place is the absurdest optimism. In what a religion shares of the abstractly true it is beneficent; in what it partakes of the untrue it is deleterious. ib.

X ... The highest conception of individual perfection is reached in a character whose physical and mental powers are symmetrically trained, and always directed by conscious reason to their appropriate ends.... This is the religion of culture. None other ranks among its adherents so many great minds. Buddha says: "Self is the god of self; who else should be the god?" In this century Goethe, Wordsworth, beyond all others Wilhelm von Humboldt, have set forth this ideal. ... Physical vigor, regarded as a sign of complete nutrition, is an indispensable preliminary to the highest religion. Bodily degeneration is in antagonism to mental progress. ... The integrity & permanence of the person is the keystone to religion, as it is to philosophy and ethics. None but a false teacher would measure our duty to our neighbor by a higher standard than our love to ourselves.

"Religion", says Mathew Arnold, "is conduct." "It is the power wh. makes for righteousness."

THE PHYSICAL THEORY OF MIND.

The sixth lecture in the Lowell Institute upon "Physical Theories and Religious Faith," by the Rev. James T. Bixby, was given on Saturday night, upon "The Physical Theory of Mind." After presenting the naturalistic interpretation of mind as a mere function of matter, and thought as a mode of motion, the lecturer pointed out the unerasable differences between them. Matter is known by the senses, mind by consciousness. Matter had dimension, might measure. But to speak of thought as an inch or a foot long, as weighing so many pounds, would be absurd. The measurability of thought is not even conceivable, hence it cannot be a quantity, much less a physical thing. Were thought a transformation of physical force it would be proportionate to the quantity received. But this is not the case. Matter is divisible, composed of parts. Mind is an indivisible unity. Reasoning, memory, comparison, responsibility, all imply the conscious oneness and identity of the mind. But this is inexplicable on any physical theory. Mental actions are always accompanied by physical actions. But they are not caused by them. The mind preceded and built up the brain, not the brain the mind. There is no transmutation of physical force into mental force. The two circuits go on side by side, but there is no evidence that either shifts into the other. Conscious brain action does not require the expense of more physical force than unconscious brain action, nor is physical force liberated by the cessation of consciousness, as would take place were one transformed into the other. Spencer, Tyndall and Du Bois-Reymond were quoted as testifying to the existence of a chasm, logically impassable, between matter and mind, motion and thought. If matter and motion, nevertheless, have somehow made mind and thought, they have made something far other and greater than themselves. No matter by what path or method it has come about, the great fact is that, now and here, we are not clay nor brute, but conscious, reasoning, worshipping men.

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Most modern students of mental phenomena seem to be of the opinion that thoughts may be generated ~~in unconscious states of the mind~~. The brightest inspirations ~~& brightest~~ profoundest utterances of genius, we are told, may often be the product of that terra incognita, the unconscious realm. This idea is not a new one. It was ~~opposite with~~ Leibnitz, Voltaire, and Schelling & many of the physicists and philosophers of our own day uphold it.

Locke tells us that self is not determined by identity or diversity of substance, but only by identity of consciousness.

land mapped out
& all modern attempts to analyse and define con-
sciousness, a terra incognita marked "the uncon-
sciano." has been mapped out. Locke tells us that
self is not determined by identity or diversity of
substance, but only by identity of consciousness.
Dr. E. von Hartmann of Berlin, who, in his
somewhat celebrated "Philosophy of the Unconscious", has undertaken
to treat the subject exhaustively, would seem to
agree with Locke, for he regards those persons
who believe belief in a double consciousness in the hu-
man subject as believing in what is equivalent
to a double personality. But is, I venture to
think, from an
imperfect acquaintance with the actual phenomena
that he draws this inference.
But the inference is not necessary arbitrary.
Those who believe in a double or even a
triple consciousness do not reckon among
their permanent
incommunicability of the different states.
On the contrary they may hold that there is a su-
preme consciousness which includes and, connects
all that is subordinate, thus reducing the mani-
fold to unity.

What are we to understand by con-
sciousness? Hartmann tells us it is not a
fixed state, but a process, a perpetual becom-
ing; that its antecedents are impenetrable to itself;
consciousness and we can only hope to resolve the
problem indirectly. This he attempts to do. He first distinguishes con-
sciousness from self-consciousness, regarding
the former as the prior of the two. Will and Intel-
lect he regards as belonging to the domain of the
Unconscious; but there is consciousness and, as understood
his philosophy, it should be comprehended, that by the
he means just what common people mean by the Infinite God. It is
Unconscious, operating on all unconscious and

functions, human, animal and vegetable is to the One absolute Subject. In other words, it is a union of Intellect and Will, which we may call God if we choose, but which to Hartmann's mind, has none of the qualities that command adoration. ¶ This unconscious power, immanent in the universe, has its phenomenal manifestation in a multitude of individuals; and consciousness first emerges through the cerebral organism of man; all hell in whose immortality, however, is a delusion. Hartmann does not claim originality for his evolution of consciousness from organism. Schelling long ago said: "It is not thought itself, but the consciousness of it, which depends on modifications of the organism."

Thus by "cerebral Consciousness" Hartmann simply means our normal Consciousness. Any other Consciousness, of which we may have experience, is in his system merely a development of the subpersonal activity of the Unconscious.

But the essence of Consciousness, he tells us, is not yet complete; to become, he and here he enters on very obscure ground — consists in breaking up the companionship between Will and Intellect. This divorce is effected by forcing upon the mind a novel perception which is not a purpose of its own volition, and therefore exists in opposition to the Will. He celebrates the birth of Consciousness in these words: "The grand revolution is now consummated; the first step is taken towards the world's enfranchisement. The Idea is emancipated from the Will: hereafter it will be able, as an independent power, to oppose itself to the Will, and to subject it to its own laws after having been hitherto its slave. The astonishment of the Will at this revolt against its authority, which up to this time has been recognized, the Sensation caused by the apparition of the Idea in the bosom of the Unconscious — that is Consciousness."

(A 123) below

Consciousness is a certain mental state;
and the Mind has no knowledge of itself apart
from that state. Were it otherwise, mind,
being at once
both subject and object, the knower and the
known, would, in taking cognizance of itself,
see itself unconscious
in both ways; which is an absurdity. Self-Consciousness is a consciousness of mental
acts and states, but not of a self
apart from them. We may ideally
the mind from
its states,
of the actual separation.

to po... ...analysis; ...extended one, ...& detailed proposals in his remar... ...ance and clairvoyance, he shows that his experience in these facts has been limited, and that his knowledge is partial. Hence he does no justice to the significance of the actual phenomena.

~~How strong, &c~~ Probably few readers will experience much of a clearing-up in their notions of Consciousness from this analysis; but, though, though epitomized, it is quite as intelligible as it could be presented in the fullness of its details. Hartmann's method is the inductive, and he proposes to found his method on observed facts; and where he has mastered the facts of a subject, his speculations are sagacious and valuable. But in his remarks on Somnambulism, the bearings of which on consciousness are most important, and Clairvoyance, he shows that his experience has been limited and his knowledge partial. Hence he does no justice to the significance of the actual phenomena. The tendency of our facts is to show that consciousness, is the necessary power of intelligence, and that if the human must be so likewise; If our purpose is to show that consciousness, is the must be of conscious intelligence, then the human conscious and so the conception of a Supreme Intelligence must be conscious. (X123) Consciousness has been said to stand in much the same relation to the mind that physical force does to the body; and to a limited extent the analogy holds good. As the least of our motions, even the act of breathing, implies a degree of physical force, so does the most trifling mental change or affection imply a degree of consciousness.

What we call unconsciousness is the suspension of all sensations and mental operations (and this remains to be proved), then consciousness must be the sign or expression of our mental activity in any of its modes. Consciousness is not a distinct faculty, as one moment active, and the next inert. It pow...

is the mind active, more or less in some part of its extended and multiplex existence. "The mind", says Dr. Thomas Brown, "is not a bundle of faculties, but a unity, capable of passing into various consecutive states." But ~~the important fact which Brown does not take into the account~~ ~~of this Dr. Brown seems to have been unaware~~, that these consecutive states may be discrete states of consciousness; it ~~was that~~ and of this great fact Brown seems to take no account. that is generally regarded as the mind's automatic activity may have been a really conscious state.

We wind up a watch, and the next minute cannot recollect that we did it. We say we must have wound it up automatically. But the fact of our not remembering is no proof of this, any more than it is of the absence of consciousness from any other mental act which we try in vain to recall.

When we are walking, ~~and~~ immersed in thought, two consciousnesses may be at work; one regulating our bodily motions, the other busy with our thinking. The fact that soldiers on a march, or persons walking for a wager, have been known to sleep while walking, does not stand in the way of our inference: a certain consciousness may accompany their acts even in sleep. A man of ordinary self-control rarely oversleeps himself when it is important that he should wake and rise three or four hours earlier than usual. What is it but consciousness that wakes him? A person stunned will pick up his hat, walk home, undress, and go to bed, though his consciousness may seem to be annihilated, and he may have no recollection of what he has done when he comes to his senses. That there was an occult consciousness regulating his "F movements" is perhaps incontrovertible.

Townshend, in his "Facts in Mesmerism", would explain the separation between the somnambulic and the ordinary consciousness by the theory that "to a mesmeric patient, the ordinary sensual consciousness is closed, – that the motives of consciousness has ceased to be introspective, – in fine that all the conditions of consciousness are unusual."

But the conditions are by no means always such as Townshend describes them, and his explanation does not cover the various facts. In an intelligent somnambulic subject the consciousness may be more introspective and analytic than in the waking state; and this in respect to the body as well as the mind; to himself as well as to another. In my own experience I have known a somnambule with wonderful acuteness to detect hidden intentions, motives, and springs of action before they had emerged to my own consciousness.

In cases of suspended consciousness we have no absolute proof that the mind, in some one of its interior states, is not still active and conscious. ~~That~~ ~~Hartmann calls~~ The normal cerebral consciousness may be stopped, but what Hartmann calls "the Unconscious" may be another consciousness in a state of activity.

The case has often been related of a woodman who, while in the act of speaking was prostrated by a blow on the head from a falling tree. He remained for months in a semi-comatose, and apparently unconscious state, but finally underwent the operation of trepanning. The minute a crushed fragment of bone was lifted, his normal consciousness returned, and he went on finishing the sentence he had begun some months before.

Sir Astley Cooper, in his Surgical Lectures, tells the case of one Jones who received an injury on his head, and remained oblivious thirteen months and a few days. The boy constantly lay on his back, and they hungry or thirst he moved his lips and tongue. At last he was trepanned, and consciousness returned. "He lived for more than one year," says Sir Astley, "drunk of the cup of Lethe, and lived wholly unconscious of existence; yet, on removing a small portion of bone which pressed upon the brain, he was restored to the full possession of the powers of his mind and body." In this and the preceding case it is taken for granted by the narrators that the apparent unconsciousness was real. But this is questionable. I have repeatedly seen a mesmerized Somnambule abruptly ~~suddenly~~ naked while performing on the piano. On being restored to the Somnambulic state, she would go on with the tune at the exact point where she had been stopped.

Epileptics have been known to finish in a new paroxysm of their complaint a sentence begun in an attack which had occurred days or weeks before.

Combe relates that an Edinburgh porter who while drunk left a package at the wrong house, could not when sober recollect where he had left it; but the minute he was drunk again he readily recalled it, and got back the package.

Thus trains of thought carried on in one state of consciousness may be interrupted by the invasion of another state, and then resumed when the former suspended state returns.

Should it be objected that the cases ~~of the~~ which I have mentioned of the restoration of ~~the normal condition~~ the "cerebral consciousness" by trephining, go to fortify Schelling's theory of the dependence of consciousness, as distinct from thought, on organism, the reply is, that there are abundant proofs of the activity of another state of consciousness, not dependent on the integrity of the brain, and which may exist while there is no sign of consciousness for even life. Some of our Clairvoyance is sometimes manifested in a state of ordinary consciousness and sometimes in a state of trance or somnambulism. We must use the term clairvoyance (clear seeing), though it, ~~is objectionable~~, inasmuch as under it are comprehended phenomena with which seeing may have nothing to do, the use is unobjectionable. But we have no better word.

According to Hartmann, clairvoyance (Hellseher) is merely a finite manifestation of the infinite prevision of the Unconscious, in which the seer and the seen are identical. But facts prove that in many states the exercise of clairvoyance is just as much an act of human consciousness as is the act of seeing by opening the eyes. ~~In neither case can~~ Our normal vision is just as much a mystery as the clairvoyant, the only difference being that the latter is more remarkable, and therefore ~~remarkable~~. The exercise of clairvoyance does not involve unconsciousness; but the subject of it may be able to give no explanation as to how it takes place.

Although for more than a century now clairvoyance has been fully admitted as an established fact by competent investigators, it is still denied, in the name of science, as "physically and physiologically impossible." A physician of New York, Dr. Geo. M. Beard, aspiring to a knowledge and infallibility far beyond what is claimed for clairvoyance itself, pronounces against it as follows: "It is capable of absolute proof that no phenomena of this kind have ever appeared in the world in any human creature in trance or out of trance."

An assertion so sweeping and despotic is not fitted to inspire confidence in the discretion of the utterer. It derives all its importance from having been repeatedly put forth in one of the leading scientific journals of America. Dr. Beard would not only rule out, by the force of an imperial *ipse dixit*, all modern supersensuous phenomena, but would have us take his word for it that it is "capable of absolute proof" that Christ never told the woman of Samaria what the Scripture narrative tells us he did; that "at no time" "in the world" has an act of clairvoyance been known "in any human creature."

The "absolute proof" by which Dr. Beard would justify this obviously indemonstrable assertion is thus summed up by himself: "No human being has any faculty different in kind from that conferred on the human race in general. ... It is established as firmly as the Copernican theory, or the law of the persistence of force, that no human creature could have any such power" (as clairvoyance) "and therefore it would be unscientific to investigate such claim."

Dr. Beard is quite as vehement in his assertion as were the gentlemen who denied the antipodes in their time. Their "deductive reasoning" settled the matter; and it is by his "deductive reasoning" that he would now settle the claims of clairvoyance. The worst of it is that things so settled do not always stay settled.

The declaration that "clairvoyance is a faculty different in kind from that conferred on the human/ over

race in general" is a wholly gratuitous assumption. No such claim is made by any one acquainted with the subject. On the contrary we have no proof whatever that potential clairvoyance is not a faculty "conferred on the human race in general," and that it may not become actual under conditions; these conditions being presented in peculiar states of the organisms, physical or psychical, the result of various causes, the full study of which is yet to be prosecuted.

Thus the whole of Dr Beard's "deductive reasoning" is the offspring of a gross misconception, a mere blunder; and his "absolute proof" is the simple equivalent of that formerly brought against the existence of the antipodes.

What if one should argue against the existence of a Mozart or a Bidder on the ground that the abnormal musical faculty of the one and the abnormal mathematical faculty of the other were "not conferred on the human race in general"? Surely there is as wide a difference between the transcendant musical aptitude of a Mozart and the incapability of the man who cannot distinguish one tune from another, as there is between the sensual vision and the clairvoyant or supersensual. Should it be objected that between these two there is a difference not simply of degree but of kind, the answer is obvious: We have no proof that the developments in Mozart and Bidder were not from the supersensuous. The latter being asked in regard to an incredibly rapid computation, "How do you do it?" could only reply, "I don't do it — I see it."

In certain forms of disease the hearing faculty of the patient may be so acute that sounds inaudible to any normal sense may be distinctly heard. The seeing faculty may be heightened or impaired. Color-blindness is a not unfrequent affection. For a man to argue against any faculty or defect of faculty because he or persons in general have not experienced it, is but a blind way of getting at the truth.

But as we cannot explain the most ordinary and simple phenomena from our idea of matter, we must either admit an immaterial substance

We must either admit an immaterial substance, or else admit that matter has properties and powers unlike those which appear, and superior to them. But the one admission is the equivalent of the other.

Speculation is thus wholly powerless in face of the stupendous problem. Spiritualism introduces facts which, though they may not establish a duality or even a unity of substance, clearly show that there may be, in the same substance, one entity, whatever we call it, a duality of degree so strongly marked as to justify the use of the distinguishing term Spirit.

"It is as rational," says Locke, "to affirm there is no body because we have no clear and distinct idea of the substance of matter, as to say there is no Spirit, because we have no clear and distinct idea of the substance of Spirit."

But other philosophers, maintaining that all knowledge is relative, and thus we can know nothing absolutely, would have us give up this idea of a substance either for matter or for Spirit. They tell us. Sir Wm Hamilton: The at the knowledge or even the

Can there be a necessity of belief without union by a thing or by something? Can there be a succession of phenomena without a cause or a ground?

Conception, of a substance in itself, and apart from any qualities in relation to, and therefore Cognizable or conceivable by, our minds, involves a contradiction; that of such we can form only a negative idea; that is, we can merely conceive it as inconceivable." And so of the notion of immateriality. Finding ~~that however subtile~~ it impossible to explain the phenomena of mind by the known and admitted properties of matter, philosophers, according to Hartley, "imagined a more and still more subtile matter, till, finding that, however subtile it were supposed it would still be matter, and thus incapable of making us comprehend the effects which they would willingly have explained, they ultimately denied the existence of all matter, thus at least arriving at a negative idea." .... ~~Hence~~ But ~~Hence~~ so long as we admit that matter is a reality we cannot admit its opposite to be a reality also; hence all the realities that we ascribe to an immaterial substance, when, for instance, we term it a simple thing, are nothing but words of the same meaning as immateriality & merely in effect nothing new is advanced."

I say - since we accept that substance is not matter, & matter is nothing? (Locke Condillac) as we are, & O'Rollin that of it, we have no idea no existence & with relation to us.

Hartley admits that, ~~to suppose per se imaterial substance, or to suppose that matter~~ it is the same possesses certain powers and properties of a nature different from and superior to those we perceive in it, is the same thing. Thus, in the argument, ~~the Materialist has no advantage whatever if there be no materialists. It is the same~~ thing whether I say, there are substances that are not material, i.e., substances which have powers and properties whereby we may explain what is not comprehensible from our ideas of matter and its powers, — or, whether I say there are properties and powers in matter which are not only of a different nature from those ordinarily admitted, but even of an opposite nature, and not to be conceived of it. Materialists and Immaterialists are here in the same dilemma.

Leibnitz escapes from it, and establishes immaterial substances as an affirmative idea by making the properties and powers themselves a substance. Dynamism, by substituting the idea of force or that of the operation of the divine will, power, to it self the substance. (?) The truly substantial does not belong to the aggregates, but to their original elements (the monads?) matter, in the vulgar sense, as something to be conceived without mind does not at all exist.

Physical dynamics teach us that it is as legitimate to regard matter a function of force, as it is to say that force is a function of matter. "There is not force without matter, and no matter without force", says Materialism. Of course, then, there must be a duality in matter; a duality corresponding to ~~to~~ mind & body in man. Science teaches us that it is quite as legitimate to regard matter as a function of force, as it is to say that force is a function of matter.

Spirituality is a mere negation of corporeity, says D'Holbach; and Fichte says: